and conspiring to quit with or without notice the service of the receivers with the object and intent of crippling the property in their custody or embarrassing the operation of the railroad.

This case was not based upon either the Interstate Commerce Act or the Anti-Trust Act, but, as the court said, upon the general principles which controlled the exercise of jurisdiction by courts of equity.

1 § 87. The right of labor organization includes the right of representatation. The right of organization into unions or brotherhoods by the employees of interstate railroads is recognized both by the federal statutes and by the courts, and this right carries with it the recognition of the right of "collective bargaining" by employees through their organizations in the betterment of their own conditions of service. Incidental to this right thus recognized is the right of representation of employees by their own officials selected by them in the presentation of their demands for the betterment of their conditions of service. A distinction is properly made between such represenatives of employees who seek the redress of the grievances of those represented by them, and the status of those not connected with employees who seek to induce them to break their contracts of employment for other purposes than their own betterment.2 This right of representation was directly involved in the recent case decided by Judge Adams in the eastern district of Missouri. In this case an injunction was sought by the railroad company against the officials of the railroad brotherhoods of trainmen and firemen enjoining them from calling a strike on an interstate railroad on the ground, among others, that these officials were not employees of the railroad, and that their action in calling a strike would be a direct interference with interstate commerce. The court found from the evidence that there was an existing dispute about the conditions of employment and that the officers of the brotherhood had been directed by the employees on the road to call a strike and therefore held that the employees had a right to act by their representatives, and the injunction was dissolved. 1 See National statute of arbitration, supra.

2 Thomas v. C., N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803. supra; see also

charge of Judge Grosscup to grand jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 828.

3 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hannahan et al, 121 Fed. Rep. 563.

§ 88. Injunctions in interstate commerce. In a progressive industrial civilization preventive remedies are frequently the only adequate remedies when business or property rights are invaded, particularly when there is any question as to the pecuniary responsibility of the parties charged with the wrong. This is the case with labor disturbances which involve a direct interruption of business and damages, which are in the nature of things irreparable, because they cannot be accurately ascer tained, even if the defendants were responsible. Where the public interest intervenes, as in the case of interstate commerce, where the traffic must continue to be moved and the cars continue to run, some form of preventive relief, usually that of injunction, is ordinarily the only available remedy.

The influence upon our jurisprudence of the ancient historic jealousy of courts of chancery is illustrated in the contention that where the trespasses or other wrongs to business or other property involve a violation of criminal law, there is no jurisdiction in equity to enjoin the commission of the acts. This contention is obviously unsound. The injunction restrains not the crime, but the irreparable injury to property. The question was definitely settled by the Supreme Court in the Debs case, where the Court held that while a chancellor had no criminal jurisdiction, and something more than the threatened commission of an offense against the laws of the land was necessary to call into exercise the injunctive power of the court, that when interference with property, actual or threatened, appeared, the jurisdiction of the court of equity arises, and is not destroyed by the fact that the interferences are accompanied by or are themselves a violation of the criminal law. The jurisdiction of the civil court is invoked, not to

1 The use of preventive remedies seems more firmly established in the English courts than in our own. The distinction between the powers of courts of law and courts of equity has there now only historical interest. All divisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature have jurisdiction to grant injunctions when it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such shall be made (sub. sec. 8, sec. 25, Judicature Act, 1873), and to award damages in

addition to or in substitution for such injunction.

On the general subject of the modern use of injunctions, see F. J. Stimson in Political Science Quarterly. June, 1895; Charles Claflin Allen at American Bar Association, 1894; Hon. Wm. H. Taft, then cir cuit judge, in defense of the federal judiciary, American Bar Associa tion, 1895.

2158 U. S. 1. c. p. 593, 39 L. Ed. 1106. supra,

enforce the criminal law and to punish the wrong-doer, but to compensate the injured party for the damages which he or they have suffered, and it is no defense to the civil action that the same act by defendant exposes him also to indictment and punishment in a court of criminal jurisdiction. In this case the injunction was sought by the government itself, and it is obvious that the right of any other litigant to preventive relief in the case of threatened irreparable injury to property by criminal trespasses would be also available.

The same remedy of injunction was invoked by the government against the railroads of the country in the proceedings under the Anti-Trust Act,' and also against combinations of capitalists under the same statute. In a very recent opinion. in the Beef Trust case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the circuit court of Illinois enjoining the defendants in a suit by the United States against certain specific acts in restraint of competition in interstate commerce.

3

In this latter case however the Court directed a modification of the injunction by striking out the general words "or by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain commerce as aforesaid," saying that the defendants ought to be informed as accurately as the case permitted what they were forbidden to do. The court said that while it was bound to enforce the act, it was also bound by the first principles of justice not to sanction a decree so vague as to put the whole conduct of defendants' business at the peril of a summons for contempt, and that it could not issue a general injunction against all possible breaches of the law.

There has been considerable discussion in the courts and also in the committees of Congress as to the scope of injunctions rendered in trade disputes. Thus, in the Debs case the injunction order included all persons whatsoever, not named therein, from and after the time when they shall severally have notice of such order. The question as to the scope of the order was not definitely determined, as the order was issued and served upon the defendant, so that this feature of 1 See United States v. Trans-Mis- ities Co., supra; Swift v. United souri Freight Association; United States (Jan. 30, 1905). States v. Joint Traffic Association, and United States v. Northern Secur

2 See Anti-Trust Law, infra.

3 Swift v. United States, 196 U. S.

the order was not discussed in the Supreme Court, although the power of the court under such an order was sustained in the circuit court.1

Persons who are in privity with the defendant as agents, servants or employees are to be distinguished from independent tort-feasors who are not shown to be in any wise allied with the defendants. The Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in the case of In re Lennon, saying that it was sufficient that he had actual notice, although he was not a party to the suit, nor served with process; in that case however Lennon was an employe of the defendant, which had been enjoined from refusing to interchange traffic with the complainant, and he was shown, with full knowledge of the injunction, to have refused to obey it.

Other questions have been raised as to the proper scope of injunctions in trade disputes, particularly with reference to the conduct of striking employees, but these have been in cases, where the jurisdiction of the federal courts was based on diverse citizenship as in mining and other local industries where interstate commerce was in no wise involved.*

1 Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746; In re Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724. As to the jurisdiction of the courts in issuing injunctions under the Interstate Commerce Act, see sec. 8, infra; and as to the AntiTrust Act and the procedure thereunder, see Anti-Trust Act, infra, 314.

2 In re Reese, 98 Fed. Rep. 984, 47 C. C. A. 87, and 107 Fed. Rep. 942.

3 166 U. S. 548, 41 L. Ed. 1110, supra. 4 See § 80, supra; see also discussion before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives of the 58th Congress. The agitation over the increased use of injunctions in trade disputes and the application of the law of conspiracy in the trial of contempts has been extensively discussed in congress in connection with the so-called Anti

Conspiracy and Anti-Injunction Bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" in the use of restrain

ing words and orders in certain cases, which has been introduced in several successive congresses, but has not been enacted into law. The proposed act is as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no agreement, combination or contract by or between two or more persons to do or procure to be done, or not to do or contemplation or furtherance of any procure not to be done, any act in trade dispute between employers and employees in the District of Columbia or in any territory of the United States, or between employers and employees who may be engaged in trade or commerce between the several states, or between any territory and another, or between any territory or territories and any state or states or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any shall be deemed criminal, nor shall state or states or foreign nations those engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crim

§ 89. Contempt in United States courts. A contempt proceeding, said the Supreme Court in a recent case,' is criminal in its nature in that the party is charged with doing some

of conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime, nor shall such agree ment, combination, or contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commerce, nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto. Nothing in this act shail exempt from punishment, otherwise than as herein excepted, any persons guilty of conspiracy for which punishment is now provided by any act of congress, but such act of congress shall, as to the agree ments, combinations, and contracts herein before referred to, be construed as if this act were therein contained.

This bill was favorably reported by a majority of the house judiciary committee of the 57th congress. The committee said in their report that no evil would come of the act as interference with the mails was a statutory crime, and that it would not legalize acts directly interfering with interstate commerce. The minority of the committee contended that the bill was ambiguous, and recommended two amendments, by striking out the words "nor shall such agreement. combination, or contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commerce," and also by adding to the bill these words: "provided that the provision of this act shall not apply to threats to injure the person or property, business or occupation of any person, firm, association or corporation, to intimidation or coercion, or to any acts causing, or tending to cause, illegal interference by overtacts with the rights of others."

The report of the majority conceded that there was possibly some danger in the use of the word "thereto" in connection with "re

straining order or injunction," as it might be construed to forbid the use of any injunction to prevent the execution of acts done in furtherance of agreements not made criminal by statute, which if unrestrained would result in irreparable injury to property, and that it might be wise to strike out the word and insert "based solely thereon," or the words "based solely thereon if no unlawful act has been done in execution thereof; " or to add the words "until some criminal or unlawful act has been done or threatened to to be done in execution thereof;" but it was said "this was hardly necessary, as such construction would be strained."

The house passed the bill without amendment, but it was not reached in the senate. It was reintroduced in the 58th congress, but was not reported to either House. At the hearing before the committee of the House of Representatives the bill was strongly opposed by representatives of business and manufac turing associations, on the ground that it was ambiguous, that it was not needed to validate strikes, but would validate boycotts and other unlawful combinations.

This proposed act goes, as it will be seen, far beyond the scope of the English act of 1876. That law related only to criminal prosecutions and was intended to legalize strikes. Unless this proposed law should be construed to validate boycotts or sympathetic strikes, it is difficult to see what effect it would have upon interstate commerce.

The regulating power of Congress extends to the business of interstate

1 Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 48 L. Ed. 997.