"necessaries." An infant being, however, still, as formerly, liable The meaning for necessaries, it is important to properly understand of the term the meaning of that term. It must follow, as a matter of course, that it will include all things essential for existence, and without which a person cannot reasonably be supposed to live, e.g. ordinary food and clothing; but it has a much wider application than this, and many things not actually essential to existence are included under it. The rule as to what will be deemed necessaries has been stated as follows: "All such articles as are purely ornamental are not necessary, and are to be rejected, because they cannot be requisite for any one; and for such matters, therefore, an infant cannot be held responsible. But if they are not strictly of this description, then the question arises whether they were bought for the necessary use of the party, in order to maintain himself properly in the degree, state, and station of life in which he moved; if they were, for such articles the infant may be responsible" (q). To take an instance to exemplify this rule, it has Instance. been held that an infant is liable for the price of horses bought by him if his position warranted his keeping horses, or if riding was recommended by his medical adviser (). To enumerate all the different cases in which things have or have not been held to be necessaries would be useless, and the answer to the question of what are necessaries for which an infant will be liable, to be collected from all the cases, may be shortly stated to be, that he will be liable, not merely for the bare essentials of life, but also for education, and generally for anything suitable to his rank and condition in life, and it will always be a question for the jury whether an infant is liable or not in every parti (9) Per Parke, B., in Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 47; cited in Broom's Coms. 573, 574. See also as to meaning of term "necessaries," Skrine v. Gordon, 9 Irish Reps. C. L. 479. (r) Hart v. Prater, 1 Jur. 623. An infant is necessaries if Nor is the parent necessarily liable. cular case (s). And if an infant has a wife or children, he will be liable for necessaries supplied to her or them (t). The statement that an infant is absolutely liable for not liable for necessaries must, however, be taken with the following residing under restriction, viz., that if an infant is residing under the the parental roof. parental roof, he cannot generally be made responsible even for necessaries, for in such a case the presumption is that the credit is intended to be given to the parent, and not to the infant (u). It must not, however, from this, be taken as law, that in such a case the parent is necessarily liable for such things supplied to his child living with him, for he is not so liable, as a matter of course, it being always necessary, to render the parent liable, to show that he in some way, either by a precedent act or a subsequent ratification, authorized his child to contract and to bind him; for if he has in no way given any authority, he is no more liable to pay a debt contracted by his child, even for necessaries, than a stranger would be. But slight evidence of the parent's authority will usually be sufficient, so that, if goods are delivered at the parent's residence, this will primâ facie raise a presumption of his liability (x): though, if, directly he heard of the goods or saw them, he objected to them, this would operate to rebut that liability. Infant not liable for money lent unless ad For money lênt to an infant not for the purposes of buying necessaries he is of course not liable, but if vanced to buy money is advanced to him to procure necessaries, and is so expended by him, the court may order repayment to the lender, on the ground that he stands in the place. of the infant's creditor, who could have recovered necessaries. (s) See hereon, Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Ex. 32 ; and also Chitty on Contracts, 141, 145. (t) Turner v. Trisby, 1 Str. 168; Chitty on Contracts, 142. (x) Ibid. he has repre to be of age. against him had his claim not been satisfied (y). The Nor is he liable mere fact of a person having fraudulently represented merely because himself to be of age when in fact he was an infant sented himself will not be sufficient to render him liable. Thus where an infant had obtained a lease of a furnished house on an implied representation that he was of full age, it was held that although the lease must be declared void and possession ordered to be delivered up, yet the infant was not liable for use and occupation (2). liable on a An infant is not liable on a bill of exchange or pro- Infant not missory note to which he is a party, although it was bill or note, given for necessaries (a); but such a bill is good as though for against the other parties thereto (b). He could, however, be sued on the original debt for necessaries. necessaries. privilege. Infancy is a personal privilege, and does not affect Infancy is a personal the other contracting person's liability, so that though an infant is not liable generally to be sued on his contracts, he is capable of suing, which forms one exception to the rule that mutuality is necessary to the contract (c). A infant cannot, however, sue for specific performance of a contract (d), and with regard also to an infant's agreement to buy land it appears that the Infant's agree Infants' Relief Act does not apply, and that such a contract is voidable by the infant, and on his attaining his majority he may either avoid or affirm it as he thinks. proper, and if he dies under age his representatives have the like privilege. If, however, an infant contracts for the purchase of an estate and pays a deposit, and afterwards on his attaining twenty-one refuses to complete the purchase, he cannot recover back his deposit, unless ment to buy land. (y) Martin v. Gale, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 428; 46 L. J. Ch. 84; Bateman v. Kingston, 6 L. R. Ir. 328. (2) Lemprière v. Lange, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 675. See also Bateman v. Kingston, 6 L. R. Ir. 328. (a) Chitty on Contracts, 145. (b) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 22 (2). (c) Chitty on Contracts, 154. (d) Bateman v. Kingston, supra. Infant not takes place it II. Married women. 1. As to their contracts made before marriage. indeed the vendor practised fraud in procuring its payment, when he can (e). An infant's contract to marry stands on the same footing as any ordinary contract he enters into, i.e. the infant is not liable on it, but can sue in respect of it. But if the infant actually completes the contract by going through the marriage ceremony in the manner prescribed by law, then if a male and of the age of fourteen or upwards, or a female and of the age of twelve or upwards, it is absolutely binding; or if under those ages but not under the age of seven, then he or she may avoid the marriage on arriving at such ages respectively, but if either party is under the age of seven then the marriage is absolutely void. The position of married women as to their contracts may be conveniently considered in the following order : I. As to their contracts made before marriage. 2. As to their contracts made after marriage, and during cohabitation; and 3. As to their contracts made after marriage and during separation. Firstly, then, as to contracts made before marriage, and here it is apparent that there may be a benefit or a liability in respect of them, and any such benefit being an outstanding right is a chose in action. The effect of marriage upon personal property in possession has until lately been that it operates as an absolute gift. sonal property. of it in law to the husband, so that from that time it is no longer her property, but his in every way (ƒ); but Rights of husband in wife's per (e) Prideaux's Conveyancing, vol. 1, 185. with regard to mere choses in action this has never been so, for to entitle the husband to them, he must reduce them into possession, and if he does this then they form part of his estate in the same way as choses in possession; but if he does not reduce them into possession, and his wife dies, he will not then be entitled to them jure mariti (that is, in his capacity of husband), but only by taking out letters of administration to his wife, and thus constituting himself her legal personal representative, which makes a very great difference, for if he takes jure mariti he is not bound to pay her debts which may possibly exist. If the wife survives the husband, then her choses in action not having been reduced into possession survive and belong to her. To constitute a sufficent reduction into What is a possession by the husband it is technically said that he reduction into must take some step showing his disagreement to, and possession. extinguishing, the interest of his wife, e.g. of course the actually receiving the principal money will always so operate, though not the mere receipt of interest, and, again, the recovery of judgment in an action brought by husband and wife will be sufficient (g). sufficient Women's With regard, however, to all marriages on or after 1st Married January 1883, it is now provided that all property Property Act, which she is then possessed of, as well as property she 1882. shall thereafter acquire, shall be to her separate use (h). This is also to be the case as regards any property acquired on or after 1st January 1883 by any married woman whenever married (i). husband on As to the liability of the husband, at common law Liability of the rule was absolute that he was liable for all his wife's contracts wife's contracts and debts entered into and contracted made before marriage. (g) See hereon, Chitty on Contracts, 152-154. The subject of married women's property and the position of married women as to separate estate, &c., belongs to conveyancing and equity, and the student is referred to Williams on Real Property, and Snell's Principles of Equity, and to the Married Women's Property Acts, 1870 and 1882. (h) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 2. (i) Sect. 5. |