tails can be seen on the ships ahead is a great help here. At certain distances, for example, the name on the stern of the other ship can just be read. It will almost always be possible to select two objects on the other ship which can be brought in range (vertically) for the correct distance, provided the observer always stands at a fixed point. A little pitching may seem to throw this out, but with practice the mean bearing can be recognized. Even at night, if the weather is reasonably clear, this plan is helpful, the spars and funnels of a ship 400 yards away being plainly visible with good binoculars.

It is sometimes practicable to use a mark on our own ship as a means of determining when we are at standard distance from the next ahead, the observer standing always at a fixed point and bringing this mark into coincidence with the water-line or some other well-defined mark on the other vessel. The objection to this is that such a mark would probably not be available in action and is thus worse than useless as a guide at other times. It may be possible, however, to fix a line on something which is always available. An officer looking through a slit in the conning tower, for example, might be guided by the angle subtended by the width of this slit-either vertically or horizontally-his eye being at a fixed point from which this angle just takes in the height of a funnel or the width of a bridge on the ship ahead.

It is important to recognize the effect of steering, upon the speed of the ship. A poor helmsman may make it impossible for any officer to keep position. Not only does the ship in steering wildly range over a greater distance than is right, but the "drag of the rudder holds her back and reduces her speed very materially. It is worth while to give great attention to training the helmsman, insisting not only that a steady course shall be kept, but that this shall be kept with the least possible amount of helm.

It is a common error for beginners to make too frequent and too radical changes of speed as a result of the failure to allow for the interval which necessarily elapses between the signal for increasing or reducing the revolutions and the actual change of speed and position to be produced by the change in revolutions. It is realized that a large ship holds her way for a long time after the engines are stopped, and that she does not gather way, if at rest, until an appreciable time after the engines are started;

but it is not always realized that exactly the same delay must be allowed for in the response to a change of a few turns when the ship is already making way. Thus the beginner, impatient to regain position, and seeing no effect from his signal to add or subtract one or two revolutions, is tempted to call for two or three more; and when, finally, the ship begins to forge ahead or to drop back, his inclination is to let this go on until he is nearly or quite in position, forgetting that the effect of the change in revolutions of his engines will continue to affect the speed of his ship long after the engines have resumed their standard speed. This leads, of course, to almost endless changes in the revolutions and keeps the ship perpetually ranging ahead of position and dropping back astern of it.

Assuming that a ship has dropped astern of position, say a hundred yards, and wishes to regain her place.1 Having steadied her, it remains to regain position and to avoid overrunning. Suppose that five revolutions correspond to one knot. This means that five revolutions per minute will give 2000 yards in an hour. One revolution will thus give 400 yards an hour, or 100 yards in 15 minutes. If, therefore, we add one to the revolutions which hold her steady, we may expect to regain position in 15 minutes, which is much too long an interval. To reduce the time to five minutes, we must add not one turn, but three. We shall not be actually in position at the end of the five minutes, for it will take a perceptible time to pick up the extra speed; but the interval for continuing the extra revolutions will be five minutes, since it will take approximately the same time to run off the extra momentum that it took to pick it up, and the ship should, theoretically, settle into place with the speed which will just keep her there.

Similar considerations govern the reverse operation of dropping back when we find ourselves ahead of position.

In all changes of speed, and indeed at all, times when working in squadron, it is not only good "comradeship" but good seamanship, to give all possible consideration to the next astern. It may be difficult for him to run into you, as is often said, but this is no reason for trying to make it easy for him to do so. If the

1 It is the "doctrine" of the Fleet to do this smartly (See Notes B at end of this chapter) but the danger of overrunning, as above described, must not be forgotten.

next ahead comes dropping back suddenly upon you, and the next astern is rather closer than he should be, there is no harm in sheering out a little until all hands have time to adjust themselves. And in the simpler case where you are merely called upon to open out for regaining your own position, it is well to do this slowly, giving indication by speed signals of your intention to reduce revolutions. If you find yourself running up on your leader, you should of course sheer out onto his quarter until he draws away or you drop back.

It is an axiom of tactics that in column a ship is better ahead of position than astern of it. This is for the reason that by running more or less ahead she does not, as a rule, subject any other ship to inconvenience. The next ahead will not usually attempt to get out of the way, and the next astern is under no obligation to follow up. On the other hand, a ship falling materially behind her station crowds back the next astern and inconveniences all ships in rear.

It should be noted, however, that if too much emphasis is placed upon this axiom, there may be a tendency for all ships to close unduly, each on the next ahead, and this may result in congestion throughout the column or a considerable part of it; and while there is comparatively little danger in such congestion so long as a steady course is steered, the danger becomes very serious if the column changes course by more than a few points. If a signal for such a change is hoisted while a number of ships are crowding up on each other, it may be presumed that every ship will try to drop back, thus producing more or less confusion; but whether they attempt this or not, the difficulties of the turn will be much increased.

It is doubtless correct for a vessel which is ahead of position when the signal for a change of course goes up, to try to get into position before the turning point is reached, but there is no excuse for the disposition frequently manifested to drop back, whether in position or not, to the maximum distance tolerated by tactical regulations. If dropping back legitimately, it is very important to pick up standard speed-not in revolutions alone, but in actual speed made good-in time to make the turn with standard speed.

In compound formations there is especial reason for insisting that the individual columns shall not be lengthened out unduly,

because the rear of a column which is taking up more than its share of sea-room will crowd the head of the next column when the fleet passes into simple formation. In compound formations, therefore, we may place more emphasis upon our rule that it is better to be ahead of station than astern of it. And here, too, as there are fewer ships in the individual column, the results of congestion are less serious.

In spite of all precautions, interference will occasionally arise between the rear of one subdivision of the fleet and the head of the next one, in passing from one formation to another, and it is well to prescribe rules as to who shall give way in such a situation, and how. A convenient rule is to require the rear vessel of a leading section, when she finds herself so far astern of position as to embarrass the leader of the next section, to give way to the side of safety; letting the leader of the other division. swing into his proper place, and continuing on herself, more or less outside the formation, until she finds a chance to work into place.

In running at night without lights, not only can the ship ahead be seen-though perhaps only very dimly-but her wake is likely to show up with more or less phosphorescence. The difficulties of this situation are less than is sometimes supposed. All must be ready for switching on the navigation lights upon the approach of other vessels, and for manoeuvring to keep clear as required by law-except, of course, in time of war.

In a Fog.

Running in a fog has been much simplified by the adoption of "position-buoys." It is found well to keep the buoy of the ship ahead a little on one bow and nearly abreast of the stem. If each ship keeps an after search-light trained upon her own buoy at night, the situation is still farther improved. The searchlight shows the buoy if it is "watching" and shows approximately where it should be, if it tows under for awhile. Moreover, the search-light itself can be made out for from 500 to 1000 yards through a very dense fog. Search-lights are useful by day as well as by night, and should be used at all times in a fog.

It is important to keep well closed up in a fog. If a ship loses touch, it is difficult to regain it.

Unless in case of an emergency, only small changes in course should be made in a fog. If the course is to be changed as much as four points, it is better to make two changes of two points each, allowing time between for all ships to get straightened out.

If danger of collision threatens with a ship outside the fleet, it must never be forgotten that the ships of the fleet are to be considered in any manoeuver that is made for keeping clear. It is as indefensible in law as in seamanship to foul a ship of the fleet in keeping clear of an outsider. The ships astern may be relied upon to help keep clear as soon as they are notified by signal, but the signals provided for this emergency are far from satisfactory. In case of backing the engines, the International Signal of three blasts must of course be given instantly; but with the other signals that are always sounding in a fog it may be doubted whether this will be recognized as promptly as is desirable. In any event, the caution here given, to remember your own ships as well as the stranger, cannot be amiss.

Although the subject of avoiding collision in a fog is fully treated in another chapter, attention may here be called to the difference between the case in which one ship strikes another on the broadside, and that in which the two ships scrape alongside. The importance of this in connection with ships in squadron lies in the fact that all the ships are, in general, headed in the same direction, so that if one of them stops without turning very much, the next astern, coming up, if she cannot avoid touching, can usually manage to scrape alongside rather than to strike a direct blow. It might perhaps be argued from this that if a ship in squadron finds it suddenly necessary to go full speed astern to clear a stranger, she should try to avoid turning more than is necessary: The next astern, coming up, has thus the maximum chance of avoiding collision altogether or of striking a glancing rather than a cutting blow.

The question of speed in a fog is very fully discussed in Chapters XIV and XV.

Special sound signals are used for manoeuvring in a fog. Those at present established are crude and unsatisfactory. It is probable that submarine signals and the wireless telephone will ultimately be substituted for them.

It is very important to have a good lookout at the bow and to provide efficient means of communication with the bridge. This