The offence of forgery is not triable at the Quarter Sessions. (a)

Great care was formerly requisite in describing the instrument in an indictment for forgery, but now it is sufficient to describe the same by any name or designation, by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or fac simile thereof, or otherwise describing the same or the value thereof. (b)

It is not necessary, in an indictment for forgery, to allege an intent to defraud any particular person, but it is sufficient to allege that the party accused did the act with intent to defraud (c)

Where goods were obtained by false pretences, through the medium of a forged order, the uttering of which was felony, the indictment must formerly have been for the felony, otherwise an acquittal would have been directed on the ground that the misdemeanor was merged, (d)

In an indictment for forging a receipt, it must be alleged that such receipt was either for money or goods, etc., as mentioned in the Con. Stats. Can., c. 94, s. 9. (e)

Where the instrument is set out in hæc verba, in an indictment for forgery, the description of its legal character is surplusage, and unnecessary. (ƒ)

Where an objection was taken to an indictment for forgery, that it concluded contra formam statuti, and that there was nothing to shew that the offence was against any Statute :-Held, that this averment was of no importance, for, if the offence was one against the Statute, it was sufficiently proven, and, if not against the Statute,

(a) Reg. v. M'Donald, 31 U. C. Q. B. 337; Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 U. C. Q. B. 118. (b) 32 & 33 Vic. c. 19. s. 49.

(c) See s. 51.

(d) R. v. Evans, 5 C. & P. 553. But see now 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 50, ante, p. 78.

(e) Reg. v. M'Corkill, 8 L. C. J. 283.

(f) Reg. v. Carson, 14 U. C. C. P. 309; Reg. v. Williams, 2 Den. C. C. 61.

but an offence at common law, the allegation was immaterial and unnecessary. (a)

It is no defence to an indictment for forging a note, that the prisoner may have expected, and fully intended, to pay it when it became due. (b)

The offence of forgery, at common law, was only a misdemeanor, and it fell within the general class of cheats. (c)

Cheats and Frauds.-These offences at common law consisted in the fraudulent obtaining the property of an other, by any deceitful and illegal practice or token, short of felony, which affects, or may affect, the public, or such frauds as are levelled against the public justice of the realm. (d)

In the case of forgery, it was sufficient that the party might be prejudiced by the false instrument, but nothing could be prosecuted as a cheat at common law without an actual prejudice, which was an obtaining on the statute 33 Hy. 8. (e)

If a person, in the way of his trade or business, put, or suffer to be put, a false mark or token upon any article, so as to pass off as genuine that which is spurious, if such article be sold by such false token or mark, the person so selling may be indicted for a cheat at common law, but the indictment must allege that the article was passed off by means of such false token or mark.

Where an indictment alleged that the prisoner, being a picture dealer, knowingly kept in his shop a picture whereon the name of an artist was falsely and fraudulently painted, with intent to pass the picture off as the original work of the artist whose name was so painted,

(a) Reg. v. Carson, 14 U. C. C. P. 309; Reg. v. Williams, 2 Den. C. C. 61. (b) Reg. v. Craig. 7 U. C. C. P. 244.

(c) 2 Russ. Cr. 709 et seq.

(d) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 94, per Drummond, J; and see 2 Russ. Cr. 613. (e) 2 Russ. Cr. 613; Ward's case, 2 Str. 747.

and that he sold the same to H. F., with intent to defraud, and did thereby defraud him, but without stating that the picture was passed off by means of the artist's name being so falsely painted:-Held, that such painting of the artist's name was putting a false token on the picture, and that the selling by means thereof would be a cheat at common law, but that the want of such last averment was fatal. (a)

Where a person contracts to deliver loaves of bread, of a certain weight, at a certain price, the delivery of a less quantity, (i. e., lesa in weight,) than that contracted for, is a mere private fraud, and not indictable, if no false weights or tokens have been used. (b)

False Personation.-Falsely personating a voter at a municipal election is not an indictable offence. Our sta tute law contains no provision on the subject, nor is it an offence at common law. (c) It would seem that, in an indictment for this offence, there should be an averment negativing the identity of the defendant with the voter suggested to be personated. (d)

Falsely assuming to vote in the name of another person, whose name appears on the list of voters, is made a misdemeanor, by Con. Stats. Can. c. 6, ss. 60 & 87, and can be tried only in a Criminal Court, and the fine imposed on conviction in such Court. (e)

A person cannot be convicted under the 14 & 15 Vic., c. 105, s. 3, of personating a "person entitled to vote," if the person personated be dead at the time, as the words can only mean a person entitled to vote at the time when the personation takes place. (ƒ)

To complete the offence of inducing a person to per

(a) Reg. v. Closs, 4 U. C. L. J. 98; Dears. & B. 460 ; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 54. (b) Reg. v. Eagleton, 1 U. C. L. J. 179; Dears. 515; 24 L. J. (M. C.) 158. (c) Reg v. Hogg, 25 U. C. Q. B. 66.; Reg. v. Dent, 1 Den. C. C. 159.

(d) Ib. 68, per Hagarty, J.

(e) Barrette v. Bernard, 14 L. C. R. 435.

(f) Whiteley v. Chappell, L. R. 4 Q. B. 147.

sonate a voter, at a municipal election, under the Imp. Act, 22 Vic., c. 35, s. 9, it is not necessary that the personation should be successful, and a conviction for the offence was held good, though it did not set out the mode or facts of the inducement. (a)

Malicious Injuries.-Injuring or destroying private property is, in general, no crime, but a mere civil trespass, over which a Magistrate has no jurisdiction, unless by Statute. (b)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 22, contains provisions respecting malicious injury to property; but, to bring a case within this Statute, the act must have been wilfully or maliciously done. (c) But malice conceived against the owner of the property, in respect of which it shall be committed, is not necessary. (d)

It is not necessary that the damage done should be of a permanent kind. Plugging up the feed pipe of a steam engine is an offence within s. 19 of this Act. The prisoner plugged up the feed-pipe of a steam engine, and displaced other parts of the engine in such a way as rendered it temporarily useless, and would have caused an explosion if the obstruction had not been discovered, and, with some labour, removed :-Held, that he was guilty of damaging the engine, with intent to render it useless, within the meaning of this clause. (e)

It was held under the former Statute, 4 & 5 Vic., c. 26, s. 5, the words of which were not so comprehensive as the present Statute, that an apparatus for manufacturing potash, consisting of ovens, kettles, tubs, etc., was not a machine or engine, the cutting, breaking, or damaging of which was felonious. (f)

(a) Reg. v. Hague, 12 W. R. 310

(b) Powell v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Q. B. 155, per Robinson, C. J. (c) Powell v. Williamson, supra.

(d) s. 66.

(e) Reg. v. Fisher, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 7; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 57. (f) Reg. v. Dogherty, 2 L. C. R. 255.

Under s. 45 of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 22, upon an indictment for maliciously wounding a horse, it is not necessary to prove that any instrument was used to inflict the wound, and the word "wound" must be taken in the ordinary sense. (a)

Ss. 20 & 28 of the 4 & 5 Vic., c. 26, gave a summary remedy, not for trespassing on the close, but for malicious injuries to the tree. (b)

A summons for malicious injury to property, under the former Statute, must have been upon complaint under oath, and a conviction stating that the offence complained of was committed "depuis environ huit jours," was held bad for want of certainty. (c)

The offence of wilfully injuring a fence, etc., under the (N. B.) 1 Rev. Stats., c. 153, s. 11, is a misdemeanor, not punishable by summary conviction. (d)

Arson at common law is an offence of the degree of felony, and has been described as the malicious and wilful burning of the house of another. (e) It is to be observed that the burning must be of the house of another, but the burning a man's own house in a town, or so near to other houses as to create danger to them, is a great misdemeanor at common law. (ƒ)

The owner of a house would, at common law, commit no offence by destroying it, whether by fire or by pulling it down to the ground, provided that, in so doing, he did not infringe the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alium non lædas, and even by non-observance of that rule he would only commit a civil injury, and not a crime. (g)

Arson, at common law, being an injury to the actual

(a) Reg. v. Bullock, L. R. 1 C. C R. 115; 37 L. J. (M. C.) 47.

(b) Madden v. Farley, 6 U. C. Q. B. 213, per Robinson, C. J.

(c) Ex parte Hook, 3 L. C. R. 496.

(d) Ex parte Mulhern, 4 Allen, 259.

(e) 2 Russ. Cr. 1024.

(f) Ib.

(g) Reg. v. Bryans, 12 U. C. C. P. 163-4, per Draper, C. J.