It would seem that, after a first conviction has been. returned to the Sessions, and filed, the Justices, if they think it defective, may make out and file a second. (a)

A conviction for selling liquor on a Sunday, in contravention of the (Ont.) 32 Vic., c. 32, s. 23, omitted to state that the liquor was not supplied, upon a requisition, for medicinal purposes; held bad, and the conviction was quashed. (b)

In Reid v. M' Whinnie, (c) it was held sufficient to state the offence in the conviction as selling "a certain spirituous liquor called whisky," though s. 254 of the 29 & 30 Vic., c. 51, which created the offence, mentioned "intoxicating liquor of any kind," for intoxicating liquor and spirituous liquor were used in the Act as convertible terms, and in the Customs Act, of the same session, whisky was recognized as a spirituous liquor. The offence alleged was selling "a certain quantity, to wit, one pint" :-Held sufficient, without negativing that it was a sale in the original packages, within the exemption in s. 252 of the Act, for it would be judicially noticed that a pint was less than five gallons, or twelve bottles, which the packages must at least have contained. (d)

Where a conviction on its face was dated on the 30th of April, and alleged the sale of liquors on the 12th of April in the same year:-Held no objection that the proceedings were not stated to have been begun within the twenty days from the offence, limited by s. 259 of this Act, for the fact sufficiently appeared on the face of the conviction. (e)

Certainty and precision are required in the statement and description of an offence under a penal statute, and

(a) Wilson v. Graybiel, 5 U. C. Q. B. 227; Chaney v. Payne, 1Q. B. 712. (b) Reg. v. White, 21 U. C. C. P. 354.

(c) 27 U. C. Q. B. 289.

(d) Ib.

(e) Ib.

an information charging several offences in the disjunctive is bad, and the defect will not be cured by the confession of the defendant. (a) The charge in a conviction must be certain, and so stated as to be pleadable in the event of a second prosecution for the same offence. (b)

The conviction must be of the offence charged in the information, and not of a different offence, or of several offences in the conjunctive, charged in the disjunctive. (c) Therefore, a conviction adjudging the defendant guilty of the several offences therein enumerated, and condemning him "for his said offences" to but one penalty, is bad. (d) A conviction will lie against a partner alone for selling liquor without license, for all torts are several as well as joint. (e)

The following conviction for selling spirituous liquors by retail, contrary to law-namely, "that A. B., of, etc., merchant and shopkeeper, did, within the space of six calendar months now last past, in the year aforesaid, at, etc., sell and vend a certain quantity of spirituous liquors in less quantity than one quart, to wit, one pint, etc., without license for that purpose previously obtained, contrary to the form of the Statute, in such case made and provided," was held bad in substance, in leaving it doubtful under which of the Stats.-40 Geo 3, c. 4; 6 Wm. 4. c. 2; 6 Geo. 4, c. 4-and for what offence the conviction was made. (f) When a conviction concludes contra formam statuti, it should first shew something done which is contrary to the Statute, and the conclusion should follow properly from the premises, otherwise a criminal charge would contain no certainty at all. (g)

(a) Ex parte Hogue, 3 L. C. R. 94.

(b) Reg. v. Hoggard, 30 U. C. Q. B. 152.
(c) Ex parte Hogue 3 L. C. R. 94.
(d) Ib.

(e) Mullins and Bellamere, 7 L. C. J. 228.
(f) Wilson v. Grayhiel, 5 U. C. Q. B. 227.
(g) Ib. 229, per Robinson, C. J.

A conviction under the 14 & 15 Vic., c 100, for retailing spirituous liquors, and not alleging such sale to have been made without license," discloses no offence, and cannot be sustained. (a) But where a conviction for selling liquor without license, contrary to the (N. S.) Rev. Stat., c. 22, s. 32, did not state that the sale was "without license" :----Held that this was an immaterial fact, and that the conviction substantially stated the nature of the offence, and was sufficient. (b)

In a prosecution for selling liquor without license, it is not necessary to negative the averment that the defendant is not a distiller within the provisions of Con. Stats., L. C. c. 6, s. 1. (c) An allegation that the defendant sold by retail, at one time, fermented liquors in less quantities than three gallons, to wit, three glasses of beer, is sufficient and legal, and such an allegation of an offence committed on a day certain, and "at divers times before and after," does not include several offences, it being conformable to the form of declaration given in the above Statute. (d) Keeping a house of public entertainment is no offence against this Act, unless qualified. (e)

A conviction under 40 Geo. 3, c. 4, for selling liquor without licence was quashed, because the information stated that "the defendant was in the habit of selling spirituous liquors without license," without charging any specific offence, and not shewing time nor place, nor that the liquors were sold by retail, and also because the conviction directed the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution, without specifying the amount. (f) But it was no objection, under the 29 & 30 Vic., c. 51, s. 254,

that the costs of conveying the defendant to gaol, in the event of imprisonment, in default of distress were specified. (a)

The quashing of a by-law under which a certificate has been granted, and license issued for the sale of spirituous liquors, does not nullify the license under the (Ont.) 32 Vic., c. 32; and a conviction for selling without license cannot therefore, under these circumstances, be supported. (b)

Under this Statute, a license to sell spirituous liquors, whether by wholesale or retail, is now necessary, either in the case of a tavern or a shop; and in the case of a shop, it must not be consumed on the premises, or sold in quantities less than a quart. Therefore, the sale of a bottle of gin, without license, is contrary to law; and it would seem that even if a license be necessary only on a sale by retail, the sale of a bottle valued at sixty cents would be a sale by retail. (c)

It is not necessary, in a conviction for selling liquor without a license, to mention the Statute under which the conviction took place. Under the 32 Vic., c. 32, it need not appear on the face of the conviction that the prosecution was commenced within twenty days of the commission of the offence. This latter point, however, depends upon the peculiar language of the Act, or rather upon the fact that the section of the Act containing the limitation is entirely distinct from the section creating the offence, and imposing the penalty-the latter being s. 22, and the former s. 25. The rule in such cases is, that the limitation arising under a distinct clause is matter of defence, and need not appear on the face of the conviction. (d)

(a) Reid v. McWhinnie, 27 U. C. Q. B. 289.

(b) Reg. v. Stafford, 22 U. C. C. P. 177.

(c) Reg. v. Strachan, 20 U. C. C. P. 182.

(d) Reg. v. Strachan, supra; Wray v. Toke, 12 Q. B. 492; Rex v. Woodcock, 7 Ea. 146.

Where the conviction is for a fine-as a fine is imposed by s. 22 for the first offence-it is not necessary to specify whether the conviction is for the first or second offence, as, from the punishment awarded, the Court would imply the first offence; and as the offence is selling liquor without license, it is not necessary to state to whom the liquor was sold. S. 25 of the Act provides that the Magistrate shall proceed in a summary manner, according to the practice and procedure, and after the forms, contained in c. 103 Con. Stats. of Canada. It was held, therefore, that the Magistrate following that Act, in awarding imprisonment in default of distress and commitment, and conveying to gaol, was not acting illegally, and that it was also sufficient for the conviction to follow the forms given by same Statute. (a)

This Statute was intended as a guide to Magistrates, and to prevent failure of justice. A conviction, therefore, is sufficient if it follows the form prescribed by the Statute. (b)

Where the depositions returned to the Court by the convicting Magistrate, under a Certiorari, shewed that there was no evidence of a license produced before him, while the affidavits filed, on the application to quash, stated that the party had a license in fact, and produced evidence of it before the Magistrate, who, moreover, himself swore that he believed a license was produced, but it was either not proved, or given in evidence:-Held that the return to the Certiorari was conclusive, and that the Court could not go behind it. (c)

The informer is a competent witness, as he is expressly made so by the Statute. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Strachan, 20 U. C. C P. 182; Re Allison, 10 Ex. 568, per Parke, B.; Mofat v. Barnard, 24, U. C. Q. B. 498; Egginton v. Lichfield, 5 E. & B.

103.