REPORT OF THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I now have the honor to make this my last annual report. Preliminary thereto, I submit the annual reports of the Adjutant and Inspector Generals (the only heads of Bureaus who report direct to the General-in-Chief) and of the commanding generals of the three divisions into which the territory of the United States is divided, with the reports of the several department commanders, who occupy the same relation to the former that a brigadier holds to a division commander of an army in the field. These are grouped as follows: 1st. Report of Adjutant-General Drum, inclosing the usual tables, "organization of the Army," "actual strength of the Army," "distri bution of the troops," "list of existing military divisions, departments, and posts" "casualties," "assignment of recruits," &c. 2d. Report of Inspector-General Sacket. 3d. Report of Lieutenant-General Sheridan, of the Division of the Missouri. 3 A.-Report of Brigadier-General Terry, of the Department of Dakota, with sub-report of Col. T. H. Ruger, of the District of Montana. 3 B.-Report of Brigadier-General Howard, of the Department of the Platte. 3 C.-Report of Major-General Pope, of the Department of the Missouri, with sub-report of Brigadier-General Mackenzie, of the District of New Mexico. 3 D.-Report of Brigadier-General Augur, of the Department of Texas. 4th. Report of Major-General Hancock, of the Division of the Atlantic, and of the Department of the East. 4 A-Report of Col. H. J. Hunt, Fifth Artillery, of the Department of the South. 5th. Report of Major-General Schofield, of the Division of the Pacific, and of the Department of California. 5 A.-Report of Brigadier-General Crook, of the Department of Arizona. 5 B.-Report of Colonel and Brevet Major-General Wheaton, of the Department of the Columbia. From these reports it will appear that the Army consists of 25,478 aggregate, as follows: These figures are almost identical with those of last year, and the current of military events during the same period has been of the most peaceful character. Nothing has occurred to disturb the rapid development of the great West, which is now completely open to the immigrant in regions where a few years ago no single man could go with safety. There have been no wars or "rumors of wars" in any of the Territories of the United States, with the single exception of Arizona, and even there the hostiles belonged to our neighbor, Mexico. General Crook, in order to reach the source of trouble, had, with the consent of the Mexican authorities, to go 200 miles into Mexico to strike the Apaches in their mountain fastness, which he did with success. I invite special attention to his report, because I think he has touched, with a master's hand, the cause of the conflicts with our Indian foes, and I believe that if he be permitted to manage the Apaches in his own way all wars will cease in Arizona, and with them will disappear the complicated Indian question which has tested the patience and courage of our people ever since the first settlement by whites on this continent. During this time of profound peace the military authorities have given their best thoughts to "military education" and to "target practice;" and in this connection, out of a large mass of reports, I have selected for printing and general reference the following: 6th. Report of Colonel and Brevet Major-General Merritt, of the Military Academy, West Point, New York. 7th. Report of Maj. L. L. Livingston, Fourth United States Artillery, of the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. 8th. Report of Col. E. S. Otis, Twentieth United States Infantry, of the School of Instruction for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. These cover the whole ground of military education, from the boy appointed as a cadet to the thorough officer of the several arms of serv ice; and I am convinced, after having seen many of the most celebrated military schools of the world, that ours are among the best, and are well adapted to the character of our people and institutions. The Military Academy at West Point is the creation of law—is rather a Congressional school than military. Each cadet represents a member of Congress, or rather a Congressional district, with the exception of the ten appointed at large; and the cadet only comes into the Army proper after his graduation, and after being commissioned as an officer. Yet, whilst undergoing instruction, the Corps of Cadets is subject to military law and discipline, and thus becomes an integral part of the Army of the United States. The education imparted at West Point always has been and must continue to be preliminary-that is, common to the whole human race-calculated to prepare them for the work of life, whether it be military or civil, such as mathematics, language, chemistry, natural philosophy, &c.; so that a cadet may graduate at West Point and yet not be familiar with the knowledge indispensable to feed, clothe, manage, and fight a company or a regiment, which are the ultimate objects of all Army education, and, therefore, the practical schools at Forts Monroe and Leavenworth have been found most advantageous, even for cadets who have graduated with honor at West Point. The school at Fort Monroe is special for the artillery, and is as necessary to the Army as a separate special training is for a surgeon, for a lawyer, for an engineer of a ship, or for one who manages a railroad train; and I am convinced that by the simple instrumentality of this admirably conducted school we now have secured a trained body of artillery officers capable of handling with skill the most massive and complicated of modern artillery, and able to continue the instruction for all time to come. By mounting and equipping two batteries instead of one to each regiment of artillery, as accomplished by General Orders No. 96, Headquarters of the Army, of 1882, we doubled our capacity for instruction in that most useful and captivating branch of the military service. In like manner the school recently established at Fort Leavenworth for cavalry and infantry is designed and calculated to give more perfect instruction in these most essential branches of the military service. This school is for commissioned officers of the Army, temporarily detailed away from their proper companies, without any increased pay or allowances, adding not a cent to the annual estimates, yet calculated to prepare the junior officers for the highest sphere of military life. In times of peace we are all apt to forget that war is ever liable to occur, and I only wish in this connection to remind many a man now living of the sudden call in 1861 for military knowledge. We now possess three admirable schools, well located, well managed, which fulfill that purpose in an eminent degree, and I bespeak for them your ardent support and encouragement. They need nothing else. The report of the Adjutant General, herewith, does not show the same satisfactory condition of the "post schools" for enlisted men and soldiers' children at the various military stations. Indeed, since the passage of the law substantially abolishing "camp women," the number of soldiers' children has largely diminished, so that there is no urgent call for such schools; and after an enlisted man has learned to read, with few exceptions, he is content with the advantages of the post libraries, which contain the usual supply of histories, novels, magazines, and newspapers. Grown men, such as compose our ranks, do not want to subject themselves to the average pedagogue, and schools for the enlisted men must be voluntary. The reading-rooms at all our frontier posts are most creditable, and are well patronized. So with target practice and the usual athletic games, good progress is reported everywhere, and so far as they have fallen under my observation they are admirably conducted, calling for no changes in the present methods. I now regard the Indians as substantially eliminated from the problem of the Army. There may be spasmodic and temporary alarms, but such Indian wars as have hitherto disturbed the public peace and tranquillity are not probable. The Army has been a large factor in producing this result, but it is not the only one. Immigration and the occupation by industrious farmers and miners of lands vacated by the aborigines have been largely instrumental to that end, but the railroad which used to follow in the rear now goes forward with the picket-line in the great battle of civilization with barbarism, and has become the greater cause. I have in former reports, for the past fifteen years, treated of this matter, and now, on the eve of withdrawing from active participation in public affairs, I beg to emphasize much which I have spoken and written heretofore. The recent completion of the last of the four great transcontinental lines of railway has settled forever the Indian question, the Army question, and many others which have hitherto troubled the country. I did intend, before retirement, to sketch out my own experience and knowledge of this most interesting and important subject, and with this end in view I determined, last spring, to cross the continent, westward, substantially by the great lakes and by the line of the Northern Pacific Railway, to return by that along the thirty-fifth parallel, having in previous years traversed the country by every other known route. I started on the 20th of June and traveled till the 8th of October, having along, with others, my aide-de-camp, Col. J. C. Tidball, of the artillery, who took careful notes, and whose report herewith, marked 9, is more full and satisfactory than any I can possibly reproduce from memory. Also, before starting, I instructed my aide-de-camp, Col. O. M. Poe, of the Engineer Corps, to rake among the public archives for a condensed, yet accurate, history of the conception, rise, progress, and completion of these transcontinental roads for my use on return. His report, herewith, marked 10, is also so complete and condensed that I beg to submit it entire, to be construed as part of my own report, better arranged than any I can do myself, and to it I invite your special attention. I regard the building of these railroads as the most important event of modern times, and believe that they account fully for the peace and good order which now prevail throughout our country, and for the extraordinary prosperity whic now prevails in this land. A vast domain, equal to two-thirds of the whole surface of the United States, has thus been made accessible to the immigrant, and, in a military sense, our troops may be assembled at strategic points and sent promptly to the places of disturbance, checking disorders in the bud. Railroads, however, are instrumentalities rather than substantial causes. They are easily broken and interrupted, because a single man, from malice or enmity, may in a minute displace a rail, move a switch, or fire a bridge, which will require a week or month to repair, interrupting all travel. They require a station, with sidings, every ten miles, water-stations at convenient and short intervals, and costly repair-shops every hundred miles. These constantly call for the protection of the military usually posted on or near the lines. Whilst these roads enable us to send soldiers to threatened points at the rate of five hundred miles a day, thus overcoming the space in one day which used to require a full month of painful marching, these soldiers must in advance be thoroughly organized, equipped, provided and instructed beforehand, because they must be ready for action the moment they reach their destination. It is then too late for preparation, so that the necessity for trained soldiers in advance of the call is rather increased than diminished by these modern developments. I therefore renew the recommendation of last year, as contained in my letter to you of October 16, 1882, that the strategic points therein named shall be adequately enlarged, with permanent barracks, so as to accommodate suitable garrisons, and that all minor places be abandoned by the military. This will in the end result in economy as well as efficiency. I admit that there exists a tendency to extravagance on the part of the military as well as of the civil agents of the United States; but the day is past when a soldier will be content to live in "dug-outs," on "his pound of bread, pound of meat, and gill of whisky" per day, whilst the farmer, mechanic, and laboring man alongside has a good house, with coffee, sugar, vegetables, and a wellprovided table. We must now treat the soldier as a fellow-man. Let him live as his neighbor, with similar comforts, and he will respond to the call of duty even to the death, as of old. I believe, with General Augur, that there has been a good deal of "loose talk" about overworking the soldiers. I have recently seen them work cheerfully at Coeur d'Alene and Spokane side by side with the civil mechanics, on the same scaffold. The soldier in America should be paid in comparison with his neighbors, and not according to the scale of foreign armies, about which he knows nothing and cares less. He is willing to abide by his contract of enlistment, provided he receives extra pay proportioned to the extra work imposed on him when employed on labor not military, and the price for this extra labor should be proportioned to its value on the spot. The local quartermaster, subject to the discretion of the department commander, under rules prescribed by the Secretary of War, can fix the value of this labor better than any other person. The law should define what kind of labor is to be paid for, because every soldier should build his own bivouac and house his own provisions; but when employed as a carpenter, mechanic, or laborer, on roads, bridges, or buildings of a permanent nature, it is only fair that he should be paid for such labor, or at least receive a credit for it to be paid on his final discharge. This would remove all the clamor about making our soldiers a body of cheap workmen, and take away the alleged excuse for desertion. I am satisfied, from personal observation, that the condition of the soldier to-day is far better than it was in 1846, and that each year it improves by the increased mail facilities, better quarters, better food, and better treatment. In this report I have purposely abstained from making any recommendations for the future, other than renewing such as had been made in former reports, because on the 1st day of November, at my own request, I will be permitted to transfer the command of the Army to my successor, Lieutenant-General Sheridan, with ample time for him to make such recommendations as he may deem wise and necessary for the action of the next Congress. On the 8th day of February, 1884, I will attain the limit of age fixed by Congress for military service in the Army, and I purposely asked of the President the privilege of anticipating this date to enable my successor to make such recommendations as he may deem necessary; but before leaving I beg to record an expression of opinion that it will be found wise to provide a common organization for all arms of the service, viz: That each regiment of infantry be composed of twelve companies, the same as now with the artillery and cavalry, making three battalions, each of four companies in time of peace, and of eight in time of war; that each company shall have a hundred men; and that in time of peace two of these battalions (eight companies) shall be maintained on a perfect war footing, whilst the other battalion (four companies) may be a mere skeleton, with its complement of officers, and used as a nucleus for recruits. In this battalion can be placed the officers and soldiers invalided by hard service or by sickness, and such as are not yet weaned of home influence or family importunity. Were such an organization (thus briefly sketched, but more elaborately described in former reports) to be sanctioned by Congress, the |