Greenwood et al. v. Town of Westport. 464; Mayor etc. of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; Mayor etc. of New York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; McCombs v. The Town Council of Akron, 15 Ohio, 476.” In Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn., 90, in Morse v. Fair Haven East, id., 222, in Healey v. New Haven, 47 id., 305, and in Bronson v. Borough of Wallingford, 54 id., 520, the court cites and approves Mootry v. Danbury, supra. In the latter case, where there was no accusation of negligence but merely of an intent to change the grade of a highway, the court distinguishes between the facts therein and the case of Mootry v. Danbury, and says: "It is only in special cases where wanton or unnecessary damage is done, or where damage results from negligence, that they, (towns) can be held responsible." And in Healey v. New Haven, supra, the court says: "The town or city, as the case may be, is practically the owner of the land for all the purposes of a highway. So long as it is used strictly for those purposes with due regard for the rights of others, no liability attaches. If however the work is improperly or negligently done, thereby causing damage to others, the corporation like an individual is liable. Mootry v. Danbury, 45 Conn., 550." Further cases upon this subject are collected and discussed in Weed v. Borough of Greenwich, 45 Conn., 170, where the borough was empowered to remove an encroaching fence, for the advantage of the borough, and to improve property therein. The principles therein involved are strikingly like those in the case at bar, and the decision is a direct authority in support of the rule that corporate liability in such cases is the same as individual liability. In Massachusetts the same distinction is made, and the rule as above stated is supported by the following and many other cases in addition to those already cited, namely: Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544; Hawks v. Charlemont, 107 Mass., 417; Waldron v. Haverhill, 143 id., 582; Doherty v. Braintree, 148 id., 495. In the latter case the town voted to take charge of the work, and appointed a committee of five to act with the selectmen, all as agents of the town. It seems to me, from these decisions that, even if the op Greenwood et al. v. Town of Westport. eration of this draw was connected with the maintenance of the highway, or for other reasons was the performance of a public governmental duty, the defendant would be liable for negligence upon the facts proved in this case. It will be noticed that most of the Connecticut cases cited have been decided since the cases relied on by the learned counsel for defendant. The well recognized distinction is nowhere. more clearly and accurately stated than in Goddard v. Inhabitants of Harpswell, 84 Me., 499, decided in 1892, where the court, reviewing the Massachusetts decisions, says: "The distinction between the two classes of cases is clear. In the one class the municipality has interfered by giving directions, or taking charge of the work by its own agents, as in Woodcock v. Calais, 66 Me., 234. In the other class the municipality has not interfered but has left the work to be performed by the proper public officers, in the methods provided by the general laws.'" But the defendant contends that, in this case, the question of liability must be determined by the law of Connecticut, and that what the law of Connecticut is appears from the cases cited by him, and from the case of French v. Boston, 129 Mass., 592. The libelant contends that this is a question of general common law or commercial law, and that if there is any conflict between the law of Connecticut and the general law, this court should be governed by the general rules of law, and especially by the decisions of the federal courts. He further contends that upon this question of damages arising from a maritime tort, it is the duty of a court of admiralty to administer relief according to its own procedure and rules, and to enforce its rules of liability so as to do justice. As already stated, it does not seem that there is any conflict, under the facts in this case, between the decisions of Connecticut and the general rules of law. As has been already shown, it is settled by the repeated adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the rule of liability established in Massachusetts, is not in harmony with the Greenwood et al. v. Town of Westport. general rule in this country, nor with the decisions of the federal courts. In this connection it seems desirable to examine the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the distinction between local laws, where the federal courts follow the decisions of the courts of the state, and general law, where the federal court is bound to exercise its independent judgment. "What constitutes a contract of carriage is not a question of local law upon which the decision of a state court must control. It is a matter of general law upon which this court will exercise its own judgment." Myrick v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 107 U. S., at 109. "On a question of general common law, the federal courts administering justice in New York have equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction with the courts of that state." R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall., 357. When private rights are to be determined by the application of common law rules alone, the federal courts are not bound by the decisions of the state courts. Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 428; 4 Wall., 657. Nor are they bound by the decisions of said courts on general questions of commercial law. Hough v. R. R., 100 U. S., 218; Oates v. National Bank, 100 id., at p. 246. This whole subject is exhaustively discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States in B. &0. R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S., 371, reviewing Swift v. Tyson and all the leading cases decided since that date in said court. Under said decisions, and especially the decision in Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S., 400, it seems clear that a federal court administering the rules of the common law within a state, is bound by the local policy of each state as to the extent of the powers and liabilities of its municipal corporations wherever such powers and liabil ities have been determined by legislative authority or the settled decisions of its highest courts, but that where the law relating to such a question "is unsettled and doubtful, such court must exercise its independent judgment, and declare the law upon the best light it can obtain." "Where the law has not been thus settled, it is the right and duty Greenwood et al. v. Town of Westport. of the federal courts to exercise their own judgment; as they always do in reference to the doctrine of commercial law and general jurisprudence." Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S., 20. In the present case there is neither legislative act nor decision of a Connecticut court establishing freedom from liability for negligence, in the absence of legislation, before the court. But in French v. Boston, supra, cited by defendant, the city of Boston was held not liable for damages caused by the detention of a vessel owing to the fact that the draw was of insufficient width for the vessel to pass through. And, while the case may be distinguished from the one at bar, in the fact that, while the obligation was imposed by statute, no liability was imposed for negligence, and the municipality “had left the work to be performed by the proper public officer," and for other reasons, yet it is an authority in support of the claim of defendant. But even if it were a direct decision in its favor, it would not show that the courts of Connecticut would follow such decision. For this reason, and because of the conclusions reached after the very careful examination of the decisions of this state as to the law herein, it seems to me that, at most, the defendant is only entitled to claim that the question herein presented, is still an open one, so far as the courts of Connecticut or the acts of its legislature are concerned. It remains to consider whether the principles thus far stated, are applicable in a court of admiralty. How far the maritime law, administered by this court of admiralty, may be enforced for the removal of obstructions in navigable rivers, is still an open question. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S., 1. But there is no question upon authority or principle, as to the power of a court of admiralty to administer relief under the facts in this case. In Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S., at p. 443, the court say: "The decisions of the state courts certainly cannot be allowed any greater weight in the federal courts when exercising the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction exclusively Greenwood et al. v. Town of Westport. vested in them by the constitution of the United States." The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United States, and state laws cannot enlarge or restrict said jurisdiction, but the admiralty courts have jurisdiction to enforce admiralty rights, according to their own procedure. Upon such questions the decisions of the highest court of the state do not relieve the admiralty court from the duty of exercising its own judgment. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S., 1; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall., at p. 586; The Guiding Star, 18 Fed. Rep., 263. In Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall., at 531, where an action had been brought under a state statute in the state court, by an administrator, for damages for injuries by a collision, resulting in death, Justice CLIFFORD said: "If the injured party had survived, no doubt is entertained that he might have sought redress for his injuries, in the proper admiralty court, wholly irrespective of the state statute enacting the remedy there given, and prescribing the form of action and the measure of damages, as the wrongful act was committed on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred upon such courts, by the constitution and the laws of Congress." The general rule of the federal courts on this question is enforced in admiralty. The Titan, 23 Fed. Rep., 413; Holt on Concurrent Jurisdiction, 208. The various decisions of the federal courts hereinbefore cited, and the reasons leading to the conclusions therein, seem to show that where a question of maritime right is presented to an admiralty court, that court, at least in the absence of legislation establishing a contrary rule, may enforce said right, and provide remedies for its violation in accordance with the rules of admiralty. In Boston v. Crowley, 38 Fed. Rep., 202, Judge COLT, affirming the decree of the district court in admiralty, in a case almost precisely like the one at bar, held the city of Boston liable, and examined therein the cases bearing upon the questions raised in this case. He held that the question involved was one "of general municipal or commercial law, and, as such, this court should follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the |