purchases and suffers loss thereby, is sufficient. Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. Rep. 594, reversed in 55 C. C. A. 70, 118 Fed. Rep. 120, 60 L. R. A. 152.

" under

§ 341. A State is not a "person or corporation section 7. In Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 Fed. Rep. 908 (1895), a demurrer was sustained to a suit filed by a liquor dealer in South Carolina under the seventh section of the Act against the members of the State Board of Control of the liquor traffic, under the State Dispensary law, alleging that the State monopoly of the liquor business was in violation of the Act. The court said that a State is not a "person" or "corporation within the meaning of the section.

§ 342. Pleadings under section 7.-A declaration in a suit under section 7 was held bad for indefiniteness and uncertainty in Rice v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Fed. Rep. 464, District of New Jersey (January, 1905), which alleged in a single count that defendant entered into a "contract, combination and conspiracy," in restraint of trade. The Court said that in a declaration under this section, plaintiff must aver, not only facts showing such a contract, combination or conspiracy as is declared by the Act to be unlawful, but also facts showing that by reason of such unlawful thing he had been injured in his business or property. The Court also held that the Act made a distinction between a contract and a combination or conspiracy, and the two could not be confused either in a declaration in a civil proceeding any more than in an indictment in a criminal proceeding. That is they could not be declared upon as synonymous terms and charged in a single

count.

§ 343. Measure of damages under section 7.- The measure of damages which a party is entitled to recover in such an action is the difference between the price paid and the reasonable price under natural and competitive conditions. See also Montague v. Lowry, supra.

The Court said in the City of Atlanta case that the plain intent was to compensate the person injured and that the enlargement of compensation by the provision for trebling the amount of damages did not constitute the action a penal action within the meaning of section 1047 R. S., U. S. The

other sections of the Act were penal, but the 7th section was distinctly compensatory.

344. Limitations in private actions.-The action in this case was brought in Tennessee, and it was held subject to the Tennessee statute of limitations prescribing the limitation of ten years for certain actions and in all other cases not expressly provided for. The Court ruled that it did not fall within the provision of the Tennessee statute prescribing a limitation of three years for injuries to personal or real property. As to limitations, see section 8 of Interstate Commerce Act, supra.

$345. The Act as a defense in suits by alleged illegal combinations.-While it is a general rule that any one sued upon a contract may set up a defense that it is a violation of an Act of Congress, Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 46 L. Ed. 1058, it is also true that a party will not be permitted to confiscate the property or property right of another on the ground that that other has violated the AntiTrust Act. See Soda Fountain Co. v Green, 69 Fed. Rep. 333; Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 302.

There is is no provision in the Anti-Trust Act, such as is contained in some of the State Anti-Trust statutes, making the fact of membership of a vendor in an illegal combination a defense by a vendee in suit for goods purchased. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 and 46 L. Ed. 679.

See also In re Wise wall, 74 Fed. Rep. 802, where it was held that one who requests and accepts services of a tug for towage purposes, cannot escape paying the reasonable value of the services rendered on ground that the tug owners are members of an association which is illegal under the Act.

It is no objection to the enforcement of a contract, in the consideration of which nothing illegal inheres, that it may incidentally aid one of the parties in exacting and violating the Anti-Trust statute. This was held in Ingraham v. Nat'l Salt Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 676, Circuit Ct. of App., 2nd Cir. reversing, 120 Fed. Rep. 40, where the action was to recover the amount of certificates created by defendant, in payment of stock of another company, the certificates in payment of the

stock purchased being held to have been lawfully issued in exercise of the defendant's implied power to incur indebted

ness.

§ 346. The act as a defense in patent litigation. It was held in General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 Fed. Rep. 922, that the fact that a complainant in a patent suit is a member of a combination in violation of the Anti-Trust Act, does not give third persons the right to infringe a patent of which the defendant is the owner, nor does it preclude the complainant from maintaining a suit to enjoin such infringement. The court in this case refused to follow the case of National Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed. Rep. 130, decided in 1895, which held that the company authorized to receive assignments of letters patent and grant back to the assignors licenses, and to regulate and control prices, was against public policy and void. This ruling however was not made under the Anti-Trust Act.

In Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 46 L. Ed. 1058, in a suit brought by the same complainant, the Court said that the object of the patent laws was monopoly, and that the rule was, with few exceptions, that any conditions, which were not in their nature illegal with regard to the kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts, and the fact that the conditions in the contract keep up a monopoly does not render them illegal.

See also Edison Electric Light Co. v. Sawyer Mfg. Elec. Co. (2nd Circ.), 3 C. C. A. 695, 53 Fed. Rep. 592; Bonsack Machine Co. et al v. Smith et al, (C. C., W. D. of N. C.), 70 Fed. Rep. 383; National Folding Box Co. v. Robertson et al (C. C., E. D. of Conn.), 99 Fed. Rep. 985.

$347. Self incriminating testimony. It was held in Foote v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. Rep. 156, that the act of Congress of February 11, 1893 does not apply to prosecutions under the Anti-Trust Act, and that the Fifth Amendment applies thereto so that self incriminating testimony could not be enforced. The Court held in this case that where the witness claims that the answer would incriminate him, it is not for the witness

but for the judge to decide whether under the circumstances such might be the effect This decision however was prior to passsge of the act of Feb. 25, 1903, which provides both as to this Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, that no "person shall be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any suit, proceeding or prosecution under said Acts; and provided further that no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."

SECTION 8.

§ 348. Section 8 of the Act.

§348. "Person" or "persons" defined.- SEC. 8. That the word "person," or "persons," wherever used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.

This statutory inclusion of the corporations and associations in the term "person" is not contained in the Interstate Commerce Act. The general rule however is well established that the term "person" as well as the term "citizen" is to be construed as including corporations unless there be something beyond the mere use of the word to indicate the intent on the part of Congress to include them. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 329, 6 L. Ed. 502; Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., 196 U. S. 360. See also supra, § 264.