The provisions of the Borough Code (u) relating hereto are as follows:

:

Section 1. This section as amended by the Act of March 30, 1917, P. L. 19, provides as follows:

Section 1. No burgess shall hold any other borough office or appointment during the term for which he is elected, but he shall be eligible to succeed himself (v), he shall not be a member of, nor preside at the meetings of, the council, except as provided in section three, article one of this chapter. (w)

(u) Chapter VII, Article II, of the Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 312. As to the duties and powers of the Burgess prior to the Code, see I Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 509, §§206-225, and decisions thereon. See also Vale's Dig. Vols. I, cols. 2586-2592; XI, 1007-1008; XIII, cols. 808-810.

(v) A chief burgess was held not to be ineligible to succeed himself under §1 of the Act of May 23, 1893, P. L. 113 §1, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 510 $206, unless he had served the full term of three years. Coatesville Borough Burgess, 6 Dist. 575. The above act was held to repeal all general and local acts relating to the election of a burgess in so far as they were inconsistent therewith. Commonwealth v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 35 W. N. C. 556, 42 P. L. J. 437, 30 Atl. 835; Huntingdon Borough, 3 Dist. 435. But see Commonwealth v. Angle, 3 Dist. 637, 14 Pa. C. C. 538.

(w) It was held that the provisions of §2 of the Act of May 23, 1893,

Section 2. No member of Congress or any person holding any office or appointment of profit or trust under the government of the United States shall be capable of holding the office of burgess.(x)

Section 3. Any person violating the provisions of section two of this article shall be liable to a penalty of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars; and the office of burgess shall be considered vacant.

Section 4. Any penalty imposed under section three of this article shall be paid, one-half to the overseers, guardians, or directors of the poor of the borough or county where such offense is committed, to be applied for the support of the poor, and onehalf to the prosecutor.

Section 5. The burgess, before exercising the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation, and the same shall be filed as provided in chapter seven, article one, section two of this act. (y)

P. L. 113, I Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 511 §207, that the chief burgess should not be a member of council or preside at the meeting, repealed all laws to the contrary Commonwealth v. Schneipp, 166 Pa. 401, 31 Atl. 118, affirming Bridgeport Borough v. Schneipp, 15 Pa. C. C. 150; Huntingdon Borough, 3 Dist. 435, and applied to all boroughs where burgesses are elected. Bridgeport Borough v. Schneipp, 15 Pa. C. C. 150, 10 Montg. 128.

(x) One, holding the office of election inspector, is ineligible to the office of chief burgess Commonwealth v. Jones, 1 Leg. Rec. R. 293, I Chester 80, but a justice of the peace or notary public has been held not ineligible. Commonwealth v. Shindle, 19 Pa. C. C. 258. On a petition for the appointment of a new chief burgess, the court cannot decide whether the office of a school director is incompatible and the remedy is by quo warranto. Lititz Borough Petition, 11 Lanc. L. Rev. 222.

(y) Under the Act of April 23, 1909, P. L. 154, §1, a borough ordinance fixing the salary of the burgess under that act was a municipal regulation and not a law within the meaning of Article III §13 of the constitution, which declares that no law shall extend the term of any public officer or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments after his election or appointment. Davis v. Homestead Boro., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 444, 1911, A burgess is not a public officer. Ibid. This act was not mandatory upon the council and was not intended to make the office of burgess a salaried one in all cases. Aliquippa Boro. v. Hall, 21 Dist. 774, 4 Munici. L. Rep. 42. A burgess whose salary is not fixed under that act is, under the Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. 133, entitled to the same fees for like services as justices of the peace. Ibid. Under §3 of that act a salary fixed by ordinance could not be changed during the term of the incumbent which meant that though an ordinance may be passed fixing a new salary, it could not affect the salary of the incumbent at the time of its passage. Madajewski

Section 6. The salary of the burgess may be fixed by ordinance, to be paid from the borough treasury, in monthly installments, on warrants authorized by the council. When so fixed such salary shall not be changed during the term of the incumbent. Section 7. The salary of the burgess shall not exceed, per annum, one hundred dollars per thousand for the first five thousand population, or fraction thereof; and fifty dollars per annum for each additional one thousand of population or fractional majority thereof; the population to be determined by the last United. States decennial census, or, by five times the number of electors in the borough as shown by the last registration thereof.

Section 8. Any salary, paid pursuant to sections six and seven of this article, shall be in lieu of all costs and fees allowed a burgess, whether acting as burgess or justice of the peace, and in such case the costs and fees shall be taxed and collected by the burgess and turned monthly into the borough treasury, together with a sworn statement of the same.

Section 9. In all cases where the burgess is given the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, he shall collect the same costs and fees as is charged by justices of the peace for like services.

Section 10. The burgess shall have power (≈):

v. Drapiewski, 6 Munici. L. Rep. 97, 17 Luz. Rep. 327. The local Act of April 2, 1831, P. L. 389, which fixes the fees of the burgess of Norristown, was not repealed by the Act of April 13, 1876, P. L. 27, as amended by the Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 255, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 512 §211. Norristown v. Shaffer, 9 Montg. 98.

(2) The chief burgess is the chief magistrate of the borough, and would seem to be merely its mayor in all but name, and he and not the president of council is the principal corporate officer. Ephrata Water Co. v. Ephrata Borough, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 484, affirming 15 York 70, 18 Lanc. L. Rev. 169. The question whether the chief burgess has the rights and privileges of a member of council or authority to preside over that body, seems to have been one in which the opinions of the courts have varied. In Price v. Beale, 34 L. I. 243, 6 Luz. Rep. 149, 5 Pa. C. C. 491, and Darrach v. Kenney, I Dist. 436, 12 Pa. C. C. 391, 5 Del. 182, 10 Lanc. L. Rev. 53, 3 Lack. Jur. 9, it was held that he had such right, while in Commonwealth v. Kepner, 10 Phila. 510, 30 L. I. 312, 1 Foster 289, it was held that he had no authority to sit as a member of council or to preside. In Richard's Appeal, 122 Pa. 547, 22 W. N. C. 531, the court expressed no opinion as the question was not properly raised, but in Zane v. Rosenberry, 153 Pa. 38, 10 Lanc. L. Rev. 125, 32 W. N. C. 73, 40 P. L. J. 379, affirming 1 Dist. 436, 12 Pa. C. C. 382, 9 Montg. 37, the subject received the attention of the supreme court, and the court held that the Act of 1834, which made the burgess president of council, was amended by the Act of June 2, 1871, P. L. 283, and that the

I. To administer oaths and affirmations in matters pertaining to borough affairs.

II. To exercise jurisdiction in all disputes between the borough and individuals arising under the ordinances, rules and regulations of the borough. (a)

III. To exercise the powers and jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the enforcement of all ordinances of the borough, and the collection of fines and penalties imposed thereunder. (b)

chief burgess was not a member of council or entitled to preside at its meetings, and is only such member when so provided by charter or by the decree of the court. See Scranton Borough Election, Brightly Elec. Cas. 455, 1 Luz. L. Obs. 12. The chief burgess or any other inhabitant of a borough may become relator in quo warranto proceedings to oust a councilman from office for being interested in a contract relating to the borough. Commonwealth v. Kepner, 10 Phila. 510, 30 L. I. 312, 1 Foster 289. See also Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 Pa. 465, 4 Leg. Gaz. 49, 2 Leg. Opin. 125, reversing 29 L. I. 4, 1 Camp 408, 4 Leg. Gaz. 6, 2 Leg. Opin. 89.

A burgess has no jurisdiction to convict for the infringement of the Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Sm. L. 177 §1, 4 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 4485 §3. Commonwealth v. Connelly, 3 Munici. L. Rep. 146, 12 Lack. Jur. 317.

(a) Where chief burgess acts as a judicial officer and has jurisdiction of the subject matter and acts within the limits of his jurisdiction, he was not liable for damages though he acts through an erroneous or mistaken judgment. Reid v. Wood, 2 Chest. 513. If he destroys property as the only means of abating a public nuisance without the order of council, he cannot be held personally liable. Reed v. Seely, 13 Pa. C. C. 529.

(b) Under the Act of April 3, 1851, P. L. 320 §5, Par. 3, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 512 §212, which gave the chief burgess the powers of a justice of the peace for certain purposes, his power was restricted to the cases mentioned in the act and he had no jurisdiction in cases of fines or penalties imposed for the violations of borough ordinances. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 110 Pa. 297, 1 Cent. 393, 1 Atl. 375, 2 Del. 460. For consideration of the rights and powers of burgesses, see Estep's Mandamus, 2 Dist. 47, affirmed in Young's Appeal, 153 Pa. 34, 31 W. N. C. 480, affirming 39 P. L. J. 307, 11 Pa. C. C. 209, I Dist. 357. As to the powers of the chief burgess to enforce the collection of a fine or penalty under ordinances by a summary conviction under the Acts of May 18, 1887, P. L. 122, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 514 §224; May 19, 1887, P. L. 133, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 514 $220, and June 4, 1897, P. L. 121, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 533 8328 et seq. see Plymouth Borough v. Williams, 8 Kulp 167; Agnew v. Washington Borough, 7 Pa. C. C. 180; Gallitzen Borough v. Gains, 15 Pa. C. C. 337, 7 Kulp 479, 12 Lanc. L. Rev. 61; Schlager v. Nanticoke Borough, 4 Kulp 244; Commonwealth v. Moore, 21 Pa. C. C. 321, 12 York 115, 46 P. L. J. 195; Bolivar Borough v. Coulter, 10 Dist. 171, 58 L. I. 133. In proceedings before a burgess for the violation of an ordinance, the record must show that the offense was committed in the borough Plymouth Borough v. Penkok, 7 Kulp 101, and the record may be removed by certiorari

IV. To exercise the powers and jurisdiction of justices of the peace within the borough for the suppression of riots, tumults, and disorderly meetings; and in all criminal cases for the punishment of vagrants and disorderly persons. (c)

Section II. It shall be the duty of the burgess:

I. To preserve order in the borough, to enforce the ordinances and regulations, to hear complaints, to remove nuisances and to exact a faithful performance of the duties of the officers appointed.

II. To demand and receive sufficient security in the amount fixed by the borough from the treasurer and high constable.

III. To sign the by-laws, rules, regulations and ordinances after they shall have been correctly transcribed by the secretary.(d)

West Pittston Borough v. Dymond, 8 Kulp 12, without a special allocatur. Edwardsville Borough v. Rice, 12 Lanc. L. Rev. 110, 7 Kulp 432.

(c) Where a chief burgess witnesses a disturbance or breach of the peace he may issue a warrant for the arrest of the offender. Commonwealth v. Black, 12 Pa. C. C. 31, 2 Dist. 46. The chief burgess may offer rewards for the detection of offenses against the safety of the inhabitants. York Borough v. Forscht, 23 Pa. 391.

(d) Where a borough ordinance provides for a fee of a dollar for a permit to make an excavation in the street, and such fee is tendered by a water company to the burgess, the latter cannot refuse to issue the license merely because the water company had a dispute with a customer as to an unpaid water bill and intended to make the excavation in order to cut off the customer's connection with the company's water main. Panther Valley Water Co. v. Blaney, 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 253. Lansdowne Borough v. Springfield Water Co., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 490, cited and relied upon. Under the Act of May 23, 1893, P. L. 113 §3, 1 Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 511 $208, which provides that if the chief burgess does not approve of an ordinance, he must return it with his objections to the council at the next regular meeting, it was held that if an ordinance was passed at a special meeting the chief burgess was not required so to act but had until the next regular meeting after the regular meeting, as a special meeting might be called just before a regular meeting and make examination if possible. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Inter-County Street Rwy. Co., 167 Pa. 75, 31 Atl. 477, 36 W. N. C. 160, reversing 4 North. 314, 15 Pa. C. C. 293, 12 Lanc. L. Rev. 181; Board of Health, 3 Dist. 225, 14 Pa. C. C. 116. It was held that the Act of May 11, 1893, P. L. 44, I Purd. Dig. (13th Ed.) 532 8320 et seq., which gives the regulations of boards of health the force of ordinances when approved by the council and chief burgess, was intended to give the chief burgess only such power to veto as he had with respect to ordinances of council. Boards of Health, 3 Dist. 225, 14 Pa. C. C. 116. It has been held that instructions by council to a street committee, to purchase and lay pipes in a drain, whether given by motion, resolu