149 150 .. 150 108. Under common control, management or arrangement for a con tinuous carriage.. 109. Transportation through a state. 110. Interstate electric railroads 111. Receivers, lessees and purchasers, pendente lite. 113. Place of incorporation of the carrier immaterial.. 119. Charges must be reasonable and just . .. 151 120. Practical difficulties in the enforcement of reasonableness in rates..... 121. Standard of reasonableness under state statutes.. 122. Standard of reasonableness under the act 123. The Commission has no power to fix rates.. 124. No power in the courts to fix rates............ 125. The Federal Courts on reasonableness in railroad rates. 126. The capitalization of railroads as a basis of rates... 127. Through rates and local rates...... 151 152 152 153 153 155 156 . 158 159 160 160 161 . 162 163 164 .. 165 167 169. 128. The Commission on through and local rates.. 129. Responsibility for through rates. 130. Reasonableness under sections 1 and 3 131. Consideration of reasonableness in the courts .. 170. ... 170 132. Rulings of the Commission upon the reasonableness of rates.. 171 133. The burden of proof before the Commission 134. Presumption of reasonableness from established rates. .. 172 172 135. The Commission on cost of service and needs of the shipper... 173 136. The Commission on the character of the traffic... 137. The Commission on distance as a factor in rates 174 174 138. The Commission on comparison of rates.... 175 139. Relation to state local rates.... 140. Reasonableness and proportion... 141. The Commission on rate wars and reasonableness of rates..... 177 142. Illustrative cases upon specific rates.. 104. The act to regulate commerce. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: Sec. 1. That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a common control, management, or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of trans-shipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country: Provided, however, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of the property, wholly within one state, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to any state or territory as aforesaid. The term "railroad" as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease; and the term "transportation" shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage. All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. § 105. All of interstate commerce not included.— The definition in this section of the carriers subject to the act does not include all the carriers engaged in interstate commerce, but only those engaged in the transportation of persons or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, or both, are used. That is, it does not include transportation wholly by water, nor does it include transportation by team or wagon. (See 7 I. C. C. R. 286). Congress had repeatedly legislated with reference to water transportation, but its attention in this enactment was directed only to the abuses in railroad transportation. A steamboat on a navigable river can only demand of a railroad connecting with river points that it receive and deliver freight at the published local rates, as an independent water line is not included in the act. (See 4 I. C. C. R. 265, and 3 Int. Com. Rep. 278). The decisions of the courts on this question have been in accord with the rulings of the Commission. A railroad lying wholly within a state which transports freight, whether coming from within or without the state, solely on local bills of lading on a special contract limited to its own lines, and without dividing charges with any other carriers or assuming any obligations to or for them, does not come within the provisions of the act and is not bound to make any reports of its business to the Commission. United States v. Railroad Co., $1 Fed. Rep. 783, following C. N. O. & T. P R. Co. v. Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, and Commission v. B. Z. & C. R. Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 942. See also U. S. v. Geddes (6th Cir. C. C. A.), 131 Fed. Rep. 452, where the same ruling was made as to railroads subject to the Safety Act. 106. Parties subject to the act. The only parties subject to the act, that is, to the jurisdiction of the Commission, are the common carriers described in this section, that is, those carriers engaged in the transportation of persons or property as described in the section. The Commission has no jurisdiction, under this section, over parties other than the carriers and those who invoke its jurisdiction against the carriers. Thus it had no jurisdiction under this section over the owners of private cars whose charges to the carriers may materially affect the rates charged to the shipper. In this connection, however, should be considered section 2 of the amendatory act of February 19, 1903, infra, § 311, which specifically provides that in any proceeding instituted before the Commission or in the courts, it shall be lawful to include as parties in addition to the carrier all parties interested in or affected by the rule, regulation or practice under consideration, and that inquiries, investigations, orders and decrees may be made with reference to and against such parties in the same manner, to the same effect and subject to the same conditions as are or shall be authorized by law with respect to carriers. This amendatory act has not yet been judicially construed, though it has been considered by the commission in several cases, with reference to sections 2 and 6 of the act. See infra, §§ 146146– 167, 233. It would seem that under this amendatory act the owners of private cars or others whose charges directly affect the charge of the carrier to the shipper would be subject to the jurisdiction of the act. This section in declaring who are subject to the act does not in express terms include carriers making shipments within a territory, that is, from one point in a territory to another. The power of congress over the territories is general and plenary, combining the powers of the state and federal governments, under the express power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States. Constitution, article IV, section 3. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 481. This power over the commerce within a territory, it will be seen, was exercised in the Anti-Trust Act, infra, § 329. The question of the application of the Interstate Commerce Act to traffic shipments entirely within a territory was suggested in the recent report of the Commission in the matter of the Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. R. 480. § 107. Express companies.- The Commission ruled soon after its organization that independent express companies were not included in the act. See 1 I. C. C. R. 349 and 1 Int. Com. Rep. 677. This ruling was adopted by the United States circuit court of Missouri in United States v. Morsman, 42 Fed. Rep. 448, where the court quashed an indictment against a party for alleged violation of the act in acting as agent for an express company, as the indictment did not allege that the express company was a mere adjunct of a railroad company or a combination of railroad companies. See also Southern Indiana Express Co. v. United States Express Co., 35 C. C. A. 172 and 92 Fed. Rep. 1022, affirming 88 Fed. Rep. 659. Before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1886, the Supreme Court in the Express Company cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 791, had decided that railroad companies were not required by usage or the common law to transport express traffic for the independent companies over their lines, and that they were not obliged to do more as express carriers than to provide the public at large with reasonable accommodations, |