and completely internal and "is carried on between man and man in a state or between different parts of the same state." The word "among" is restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one. The completely internal commerce of a state is excluded from federal control, but all other commerce is subject to federal control. (Gibbons vs. Ogden, supra.)

"The states have as much control over their purely internal commerce as Congress has over commerce among the several states and with foreign nations." (County of Mobile vs. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691.)

"The rule that the regulation of commerce which is confined exclusively within the jurisdiction and territory of a state, and does not affect other nations or states or the Indian tribes, that is to say, the purely internal commerce of a state, belongs exclusively to the state, is as well settled as that the regulation of commerce which does affect other nations or states or the Indian tribes, belongs to Congress." (Western Union Telegraph Co. vs. Texas, 105 U. S. 460.)

It is the fact of diverse citizenship that brings the parties dealing with each other within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. That diversity once established, the state lines vanish, and the commercial intercourse is among citizens, not of the states, but of the United States, and the regulation is conducted without regard to state lines.

"The nations, states and tribes designated in this clause of the Constitution do not mean those bodies in the aggregate. For example: the state of Tennessee has no commerce with the state of Kentucky lying adjacent to it; the United States, as a body, has no commerce with England. It simply means commerce, traffic and intercourse between the citizens or subjects of those nations, states or tribes." (Miller's Lectures on Constitutional Law, 467.)

It, therefore, appears that the Constitution is sufficiently expansive to cover even instrumentalities of commerce that were not in existence or dreamed of at the time of its adoption: but the contemporary practical construction of Hamilton.

and Wilson defines insurance to be commerce. The various uses made of the different kinds of insurance written and the methods by which the business is done, conclusively establish it to be an instrumentality of commerce and the business itself

commerce.

In sec

Congress has declared insurance to be commerce. tion 6 of the Act of Congress entitled, "An Act to establish the Department of Commerce and Labor," the Bureau of Corporations is charged with a "diligent investigation into the organization, conduct and management of the business of any corporation, joint stock company or corporate combination engaged in commerce with the several states and with foreign nations, excepting common carriers"; and it is the duty of that bureau "to gather, compile, publish and supply useful information concerning corporations doing business within the limits of the United States as shall engage in interstate commerce or in commerce between the United States and any foreign country, including corporations engaged in insurance,” etc. Congress is the exclusive judge of the expediency of such regulation and of the facts which render such regulation expedient. (See McCulloch vs. Maryland, supra.) And Congress has the exclusive power "to determine the articles. which may be the subjects of commerce." (Per Mr. Justice Catron in License Cases, 5 How. 504, quoted by Justices Matthews and Field in Bowman vs. Railway Co., supra.)

"We cannot hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as subjects of interstate commerce are not such." (Per Chief Justice Fuller in Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 125.)

Mr. Justice Miller in United States vs. Steffens, 100 U, S. 182, states that Acts of Congress held unconstitutional for want of constitutional power may be counted by anyone upon his fingers.

The apparent conflict in the decisions of the Supreme Court. with respect to the commerce clause of the Constitution has arisen chiefly because of the divergent views entertained by the various members of the court with respect to the opposing

doctrines of concurrent and exclusive power. But when Congress has spoken, even withdrawing from federal regulation any of the conceded subjects of commerce, as, for instance, intoxicating liquors (in re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545), its will has been made effective by the Supreme Court.

In the interest of that publicity which will insure the maximum of protection to the public and to lessen the cost of insurance, Congress should supplement its directions to the Bureau of Corporations by providing for the complete supervision of the business; for it is only by legislation that this power of the general government can be determined.

THE VALUED POLICY LAWS.

In nineteen or twenty of the states are statutes known as valued policy laws which require fire insurance companies to pay to the insured in the event of the total destruction of real or personal property insured, the full amount named in the policy, regardless of the value of the property at the time of the loss. Such laws, according to the experience of insurance companies and others qualified to speak upon the subject, invite fraud, perjury and arson. The man who insures his property for more than it is worth and then sets it on fire, is protected by law in his dishonesty and crime to the extent of his overinsurance. Such laws have increased both the cost of insurance and the fire waste. They place before every evil-disposed person the temptation to overinsure and then to burn his property for the gain there is in it, and even an honest insured is likely to be very much more careless than when he is obliged to carry some portion of the risk himself. No man ought to be permitted to recover on a fire insurance policy more than the value of the property that is destroyed.

Governor Shaw of Iowa in 1900, Governor Pattison of Pennsylvania in 1893, Governor Altgeld of Illinois in 1893, Governor Thomas of Colorado in 1899, Governor Wells of Utah in 1899 and Governor Sadler of Nevada in 1899 vetoed bills of this character, and the Insurance Commissioners of

Ohio, Wisconsin, Missouri, Michigan and other states have condemned these statutes in the severest terms. Governor Shaw made an investigation of the operation of such statutes in other states and collected the record of over eight hundred policies in the southern tier of counties of Iowa and the northern tier of counties of Missouri, from which he found that the rate of insurance was materially increased, and in many instances doubled, and in some cases more than doubled. In his veto message he said:

"There is no escaping the proposition that the insured must pay all losses and any law that has the effect to increase the hazard must necessarily increase the rate. True insurance is indemnity. Nothing in excess of actual loss should ever be collectible. In order to reduce the loss to the minimum there must be some inducement for the owner of the property to throw water rather than oil upon incipient fires."

A UNIFORM FIRE POLICY.

In the states of New York, Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota and New Hampshire all policies of fire insurance are written upon a form known as the New York standard fire insurance policy, or a form substantially like it. This form contains between two hundred and fifty and three hundred points (see index to New York standard fire insurance policy by F. O. Affeld, Jr.). These provisions of the fire insurance policy have given rise in the several states to much litigation and to a great diversity of judicial opinion. For instance, in one state the appraisal clause of the policy is avoided; in the others it is upheld. In twenty of the fifty states and territories the amount of recovery is determined not by the amount of loss, but by the amount of insurance named in the policy. In some states notice to the company's agent in a mode expressly prohibited by the policy is binding upon the company; in other states the terms of the policy control. Upon

many questions the federal rule differs from that of the state courts, and the anomalous situation is often presented that upon precisely the same facts the judgment of the federal court will be exactly opposite to the judgment of the state court in the same federal district. A form of policy expressed in simple terms, which shall mean the same in California as in New York and in Texas as in Minnesota, and covering all necessary requirements, could be made simpler, better and much shorter than the one now in use, and would very greatly simplify the business of fire insurance and be to the mutual advantage of the public and the companies. If federal supervision is not accomplished, then some such plan should be adopted to secure uniformity in the terms of fire insurance policies and their established meaning throughout the states as the Association has adopted with reference to negotiable instruments.

THE REVOCATION OF LICENSES.

The

In many of the states authority is conferred on a single individual, either the insurance commissioner or the auditor of state, to revoke arbitrarily the licenses of companies transacting their business outside of the states of their creation, whenever in the judgment of such official, any company is violating any state law, or its solvency is impaired. There is no objection to the revocation of licenses for any substantial cause. objection is to the lodgment of so much power in one individual, and all such statutes should be modified so as to give any company threatened with the revocation of its license an opportunity to be heard and the right to appeal to the courts, if necessary, before its license is revoked, upon giving adequate security for the protection of its policy holders, pending the appeal, to be fixed and approved by the court to which the appeal is taken.

STATUTES PROHIBITING THE REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

In a number of the states there are statutes requiring all insurance companies of other states to agree not to remove any