Tientsin Electronic Instruments Plant No. 2: 1965-This plant advertises model CDOGX 65 duplicator. The machine is capable of making a print as wide as 110 centimeters and as fast as 230 meters per hour. Tientsin Radio Plant: 1966-Produces the ZF-2 model noise generator and XFC-4 UHF signal generator, 1960, produced parts for TV receivers. Tientsin Broadcasting Equipment and Materials Plant: 1969-This plant was damaged by fire on January 17, 1969. Probably three buildings were destroyed and a parts warehouse and an insulation materials warehouse were possibly damaged. Tientsin Electric Meter Plant: 1970-Plant produces AC voltage meters, DC voltage meters, three-phase watt meters, milliammeters. Tientsin Optical Precision Instruments Plant: 1965-This plant advertises model WDS-1 all-purpose monochromator, model WS-4 instrument for testing the sharpness of cutting tool edges, model WX-3 spectroscope, model WPF-2 AC electric arc generator, and model WPS-3 capacitor spark generator. Hupch Province CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA Wuhan Electronic Instruments Plant: 1966-Announced the production of the model GTC-1 ultrasonic fault detector. Kwangtung Province Canton Broadcasting Equipment Factory: 1960-Produces TV receivers. Canton Wire Communications Equipment Plant: 1960-Operation began in 1956. Produces telephone equipment. Swatow Ultrasonic Electronic Instruments Plant: 1970-Plant produces ultrasonic instrument models CTS-1, CTS-2, CTS-3, and CTS-4. Canton Adding Machine Plant: 1966–Recently produced China's first electric adding machine. This machine has 10 digits and can carry out addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and the extraction of square roots. Szechwan Province SOUTHWEST CHINA Chengtu Instruments Plant: 1965-This plant advertises mass spectra leak tester, thermo-ionic vacuum meter, ionization vacuum meter, thermo vacuum meter, and acidity meter. Shensi Province NORTHWEST CHINA Sian Instruments Plant: 1970-Construction of this plant was started in December 1957 and put into operation in 1960. Entire plant covers 80.000 square meters of floor space. Equipped with 2,700 pieces of machinery, plant primarily produces temperature, pressure, regulating, electrical, and electronic instruments. By 1965 plant employed 3,200 workers. CHINA: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, 1949-71 By ALVA LEWIS ERISMAN I. CONCLUSIONS Agricultural development policy in the People's Republic of China (PRC) may be divided into two distinct periods, distinguished by contrasting investment policies. In the first period, 1949-61, Peking tried to build up the capacity and output of the agricultural sector through the restoration and rationalization of China's traditional agricultural system-the intensive application of labor on an inelastic supply of cultivated land. Primary reliance was placed on the increased controls permitted by collectivization and on investment from within agriculture itself, such as massive use of rural manpower on projects for irrigation, drainage, and improvement of the soil. The small amount of investment from central resources went mainly to large-scale water conservation projects on the North China Plain. For the first few years, these measures were sufficient to provide China's growing population with a reasonable minimum of food and clothing although production was not large enough to provide sizable surpluses. The results fell increasingly behind the expectations of the Chinese leadership. A major disappointment was the almost complete lack of results from the large-scale projects on the North China Plain. In 1958, the regime, instead of increasing the priority of agriculture for central investment resources, chose to increase the tempo of local investment and to demand enormous increases in agricultural production forthwith. Huge supercollectives-the so-called communes-were set up to implement this frenzied Leap Forward policy. The result of this ill-advised approach to agricultural development-combined with three consecutive years of bad weather in 1959-61-was a drop in output of one quarter and severe nationwide shortages of food. In the second period, 1962-71, Peking was forced to shift to an "agriculture first" investment policy. Large and increasing amounts of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, equipment for irrigation and drainage projects, and farm machinery began to flow into the agricultural sector. Decisions on day-to-day agricultural matters were left to small production teams. The rural population was permitted to engage insideline farming, handicrafts, and trade in return for putting in a reasonable effort on the collective acreage. Finally, the locus of the main investment effort was shifted away from north to south China in a successful effort to raise yields on land that already had comparatively high yields. As a result of the turnabout in policy, total food production was rapidly restored to the pre-Leap Forward level and thereafter increased at a rate somewhat higher than the population growth rate But valuable time had been lost. Prospects through 1975 are for continued increases in agricultural production in line with population growth. At the same time, the agricultural sector is not likely to provide large new quantities of industrial raw materials and export goods. Peking's policy toward agriculture remains "agriculture first" in comparison to the lowpriority policy of the first decade; it is not "agriculture first” when compared to the continued emphasis placed on military-industry expansion. Organization of the Paper Section II of this paper provides background information in China's agricultural resources. Section III deals with the problems of agricultural development in the first decade, and section IV with the problems in the second decade. Section V describes in detail the inputs made available to agriculture in the second decade. Section VI examines the impact of the new strategy on output and the prospects for agriculture during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Two appendixes give detailed information on agricultural zones in China and a brief description of sources used in the preparation of this paper. II. BACKGROUND A Leading Agricultural Nation The PRC is one of the world's foremost agricultural nations. Because of wide variations in climate, topography, and soils practically every farm crop and type of livestock can be produced. China produces more rice, millet, sweet potatoes, sesame, and rapeseed than any other nation and ranks second or third in the production of soybeans, tobacco, wheat, and cotton. China also ranks high in animal husbandry although livestock are valued more for draft power and fertilizer than as a source of food. More hogs are grown in China than in any other country in the world. In summary, the PRC vies with the Soviet Union for second place behind the United States in the value of agricultural commodities produced. Topography, Soils, and Climate Despite China's overall eminence as an agricultural nation, natural conditions are not particularly favorable for agriculture. Unsuitable topography, soils, and climate have restricted the cultivation of crops to only 11 percent (107 million hectares) of the mainland mass.1 Most of the land that is not already in use is in marginal agricultural areas where aridity, altitude, short growing season, and other physical factors inhibit farming. More than 80 percent of the population and a similar percentage of the cultivated land are concentrated in the eastern one-third of the country. Of the land that is farmed, less than one-third is classified as fertile and slightly more than one-half is level. Thus, only a fraction of China's farmland is naturally endowed with the combination of smooth topography, fertile soil, and favorable climate necessary for high crop yields. 1 By comparison, almost 157 million hectares, or about 20 percent of the land area of the continental United States is under cultivation. In China, however, the intensive use of land through multiple cropping permits the sown area to exceed the basic cultivated area by more than 40 percent. In contrast, about one-third of the cultivated land in the United States normally lies fallow. In all, the total area sown to crops in China exceeds that of the United States by about one-third. Most of the western two-thirds of China is ruled out for agricultural purposes by extremely rugged mountain terrain and extensive desert areas. Even in the agricultural eastern third, because of fluctuations. in atmospheric pressure, and in the pattern of dry northerly and moist southerly air currents, rainfall varies widely and unpredictably from region to region and from year to year (see fig. 1). Depending on the season of the year, irrigation is useful in all regions even when precipitation is normal and is mandatory for preventing crop failure in periods of drought. At the same time, about one-fourth of China's farmland is subject to flooding and waterlogging, and losses from too much water are almost as great as losses from too little water. Floods and drought have occurred more often and have caused greater loss of crops, property, and lives in China than in any other part of the world. Natural divisions of climate and topography separate China's easttern agricultural area into two broad segments-north and south China-with the break occurring at roughly the Huai River. The river (a) marks an abrupt transition between the leached, acidic, non-calcareous soils of the south and the generally calcareous, alkaline soils of the north; (b) constitutes the northern limit for the harvesting of two crops in 1 year from the same plot of ground; (c) separates the high precipitation regime of the south from the low, highly seasonal, and uncertain precipitation regime of the north; and (d) separates an agriculture based on paddy rice in the south from that based on the cultivation of dry land crops, especially coarse grains and wheat, in the north. In addition to the major crops, a large variety of other crops is grown in each of the two broad areas. Furthermore, some wheat and coarse grains are grown as secondary crops in every province south of the Huai River and a small amount of rice is grown in every province to the north. 2 Paddy land refers to fields enclosed by dikes that are capable of holding standing water (flooded) and are almost always used for the cultivation of rice. Dry fields are not diked, are unable to hold standing water, and may or may not be irrigated. |