Ritchie v. Waller. Whether or not it had done so is also a question of fact. Bill v. City of Norwich, 39 Conn., 222; Manchester v. City of Hartford, 30 id., 118. On the other hand, the rule of duty imposed by law on the plantiff was admitted-that he must have acted with reasonable care himself. Whether he did so or not is quite as clearly a question of fact. We do not understand that the statute, § 2689, which provides that drivers of carriages shall turn to the right hand absolutely bars one who turns to the left hand from all right to recover. Such turning to the left would be a circumstance, and doubtless a very strong one, which the court would consider in deciding whether the party acted with reasonable care. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the injury done to his horse he is entitled to recover the whole damage. We interpret the finding as intending to say that the horse was injured beyond all reasonable hope of recovery and so of no value at the time it was killed. The Court of Common Pleas is advised that upon the facts found there is nothing in the law to prevent the court from rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the value of the horse. In this opinion the other judges concurred. PETER RITCHIE vs. WILLIAM WALLER. New Haven & Fairfield Cos., April T., 1893. ANDREWS, C. J., CAR- The defendant, who had for several years been accustomed to get manure from a brewery in a city for his farm in a neighboring town, hired B as a farm laborer, and had him frequently go with his team to procure and haul it, going first with him himself to show him the place, and taking a direct route in the city, but giving him no directions as to the route he should follow there. On a certain occasion when B had been so sent, and with no directions as to his route in the city, he started with his load for home, but went through a different street and less direct route, and stopped on an errand of his own, leaving his Ritchie v. Waller. horses for a few minutes standing unhitched in the street. While so left they started forward and before they had gone far ran into and upset the plaintiff's wagon, injuring him and the wagon. The court below held that the defendant was liable for the injury. Held that the court properly so decided. The question in such a case is, whether or not the act was done in the execution of the master's business within the scope of his employment. If the servant in going extra viam is really engaged in the execution of the master's business within the scope of his employment, it is immaterial that he joined with this some private business or purpose of his own. Where the question of the master's responsibility turns principally upon the mere extent of the deviation by the servant from the strict course of his employment or duty, it has been generally held to be one of fact and not of law. In cases where the deviation is slight and not unusual the court may, and often will, as matter of law, determine that the servant was still executing his master's business. So too, where the deviation is very marked and unusual, the court may determine that the servant was not on the master's business, but on his own. Cases falling between these extremes will be regarded as involving merely a question of fact, to be left to the jury or other trier of such questions. [Argued April 18th-decided May 22d, 1893.] ACTION for an injury to the person and property of the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant's servant; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court upon a general denial before J. M. Hall, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion. J. J. Rose and G. P. Carroll, for the appellant. In the case of torts the doctrine of respondeat superior applies only where the master has directed the tortious act of his servant, or where such act is incidental to the performance of the services for the master and is in the line of such performance. Since there is no clothing of the servant with any indicia of apparent authority, in reliance upon which the plaintiff is supposed to have acted, the master is not liable for those acts which lie, so to speak, within the penumbra of the authority actually conferred upon the servant. Wood's Master & Servant, §§ 277-280; Shearm. & Redf. Ritchie v. Waller. on Neg., § 146 et seq.; Mechem on Agency, § 737 et seq.; Wood v. Cobb, 13 Allen, 58; Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass., 518; Levi v. Brooks, 121 id., 501; McCann v. Tillinghast, 144 id., 327; Morier v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 31 Minn., 351; Stevenson v. Southern Pacific Co., 93 Cal., 558; Dells v. Stollenwerk, 78 Wis., 339; Ayrigg's Ex'rs v. N. York & Erie R. R. Co., 30 N. Jer. Law, 460; Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N. York, 543; Mars v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 54 Hun, 625. The accident in the present case did not occur by reason of Blackwell's making a detour the better to carry out his master's business. Nor did he stop and get his shoes mended at a place on the line of any imaginable route home from the brewery. But he had clearly and unequivocally thrown off his master's employment as regards both place and circumstance, and, without the latter's knowledge or consent, was then engaged in a matter of his own private business. This by all the authorities is sufficient to save the master from all liability. Thames Steamboat Co. v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 24 Conn., 40; Crocker v. N. London, Will. & Palmer R. R. Co., id., 249; Phelon v. Stiles, 43 id., 426; Stone v. Hills, 45 id., 47; Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49, 57; Walton v. N. York Central Sleeping Car Co., 139 Mass., 556. N. W. Bishop and E. O. Hull, for the appellee. TORRANCE, J. This is an action against a master for damage caused by the negligence of his servant. The court below, upon the facts found, decided that the injury occurred solely through the negligence of the servant. One of the claims of the defendant, though it was not pressed on the argument, is that the court, as matter of law, erred in so doing. Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the record does not present any question of law for review. Upon the facts as they appear of record we must regard the decision of the trial court upon this point as final and conclusive. In the discussion of the case, therefore, we will assume Ritchie v. Waller. that the negligence of the servant and the damage resulting therefrom have been determined against the defendant, and that the question of the responsibility of the master therefor alone remains to be considered. The facts bearing upon this question are in substance the following: The defendant is a farmer in Trumbull, and at the time of the injury, in September, 1891, and for some years prior thereto, had been accustomed twice a week to get manure for his farm from a brewery on North Washington Avenue in Bridgeport. This avenue and Main street intersect at a point called Bull's Head, about a thousand feet south of the brewery. The avenue and Main street are connected by three cross-streets, called respectively, beginning with the one next north of Bull's Head, Mulloy's Lane, Grand street and Commercial street. The brewery is nearly opposite the point where Mulloy's Lane enters the avenue. In December, 1890, the defendant hired the servant in question, whose name is Blackwell, as a farm laborer. Soon thereafter the defendant, for the purpose of getting a load of manure, and of showing Blackwell the place to procure it in the future, drove with him from the farm to the brewery, passing down Main street to Grand, through Grand to North Washington Avenue, and thence southerly to the brewery. After getting a load they returned through Grand street to Main, and thence northerly home. Neither at that time nor on any subsequent occasion did the defendant give any special directions or instructions as to what particular route Blackwell should follow in going to or returning from the brewery with manure, although he supposed Blackwell took the same route followed on the first occasion above mentioned. In fact Blackwell went or returned sometimes by way of Mulloy's Lane, and sometimes by way of Grand or Commercial street, and the defendant never at any time made any inquiries as to what route he took. On the day of the injury the defendant told Blackwell to go to the brewery after a load of manure and to spread it on a designated lot on the farm. These were all the directions. given to him. The defendant did not know that he intended to go to any other place. Pursuant thereto Blackwell, with the wagon and two horses of the defendant, went to the brewery and procured a load of manure. After so doing, instead of returning to Main street through the lane or Grand or Commercial street, and going thence northerly towards Trumbull as usual, Blackwell drove southerly down the avenue to Bull's Head, and thence into Main street, and thence northerly in the direction of home till he came to a certain shoemaker's shop on Main street southerly of Mulloy's Lane. There he got off his wagon, leaving his team for about five minutes, and went into the shoemaker's shop. Blackwell's purpose and object in so doing was to see the shoemaker about soleing or mending the shoes belonging to and then worn by him. While he was in the shop the team started at a slow trotting gait up Main street, till it came opposite the plaintiff's market, where the wheels of the defendant's wagon caught in the left rear wheel of the plaintiff's wagon, upsetting the same, and causing the injuries to the plaintiff and his property referred to in the complaint. Blackwell was employed by the month, and the carting of the manure was within the ordinary scope of his employment as a servant of the defendant, and he was in the service of the defendant at the time of the accident. Just here it may be well to call attention to two points in the finding, and to settle its interpretation with reference to them. After stating that Blackwell drove around to the shoemaker's shop, and there left his team and went into the shop, the court, as we have seen, adds that "Blackwell's purpose and object in so doing was to see the shoemaker about soleing or mending his shoes." or mending his shoes." Now whether the phrase "in so doing" refers to the entire conduct of Blackwell from the time he left the brewery till the horses ran away, or only to his act in leaving them and going into the shoemaker's shop, is perhaps not free from doubt. We will assume, however, in accordance with what seems to be the claim of the |