show cause why an order should not be entered requiring it to cease and desist from the violation of law charged in the complaint. This provision of the statute must comprehend a hearing judicial in its nature with all the attendant requirements of due process. Intervention by any person or corporation is expressly permitted upon cause shown. Obviously, where the principal issue is the lessening or restraint of competition or the effect of improper competition, there must always be other parties interested in the issue than the particular defendant or defendants to the Commission's or Board's complaint. The testimony must be reduced to writing and filed in the office of the Commission or Board and if it is of opinion the law has been violated it shall make a report in writing stating its findings as to the facts, which findings are conclusive, if supported by evidence, in the Court reviewing the Commission's or Board's orders.

If a violation of law is found on such hearing, section 5 of the Trade Commission law provides that an order shall be entered requiring the defendant to "cease and desist from using such method of competition.' It is to be observed that the Commission is not given definite authority to determine the time or manner in which the order is to be carried out. Section 11 of the Clayton law provides that if on the hearing violations are found an order shall be entered requiring the defendant to "cease and desist from such violations and divest itself of the stock held or rid itself of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of this act, if any there be, in the manner and within the time fixed by said order." It is thus seen that there is a difference as to the kind of order comprehended by the two sections. However, in actual practice the functions of the Commis

sion, because its power is essentially judicial under both sections, will probably be exercised to about the same extent in one case as in the other.

The Commission or Board has the power upon such notice and in such manner as it may deem proper either under section 5 or section 11, to modify or set aside in whole or in part any report or order issued under either of the sections, until a transcript of the record before the Commission or Board shall have been filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States. The filing of such record, together with a petition by the Commission or Board or bill for relief by a party to the Commission's or Board's order, is the beginning of proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States to enforce or review such order. If the defendant in proceedings before the Commission or Board fails or neglects to obey its order while in effect, the Commission or Board is given the power to apply to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the enforcement of its order and is required to certify and file a transcript of the entire record, including all the testimony taken and its report and order. The Court shall thereupon cause notice to be served upon the defendant and shall have jurisdiction of the proceedings and power to make and enter on the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth in such transcript a decree "affirming, modifying or setting aside the order." This provision is the same in both sections. Obviously, the Circuit Court of Appeals is expressly permitted to place itself in the position of a reviewing Commission or Board and is authorized to act in exactly the same way as the Commission or Board, although to act only upon the proceedings before the Commission or Board. This definition of the authority of the Circuit Court of Appeals therefore must mean that

the Commission or Board under either section shall exercise an essentially judicial function, because it would be unconstitutional to delegate to the Circuit Court of Appeals authority other than judicial in its nature."

The findings of the Commission or Board as to the facts, if supported by the testimony, shall be conclusive. Upon cause shown to the Court it may order the taking of additional evidence but such evidence must be taken before the Commission or Board and be brought before the Court in such manner as the Court may provide. The Commission or Board is authorized to modify its findings or make new findings by reason of the additional evidence and to file such modified or new findings which, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive. The Commission or Board is also authorized to recommend the modification or setting aside of its original order upon the return of such additional evidence, if it shall see fit. These provisions probably mean that no testimony can be taken in the Circuit Court of Appeals in a proceeding to review orders entered under either of these sections. It is probable the Court may hear evidence to determine whether or not proper cause exists for the taking of additional testimony before the Commission or Board.

Any defendant subject to an order entered under either of these sections may obtain a review in the Circuit Court of Appeals by filing a written petition praying that the order be set aside, and copy of the petition shall be forthwith served upon the Commission or Board which is thereupon required to serve and file in the Court a transcript of the record in the same way as if the Commission or Board itself were

7.-Note to Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409; United States vs. Yale Todd, 13 Howard 52, note.

the petitioning party. The jurisdiction of the Court to review the Commission's or Board's order upon such application is the same as in suits instituted by the Commission or Board seeking enforcement of its order. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce, set aside or modify orders of the Commission or Board entered under either of these two sections is exclusive and review of the judgments of the Court may be obtained in the Supreme Court upon certiorari as provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code. It is to be noted that both statutes would make such review applicable only to judgments entered by the Circuit Court of Appeals in suits instituted therein by the Commission or Board, and that review in the Supreme Court would seem not to be authorized in cases instituted in the Circuit Court of Appeals by a party seeking to set aside an order of the Commission or Board. It is true, however, that review could be obtained by certiorari under the Judicial Code without express authority in these sections, unless the law be interpreted to mean that Congress intended that the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be final in cases instituted therein by corporations or persons.

Both sections provide that proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals shall be given precedence and in every way expedited, and also provide that no order of the Commission or Board, or judgment of the Court to enforce the same "shall in any wise relieve or absolve any person, partnership or corporation from any liability under the Anti-trust acts." This provision is found in both sections.

Both sections provide the manner in which service of orders or other processes of the Commission or Board may be made, either (a) by delivering copy to the defendant or member of the partnership, if such,

or the president, secretary or other executive officer or director of a corporation; (b) by leaving copy at the principal office or place of business of any partnership or corporation; or (c) by sending a copy by registered mail to such principal office. Verified return by the person serving or leaving the same, or the registered postoffice receipt shall be proof of such service.

BANKS.

We have discussed substantially all of the provisions of the laws concerning banks under the heading "Inhibitions of the Clayton law." General provisions concerning the power of the Federal Reserve Board to enforce compliance with the Trade Commission and Clayton laws are also discussed under the heading "Commission Procedure," etc. However, we think it proper briefly to repeat here that the prohibitions of sections 2 and 3 against price discrimination and tying clause contracts do not apply to the normal operations of banks, and that the only provisions of the Clayton law which specifically apply to banks are those against unlawful stock ownership and interlocking directors, officers or employees.

It is to be noted that the provisions against interlocking apply to a national bank as one party in each case, which indicates that Congress had in mind in making these enactments not only its powers under the commerce clause of the constitution 8 but also its powers to establish and regulate national banks.

While unfair methods of competition are declared unlawful without limitation as to persons or corpora

8.-Are banks engaged in commerce? See Nathan vs. Louisiana, 8 Howard 73; New York Life Insurance Company vs. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495.