levy war, are distinct offenses. The first (levying war) must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. 4. "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors; but there must be an actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose to constitute a levying of war." 5. The Constitution is humane to the accused, in requiring the strictest proof for the establishment of his guilt. There must be two witnesses, at least, to the same overt act, unless the prisoner make confession in open court. Confessions out of court, though testified to by any number of witnesses, are not sufficient. Confessions (out of court) are said to be the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises of favor, or menaces; seldom remembered accurately or reported with due precision, and incapable in their nature of being disproved by other negative evidence.' There must be a concurrence of two witnesses to the same overt act, that is, open act of treason, who are above all reasonable exception.2 The power of Congress to declare the punishment of treason was noticed in part ii. chap. iv. art. iv. FREEDOM. ART. VII. - OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES. 1. FROM ARREST. Members of Congress shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest,— 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. iv. p. 357. 2 Story on the Constitution, § 1802. Ist, During attendance at their respective Houses. 2d, While going to and returning from the same. 2. OF SPEECH. For any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (21) 1. Although freedom from arrest is here classed under the title of "Personal Rights," as it relates to members of Congress, yet it is as much the right of their constituencies, and of the Houses of which they are members, as it is the right of the members themselves. It is an official immunity. It is a right universally accorded to members of legislative bodies in all countries, and in all the States of this Union. They can be arrested for crime only. Blackstone says, "It has immemorially constituted a privilege of both Houses of the British Parliament." 2. Thomas Jefferson says, "It seems absolutely indispensable for the just exercise of the legislative power in every nation purporting to possess a free constitution of government, and it cannot be surrendered without endangering the public liberties as well as the private independence of the members." Of course, an arrest of a member of Congress would prevent the performance of his duties in the House of which he was a member. His constituency would be left without representation. The public interests, which are always considered paramount to private, must suffer for want of attention. The privilege is considered not that of the member or of his constituents only, but a privilege of the House also. 3. And, for the purpose of securing entire freedom of discussion, no member of either House can legally be questioned elsewhere for anything which he may see fit to utter in debate in his place as a member; that is, he cannot legally be called to account before the courts, no matter how much he may slander private character. Of course, this is a right which may be, and sometimes is, abused; but the public interests may require the most critical and searching examinations into personal and official qualifications of individuals proposed as candidates for public stations of grave responsibility. Members should be allowed to perform these duties without fear of future personal retribution. In a President of the United States of America. (53) 1. Under the Confederation, there was no such officer as a President of the United States. There was an Executive Committee of thirteen, one from each State, having no power except during the recesses of Congress. Congress possessed the executive power while in session. Alexander Hamilton says in "The Federalist," "There is hardly any part of the system [of government], the arrangement of which could have been attended with greater difficulty; and there is none which has been inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment." These remarks were made while the Constitution was before the people for deliberation. 2. Energy in the Executive is one indispensable characteristic in the definition of good government; for the duty of this department is to see that the laws are faithfully and promptly executed. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government; a feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be a bad government in practice.' 3. It was a subject, of much and earnest debate in the convention that formed the Constitution, whether this department should be placed in the hands of one, or in the hands of several. No subject was more thoroughly discussed in that body. It was maintained that energy would be most likely to be secured by unity of executive, and that wisdom would 1 The Federalist, No. 72. be most likely to be secured by a plurality, and that the latter would be most likely to command the confidence of the people. 4. As the executive prerogative is limited to the faithful execution of the laws after they shall have been duly enacted and promulgated, it was doubtless most judicious that the executive power should be vested in a single individual. It gives a stronger sense of personal responsibility. No discretion is submitted to the executive officer as to the wisdom or expediency of the law. What has once been declared to be law, under all the cautious forms of deliberation prescribed by the Constitution, ought to receive prompt obedience.1 ART. II. - TERM. He shall hold his office during the term of four years. (53) 1. This was a subject on which there was a great variety of opinion in the convention. There were those who favored the proposition that the Executive should hold his office for life, or during good behavior. At one stage of the proceedings seven years was fixed as the duration of the term. The term of four years was finally fixed upon as a compromise; for there were members in favor of one year, others in favor of two, and others three years. 2. The term of four years is intermediate between the term of office of the Senate and that of the House of Representatives. In the course of one presidential term, the House is, or may be, twice recomposed, and two thirds of the Senate changed or reëlected. The executive term should not be so short as to be constantly changing from one incumbent to another, giving the government no opportunity to test by experience the policy of its measures; nor, on the other hand, should it be so long as to allow an obstinate and corrupt Executive, should the country unfortunately be cursed with one, to bring on widespread mischief and disaster. 3. The presidential term commences on the fourth day of 1 Kent's Commentaries, Lect. 13. * Story on the Constitution, § 1438. March next after the President's election; and in case of his death, removal, or resignation, during his term, the person who succeeds to the duties of the office serves the unexpired portion of the term only. ART. III.- ELIGIBILITY. 1. He must have attained to the age of thirty-five years. 4. A citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. (56) (See Appendix, D, p. 107.) 1. The age required was regarded as necessary to give the candidate for this office sufficient time to demonstrate his character, and to enable his fellow-citizens to judge of his fitness for the high position of chief executive of a great nation. The mental faculties are usually in full vigor at this age; and opportunities must have been afforded for long public service, and for varied and large experience in the public councils. 2. Fourteen years' residence in the United States is intended not only to give opportunity for an extensive acquaintance on the part of his fellow-citizens with the candidate for this office, but also to furnish him with the requisite knowledge of the wants and institutions of the country. Besides, it may be presumed that a citizen whose residence has been chiefly abroad may not only be deficient in affection for his own country, but may have become partial to the institutions of other countries with which he has long been familiar. 3. The Constitution requires that the President shall be a natural-born citizen of the United States, or a citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. This is an important restriction, when we consider the sacredness of the trust committed to the charge of the Executive. It will be useless for ambitious foreigners to intrigue for the office, as this qualification of birth cuts off all those inducements from |