comprehending Unity," an Absolute Ego, in whose self-determination all the Non-Ego is determined."

Fichte has been accused of teaching a system of mere Egoism, of elevating the subjective personality of man into the place of God. No one who is acquainted with any of his later writings can fail to see the falsity of this charge, but as it has been alleged that in these works he abandoned the principles which he advocated in earlier life, it may not be unimportant to show that the charge is utterly groundless, and inapplicable even to the very first outlines of his philosophical theory. The following passages occur in a letter to Jacobi, dated 30th August 1795, when transmitting to him a copy of the first edition of the Wissenschaftslehre, and seem to be quite conclusive as to the fact that the Absolute Ego of his earlier teaching may be scientifically, as well as morally, identified with the highest results of his later doctrines.

Fichte to Jacobi.

"I have read your writings again this summer during the leisure of a charming country residence,read them again and again, and I am everywhere, but especially in "Allwill," astonished at the striking similarity of our philosophical convictions. The public will scarcely believe in this similarity, and perhaps you yourself may not readily do so, for in that case it would be required of you to deduce the details of a whole system from the uncertain outlines of an introduction. You are indeed well known to be a Realist, and I to be a transcendental Idealist more severe than even Kant himself;-for with him there is still recognised a multiform object of experience, whilst I maintain, in

9

plain language, that this object is itself produced by us through our own creative power. Permit me to come to an understanding with you on this point.

"My Absolute Ego is obviously not the Individual; -although this has been maintained by offended courtiers and chagrined philosophers, in order to impute to me the scandalous doctrine of practical Egoism. But the Individual must be deduced from the Absolute Ego. Thus the Wissenschaftslehre enters at once into the domain of natural right. A finite being as may be shown by deduction can only conceive of itself as a sensuous existence in a sphere of sensuous existences, over one portion of which-(a portion which can have no beginning)—it exercises causality, and with another portion of which—(a portion to which we ascribe the notion of causality), -it stands in relations of reciprocal influence;-and in so far it is called an Individual: (the conditions of Individuality are Rights.) So surely as it affirms itself as an Individual, so surely does it affirm such a sphere; for both are reciprocal notions. When we regard ourselves as Individuals-in which case we always look upon ourselves as living, and not as philosophizing or poetizing,—we take our stand upon that point of view which I call practical;-that of the Absolute Ego being speculative. Henceforward, from this practical point of view there is a world for us, independent of ourselves, which we can only modify; and thus too the Pure Ego, which does not disappear from this region, is necessarily placed without us, objectified, and called God. How could we otherwise have arrived at the qualities which we ascribe to God, and deny to ourselves, had we not first discovered them in ourselves,

and only denied them to ourselves in one particular respect—i. e. as Individuals? This practical point of view is the domain of Realism; by the deduction and recognition of this point from the side of speculation itself arises that complete reconciliation of philosophy with the Common Sense of man, which is promised in the Wissenschaftslehre.

"To what end, then, is the speculative point of view, and with it all philosophy, if it belong not to life? Had humanity never tasted of this forbidden fruit, it might indeed have done without philosophy. But there is implanted within us a desire to gaze upon this region which transcends all individuality, not by a mere reflected light, but in direct and immediate vision; and the first man who raised a question concerning the existence of God, broke through the restrictive limits, shook humanity to its deepest foundations, and set it in a controversy with itself which is not yet adjusted, and which can only be adjusted by a bold advance to that highest region of thought from which the speculative and practical points of view are seen to be united. We begin to philosophize from presumption, and thus become bankrupt of our innocence; we see our nakedness, and then philosophize from necessity for our redemption.

"But do I not philosophize as confidently with you, and write as openly, as if I were already assured of your interest in my philosophy? Indeed my heart tells me that I do not deceive myself in assuming the existence of this interest.

"Allwill gives the transcendental Idealists the hope of an enduring peace and even of a kind of alliance, if they will but content themselves with finding their

own limits, and making these secure. I believe that I have now fulfilled this condition. If I have moreover, from this supposed hostile land, guaranteed and secured to Realism itself its own proper domain, then I may lay claim not merely to a kind of alliance, but to an alliance of the completest kind.”

Still more decisive on this point is the following passage from a review of Schulz's "Enesidemus," in the Literatur Zeitung for 1794:

"In the Pure Ego, Reason is not practical, neither is it so in the Ego as Intelligence; it only becomes so by the effort of these to unite. That this principle must lie at the root of Kant's doctrine itself, although he has nowhere distinctly declared it;-further, how a practical philosophy arises through the representation of this hyper-physical effort by the intelligent Ego to itself, in its progressive ascent through the various steps which man must traverse in theoretical philosophy, this is not the place to show. Such an union,— an Ego in whose Self-determination all the Non-Ego is determined (the Idea of God)—is the highest object of this effort. Such an effort, when the intelligent Ego conceives this object as something external to itself, is faith:-(Faith in God.) This effort can never cease, until after the attainment of its object; that is, Intelligence cannot regard as the last any moment of its existence in which this object has not yet been attained,- (Faith in an eternal existence.) In these ideas, however, there is nothing possible for us but Faith;-i. e. Intelligence has here no empirical perception for its object, but only the necessary effort of the Ego; and throughout all Eternity nothing more

than this can become possible. But this faith is by no means a mere probable opinion; on the contrary, it possesses, at least according to the testimony of our inmost convictions, the same degree of certainty with the immediately certain postulate I am,'-a certainty infinitely superior to all objective certainty, which can only become possible mediately, through the existence of the intelligent Ego. Enesidemus indeed demands an objective proof for the existence of God and the Immortality of the soul. What can he mean by this? Or does objective certainty appear to him superior to subjective certainty? The axiom-I am myself' —possesses only subjective certainty; and so far as we can conceive of the self-consciousness of God, even God is subjective so far as regards himself. And then, as to an objective existence of Immortality! (these are Ænesidemus' own words),—should any being whatever, contemplating its existence in time, declare at any moment of that existence- Now, I am eternal!'-then, on that very account, it could not be eternal."

We have seen that the attitude of the finite Ego towards the Non-Ego is practical; towards the Infinite Ego, speculative. In the first relation we find ourselves surrounded by existences, over one part of which we exercise causality, and with the other (in whom we suppose an independent causality) we are in a state of reciprocal influence. In these relations the active and moral powers of man find their sphere. The moral law imparts to its objects-to all things whose existence is implied in its fulfilment-the same certainty which belongs to itself. The outward world assumes