A private person is justified in arresting another in suspecting that a felony has been committed, and also reasonable ground to suspect that the person he arrests is the committer of the felony (q). If a person makes a reasonable charge of felony against another, a constable is justified in arresting such alleged culprit and is not liable to any action for false imprisonment for so doing, though the person making the complaint and requiring the arrest may be so liable (r). The following are also specific cases in which a constable is justified in arresting without warrant: Where an assault is committed in his presence, or to prevent a breach of the peace (s); where a person is found committing malicious injury to property (t); where a person is found committing an indictable offence in the night between the hours of nine P.M. and six A.M. (u); where a person is found collecting a crowd round another's house, or continually ringing another's bell, because such acts are likely to lead to a breach of the peace (x). A private person may also in some few cases arrest another, and not be liable to any action for false imprisonment. Particularly he may do so if he sees a some few cases, felony committed, or if a felony has been actually com as when he sees a felony committed, mitted and he has just and reasonable cause for suspecting the person he arrests to be guilty of it. There is, however, a great distinction between an arrest without warrant in respect of a felony, by a constable and by a private individual, for "in order to justify the private individual in causing the imprisonment, he must not only make out a reasonable ground for suspicion, but he must prove that a felony has actually been committed by some person or another, and that the circumstances were such that any reasonable person acting without (9) He may not, however, arrest without warrant merely on suspicion of a misdemeanour. (r) Broom's Coms. 729, 730. passion or prejudice would have fairly suspected that the plaintiff had committed it, or was implicated in it; whereas a constable, having reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony has been committed, although in fact none has been, is authorized to detain the person suspected until he can be brought before a justice of the peace to have his conduct investigated (y). a continuance Special powers brokers as to A private person may also arrest another actually Or to prevent fighting in the streets, to prevent the continuance of a of a breach of breach of the peace (2). And if a pawnbroker to whom the peace. any property is offered has reasonable ground for be- of pawnlieving that an offence has been committed in respect arrest. of it, he is justified in arresting the person offering such property, and taking him and the property before a justice of the peace (a). Thirdly. In civil cases persons are sometimes liable Detention in to be arrested and imprisoned. civil cases. court. Imprisonment by reason of contempt of court may Contempt of be ranged under this head, although of course it may equally occur in criminal cases. Contempt of court consists in any refusal to obey an order or process of a court of competent jurisdiction, or in offending against particular statutes which render such offending a contempt of court, or in interfering with or violating. established rules of court, or in behaving in a disrespectful or improper manner towards the court or any judge or officer thereof (b). Instances of contempt are easy to find, e.g. non-obedience to a judgment for specific performance, or an injunction granted by the High Court of Justice, or the interfering, by marrying or otherwise, with a ward of the court, or by threaten (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 103. (b) Brown's Law Dict. 120. See also Reg. v. Castro, L. R. 9 Q. B. Six cases of ing a witness, so as to prevent him giving, or to intimidate him in giving, his evidence, or disrespectful behaviour to the court, or commenting in a newspaper article on a case then pending (c). Imprisonment for debt is said to be abolished (d), but nevertheless it may occur in various cases. The Act upon this subject is the Debtors' Act, 1869 (e), which enacts that, with the exceptions thereinafter mentioned, no person shall after the commencement of the Act (ƒ) be arrested or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money (g). The exceptions are as follows: 1. Default in payment of a penalty, or sum in the special excep- nature of a penalty, other than a penalty in respect of tions. any contract. 2. Default in payment of any sum recoverable summarily before a justice or justices of the peace. 3. Default by a trustee or person acting in a fiduciary capacity (h), and ordered to pay by a Court of Equity any sum in his possession or under his control. 4. Default by a solicitor in payment of costs when ordered to pay costs for misconduct as such, or in payment of a sum of money when ordered to pay the same in his character of an officer of the court making the order. (c) See hereon, Snell's Principles of Equity. (d) See the title of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, "An Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt," &c. (e) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62. (f) 1 January, 1870. (g) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 4. () As to who is a trustee or a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, see Morris v. Ingram, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 338; 49 L. J. Ch. 123; 28 W. 434; In re Diamond Fuel Co., Metcalf's Case, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 815; 49 L. J. Ch. 347; 28 W. R. 435. 5. Default in payment for the benefit of creditors of any portion of a salary or other income in respect of the payment of which any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy is authorized to make an order. 6. Default in payment of sums in respect of the payment of which orders are in this act authorized to be made (i). It is provided, however, that in all or In which, however, the any of these excepted cases no person shall be im- imprisonment prisoned for a longer time than one year, and nothing is not to be in the section is to alter the effect of any judgment or order of any court for payment of money, except as regards the arrest and imprisonment of the person making default in paying such money (k). With regard, however, to the exceptions above numbered 3 and 4, it is now provided by the Debtors Act, 1878, that the Court or judge may inquire into the circumstances of the case, and is to have a discretionary power as to imprisoning (). And it has been held that under this provision the court will refuse to grant an application for a writ of attachment against a defaulting trustee, where owing to the defaulter being wholly without means, no useful object would be gained thereby (m). for beyond one year. commit to In addition to the foregoing cases, the same act also Also power to provides that any person making default in payment of prison for six any debt, or instalment of any debt, due from him in weeks on proof pursuance of any order or judgment, may be committed to prison for a term not exceeding six weeks, on its of means. (i) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 4. (k) However, a person who makes default in payment of a sum of money which he has been ordered by the Court to pay cannot be attached for contempt, but must be proceeded against under sect. 5, as to which see post, p. 338. Esdaile v. Visser, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 421; 28 W. R. 281; 41 L. T. 745. (?) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 54. This act came into operation on its passing 13th August 1878. (m) Re Mackenzie, 44 L. T. 618. Y Conditional order for committal not good. When a defen dant in a civil arrested. being proved that he has or has had since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay the same (n). The application to commit to prison under this provision is made by a summons called a judgment summons, and in the superior courts is made to a judge in chambers. In an inferior court, it must be made in open court before the judge or his deputy (0). No conditional order for committal to prison at a future day can be made under any circumstances; not even by consent. Every committal order must be absolute and present in its terms, but the issue of the order may be restrained for a certain time for the purpose of giving a locus pœnitentiæ to the defaulting party (p). The Debtors Act, 1869, also contains an enactment action may be as to the arrest of a defendant in a case totally distinct and apart from imprisonment for debt, it being provided (q) that where the plaintiff in any action in any of her Majesty's superior courts of law proves at any time before final judgment by evidence on oath to the satisfaction of a judge of one of those courts that (1) the plaintiff has good cause of action against the defendant to the amount of £50 or upwards, (2) that there is probable cause for believing that the defendant is about to quit England unless he is apprehended, and (3) that the absence of the defendant from England will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action (r), the judge may order such defendant to be arrested and imprisoned for a period not ex (n) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 5. (0) Ibid. (p) The above order was made by notice dated 12 December 1881. (9) Sect. 6. (r) This being a matter very difficult to prove, orders for the arrest of a defendant under this section are not at all frequently granted. |