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In the Matter of Pratt and others, &c.

upon the old, that the successful practitioner must now understand the old system, before he can practice the new, even in a single protracted litigation.

The legal student need not expect that he can become qualified for admission to practice by a few months casual and superficial reading. No one can profitably enter upon a course of legal studies, until he has at least a well-grounded English education; and his mind is well stored with general knowledge and information. He must follow his course of professional reading with system, patience and perseverance: when he has mastered Blackstone, Cruise, Kent, Sugden, Comyn, Chitty, Starkey, Greenleaf, Story, and other elementary works, ancient and modern, and made himself familiar with the leading provisions of the Revised Statutes, he will have reached a point where he may begin to peruse the Code with advantage, and contemplate the decisions of the courts with a just appreciation of their conclusions.

The undersigned are by no means unmindful or ignorant of the labor the course recommended imposes upon the candidate for legal honors; but they deem it as well due to the applicant for admission as to the public, that it should be adopted and rigidly enforced; nor especially are they unmindful of the interests of those who, without pecuniary means or adventitious aids, are struggling to procure an education and admission to the bar. They have seen and felt the obstacles which those thus situated must surmount to attain the object of their wishes, and would place no impediments in their pathway. But all experience has proved, that nothing short of a term of thorough study and training, and that too in the office of a practicing attorney, will ever make a lawyer. As well might the surgeon become qualified to practice his profession away from the subject, the mechanic to acquire his art by the abstract study of his trade, or the chemist away from his laboratory, as the legal student to become qualified to practice by merely reading, without practical office education. Sir EDWARD COKE truly said of the profession, that "the study was abstruse and difficult, the occasion sudden, the practice dangerous."

In the Matter of Pratt and others, &c.

Many members of the bar, under a system requiring a long and fixed time of study, when courts were more inaccessible than they now are, the expenses of admission much greater, and facilities less, have illustrated the truth, that even with no other advantages, industry, economy and perseverance will finally reward the efforts of those who sternly practice these sterling and cardinal virtues.

An attorney at law stands in a most interesting and responsible relation to society, and has no apology for ignorance. The last and dearest interests of individuals in every walk of life are daily confided to his keeping. The life, liberty, character and material interests of clients depend constantly upon his integrity and skill. His license is evidence that the courts regard him as competent to discharge his duties by reason of approved integrity and learning, and the generous confidence which society has at all times extended to the profession, demands that those only possessing these qualifications should, under any circumstances, be admttted to practice as attorneys and counsellors of this court.

Dated July 9th, 1856.

DANIEL S. DICKINSON,
SAMUEL GORDON,

HENRY R. MYGATT,

Committee.

By the court-SHANKLAND, Presiding Justice. The court approve of the report of the examining committee; and of the sentiments therein contained, in respect to the qualifications which should be required of candidates for admission as attorneys and counsellors of this court.

Mr. Pratt is therefore admitted, and the other candidates rejected, in accordance with the recommendations of the examining committee.*

NOTE. This case was furnished by Henry R. Mygatt, Esq., of Oxford, N. Y., one of the examiners, who stated that he was requested by each of the justices of the sixth district to forward it for publication in this work. RE

PORTER.

The People ex rel. Debenetti agt. Gale, clerk, &c.

SUPREME COURT.

THE PEOPLE on the relation of DEBENETTI agt. GALE, Clerk of the Marine Court.

Appeals from the marine court to the common pleas can only be taken from decisions at the general term of the marine court. (The same decision is made in The People ex rel. De La Figaniere agt. Justices of Marine Court, 11 How. Pr. R. 400, and in White agt. Anderson, 12 id. 377.) An application for a mandamus to compel the marine court to issue execution upon a judgment, rendered by that court, must be made against the clerk of the court. Because, by the act organizing that court, (2 R. L. 383, § 111,) there is an express provision making it the duty of the clerk, and not of the court, to issue all process.

New-York Special Term, 1856.

APPLICATION for a mandamus against the clerk of the marine court, New-York.

AMOS K. HADLEY, for relator.
THOMAS NELSON, opposed.

CLERKE, Justice. The opinion which I incidentally expressed in The People on the relation of De La Figaniere agt. The Justices of the Marine Court, (11 How. Pr. R. 400,) I have discovered no reason to change now, when the question to which it refers comes directly before me in the present case. I still hold, and now expressly decide, that appeals from the marine court to the common pleas can only be taken from decisions of the general term of the marine court. My reasons, though briefly, are, I think, sufficiently stated in the latter part of the decision in De La Figaniere's case.

With regard to the other question presented on behalf of the defendant, that the application should be made against the justices, and not against the clerk of the court; that undoubtedly would be the only proper course, if an express provision did

The People ex rel. Debenetti agt. Gale, clerk, &c.

not make it the duty of the clerk, and not of the court, to issue process. The act relating to the organization of the marine court, then called, "The Justices' Court of the city New-York," (2 R. L. p. 383, § 111,) enacts, that "all applications for process for the recovery of any debt or demand, to be holden by virtue of this act, before the said justices, shall be made to the clerk of the said court, and not otherwise, and that all process, to be issued out of said court, shall be tested in the name of said justices, and be signed by the clerk of the said court with his name," &c. So that the act makes it the duty of the clerk, and of the clerk alone, to issue process; and when a duty is imposed upon any public officer, which he neglects or refuses to perform, it necessarily follows that the application for a mandamus is properly against him alone, whatever may be the relation in which he stands to others in the same department. From the terms of the act it appears that the duty of the justices is only to entertain the action, make the necessary collateral orders, if any should be necessary, decide the issues, and render judgment. The issuing of the execution pursuant to the judgment is purely and exclusively a ministerial duty, to be performed manually by the clerk; and if we issued a mandamus to the justices, ordering them to perform it, it would be contrary to the provision which I have quoted. All that they could do in obedience to the order would be to endeavor to prevail upon the clerk to sign and issue the execution, or per haps they may have some means of compelling him to do it. But it is clear that they cannot, in their own persons, perform the act it is not their duty to perform it; and, consequently, a mandamus against them would be entirely nugatory.

Application granted, without costs.

Parshall and Westfall agt. Tillou and Tillou.

SUPREME COURT.

DEWITT PARSHALL and PETER R. WESTFALL agt. HENRY TILLOU and WILLIAM H. TILLOU.

A creditor's suit, (or bill,) to reach equitable property, cannot be commenced until his remedy at law upon his judgment is exhausted-by the issuing of execution, and its return unsatisfied.

But he is entitled, without the issuing and return of an execution, to set aside any fraudulent conveyance or incumbrance of the debtor's property, which stands in the way of the collection of his judgment.

In such an action, it seems, that an answer containing a general denial of each and every allegation in the complaint, except certain portions therein admitted, is good. Although the admissions are not called for, still they serve to qualify the general denial, so as to authorize the verification of the answer with safety.

Monroe Special Term, May, 1856.

MOTION to make answer more definite.

The complaint contained the allegations generally in a creditor's bill, setting out the recovery of a judgment, and that defendant had fraudulently disposed of his real estate, and had equitable property, which he concealed, or had fraudulently disposed of. The answer denied generally each and every allegation of the complaint, except as therein admitted, and then proceeded to make certain admissions in regard to the transfer of the real estate and personal property. The complaint and answer were both verified.

O. H. PALMER, for plaintiffs.
J. W. STEBBINS, for defendants.

E. DARWIN SMITH, Justice. The plaintiffs having a judgment, but no execution thereon, returned unsatisfied, can only sustain this action as a bill to set aside the fraudulent conveyances of the real estate set out in the complaint.

Without issuing an execution, the judgment-creditor is en

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