Lands there, by whom it was forwarded to the Commissioner of Crown Lands, and that, subsequently, a patent for the Lot issued to the party in whose behalf the affidavit had been made: and this was held evidence from which it might be inferred that the affidavit was sworn in the County of Grey, and that the jury had properly so inferred-Held, also, that if the affidavit was sworn in the County of Grey, the proof of the swearing by the Justice of the Peace, and the taking of the oath by the defendant, were made out by proving their signatures. (a)

It has been held that, on an indictment for perjury, the defendant must appear and submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, before he can be allowed to plead, and that this rule applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies. (b)

An indictment for perjury charged that it was committed on the trial of an indictment against A. B., at the Court of Quarter Sessions for the County of B.,on the 11th of June 1867, on a charge of larceny:-Held, sufficient, and that it was not necessary to specify the property stolen, the ownership thereof, or the locality from which it was taken, nor to allege that the indictment was in the name of the Queen, as the Court must take judicial notice of the fact that Her Majesty alone could prosecute on a charge of larceny. (c) This decision was, to some extent, founded on the provisions of the Con. Stats. C. c. 99, s. 39 & 51.

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s. 9, are the same in substance, so that the decision will still hold.

Although, in an indictment for obtaining money or goods by false pretences, the property in the money or

(a) See Reg. v. Greenland, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 65, as to affidavits under the 7 Geo, 4, c. 23.

(b) Reg. v. Maxwell, 10 L. C. R. 45.

(c) Reg. v. Macdonald, 17 U. C. C. P. 635.

goods must be alleged, yet on reciting such a prosecution, upon which to found a charge of perjury, it seems the same particularity would not be necessary, otherwise the false pretence should be set out, too, and it was only after a long course to the contrary that it was at length determined the false pretences should be set out in the indictment, for the specific offence. (a)

An indictment for perjury stated that a cause was pending in the County Court, in which A. and B. were plaintiffs and C. defendant; that, on the hearing of such cause, it "became a material question whether the said A. had, in the presence of the prisoner, signed at the foot of" a certain bill of account, purporting to be a bill of account between a certain firm called A. & Co. and the aforesaid C., a receipt for payment of the amount of the said bill," and that the said prisoner did" falsely, corruptly, and maliciously swear that the said A. did, on a certain day, in the presence of the prisoner, sign the said receipt, (meaning a receipt at the foot of the said first mentioned bill of account for the payment of the said bill,) whereas, etc.:-Held, that the indictment was suf ficiently certain. (b)

An indictment for perjury stated the offence to have been committed on the trial of " a certain indictment for misdemeanor," at the Quarter Sessions for the County of Salop, but it did not state what the misdemeanor was, so as to shew that the Court had jurisdiction to try it, nor did it expressly aver that the Court had such jurisdiction: -Held, that the indictment was good. (c)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s, 9, renders it unnecessary to set forth the authority to administer the oath. This Act

(a) Reg. v. Macdonald, 17 U. C. C. P. 638, per A. Wilson, J.; Rex v. Mason, 2 T. R. 581.

(b) Reg. v. Webster, 5 U. C. L. J. 262; 1 F. & F. 515.

(c) Reg. v. Dunning, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 290.

was passed to do away with technical forms of indictments, and where an indictment contains every averment required by this section, it is by the express terms of the section sufficient, although it does not contain any express or equivalent averment that the Court had competent authority to administer the oath. (a)

Where it appeared, on the face of an indictment for perjury, that the statement complained of was made before a Justice of the Peace, in preferring a charge of larceny committed within his jurisdiction, it was held unnecessary to allege expressly that he had authority to administer the oath. (b)

In an indictment for perjury, which charged the defendant with having sworn falsely in certain proceedings before Justices, wherein he was examined as a witness, the allegation of materiality averred that "the said D. R. (the defendant) being so sworn as aforesaid, it then and there became material to enquire and ascertain, etc. :— Held, bad, as not sufficiently shewing that the alleged perjury was committed at the said proceedings, and that the words "upon the trial" should have been used. (c)

In 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s. 9, "the substance of the of fence charged " means that the charge must contain such a description of the crime that the defendant may know what crime he is called upon to answer; that the jury may appear to be warranted in their conclusion of guilty or not guilty upon the premises delivered to them, and that the Court may see such a definite crime that they may apply the punishment which the law prescribes. (d) Where a prosecutor has been bound by recognizance

(a) Reg. v. Dunning, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 294-5, per Channel, B.
(b) Reg. v. Callaghan, 20 U. C. Q. B. 364.

(c) Reg. v. Ross, 1 Oldright, 683; and see 32 & 33 Vic. c. 29, Sch. A. Perjury 291.

(d) Reg. v. Macdonald, 17 U. C. C. P. 638, per A. Wilson, J.; Rex v. Horne, Cowp. 682.

to prosecute and give evidence against a person charged with perjury, in the evidence given by him on the trial of a certain suit, and the Grand Jury have found an indictment against the defendant, the Court will not quash the indictment because there is a variance in the specific charge of perjury contained in the information, and that contained in the indictment, provided the indictment sets forth the substantial charge contained in the information, so that the defendant has reasonable notice of what he has to answer. (a)

An indictment for perjury, based upon an oath alleged to have been made before the "Judge of the General Sessions of the Peace, in and for the said district" [of Montreal,] instead of, as the fact was, before the "Judge of the Sessions of the Peace in and for the City of Montreal," that being the proper title of the Judge, may be amended after plea of not guilty. (b)

Where an attempt to incite a woman to take a false oath consisted of a letter written by defendant, dated at Bradford, in the County of Simcoe, purporting but not proved to bear the Bradford post mark, and addressed to the woman at Toronto, where she received it :-Held, that the case could be tried in York; but semble per Draper, C. J., if the post mark had been proved, and the letter thus shewn to have passed out of the defendant's hands in Simcoe, intended for the woman, the offence would have been complete in that county, and the indictment only triable there; per Hagarty, J., the defendant would still, in that case, have caused the letter to be received in York, and might be tried there. (c) Quære, if the woman had committed the offence, it should have been

(a) Reg. v. Broad, 14 U. C. C. P. 168.
(b) Reg. v. Pelletier, 15 L. C. J. 146.
(c) Reg. v. Clement, 26 U. C. Q. B. 297.

charged as a misdemeanor, or as the statutory offence of perjury. (a)

But now the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s. 10, contains provisions as to the form of the indictment, whether the offence has or has not been actually committed, and section 8 provides that any person accused of perjury may be tried and convicted in any district, county, or place, where he is apprehended, or is in custody.

The ordinary conclusion of an indictment for perjury, "did thereby commit wilful and corrupt perjury," may be rejected as surplusage. (b)

It has been held, under the 14 & 15 Vic, c. 100, s. 1, (c) that the Judge had power to amend an indictment for perjury, describing the Justices before whom the perjury was committed as Justices for a county, where they are proved to be Justices for a borough only. (d)

By 26 Vic., c. 29, s. 7, it is enacted that witnesses before commissioners for enquiring into the existence of corrupt practices at elections shall not be excused from answering questions, on the ground that the answers thereto may criminate them, and that "no statement made by any person, in answer to any question put by such commissioners, shall, except in cases of indictments for perjury, be admissible in evidence in any proceeding, civil or criminal":-Held, that, " except in cases of indictments for perjury," applies only to perjury committed before the commissioners; and, therefore, on an indictment for perjury, committed on the trial of an election petition, evidence of answers to commissioners appointed to enquire into the existence of corrupt practices at the election in question is not admissible. (e)

(a) Reg. v. Clement, 26 U. C. Q. B. 297; see ante, p. 84.

(b) Reg. v. Hodgkiss, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 212; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 14; Ryalls v. Reg. 11 Q. B. 781.

(c) See 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 71.

(d) key. v. Western, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 122; 37 L. J. (M. C.) 81.

(e) Reg. v. Buttle, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 248.