confession, and continued to act in the prisoner's mind, notwithstanding the warning of the Coroner, he was right in directing the jury to reject them. If, in the course of the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, the Judge had suspected the confession had been obtained by undue influence, that suspicion ought to have been removed before the evidence was received. (a) Examinations taken before a Commissioner in Bankruptcy are admissible in evidence against the prisoner examined on a criminal charge. (b)

The prisoner's house had been visited by a constable, who came to enquire about the purpose for which the prisoner's forge was used. The prisoner volunteered a statement, implicating himself and several others in a Fenian conspiracy. The constable asked the prisoner, "Had he any objection to tell that to the Superintendent?" The prisoner said, "No," and went to the Superintendent, and thence to a Magistrate, where he made a detailed information, upon oath, to the same effect. No inducement whatever was offered to the prisoner to make the information, but he was not cautioned by the Magistrate. Some days afterwards, he was asked by the constable to come down and hear his information read, in the presence of the persons whom he had informed against, now in custody. He went down, and made a further information, and, on that occasion, made this statement, "I came to save myself." No caution was given on this occasion. The prisoner was bound over to prosecute, and the Magistrate considered him as an approver.

No charge was preferred against the prisoner up to this point, nor was he in custody. Subsequently, he

(a) Reg. v. Finkle, 15 U. C. C. P. 453.
(b) Reg. v. Robinson, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 80.

refused to prosecute, and was then arrested, tried, and convicted, his own information being put in evidence against him:-Held, (a) that the informations were not properly received, and that, therefore, the conviction was bad :—Held, by Fitzgerald and Deasy, B. B. that the first information was admissible, no intimation having been made by the prisoner of the expectation under which he made the admission, but that the second information was inadmissible. (b)

This case does not affect the position that the voluntary deposition of a witness, on oath, is admissible against him when subsequently charged with a crime. O'Hagan, J., expressly declares that the fact of its being made on oath would not render the deposition inadmissible, if made voluntarily and spontaneously. Fitzgerald and

Deasy, B. B. held that the first deposition, on oath, was admissible, for no inducement was then held out, the witness not being considered an approver. In fact, the ground on which the depositions were rejected, by the majority of the Court, was, that the confession was made with the view and under the hope of being thereby permitted to turn King's evidence. (c)

A voluntary statement, made by a prisoner, in the presence of a Magistrate, upon an application for a remand, is admissible in evidence, although the statement was not taken down in writing, and no caution was given by the Magistrate to the effect prescribed by the (d) corresponding English section of the 32 & 33 Vic. c. 30, s. 31. (e)

Confessions to a constable, by an accused in his custody, were not admitted where the accused might be

(a) Monahan, C. J., and Keogh, J., dissentientibus.

(b) Reg. v. Gillis, 14 W. R. 845.

(c) See Hall's case, 2 Leach, C. C. 559; 3 Russ. Cr. 373.

(d) 11 & 12 Vic. c. 42, s. 18.

(e) Reg. v. Strip, 2 U. C. L. J. 137; Dears. 648; 25 L. J. (M. C.) 109.

under the influence of hopes held out; but admissions made the same day, to a physician, in the absence of the constable, were admitted. (a)

Statements made by a prisoner to parties who arrested him, he having been previously told on what charge they arrested him, are evidence. (b)

The prisoner was called up by his master, and told, "You are in the presence of two police officers, and I should advise you, that, to any question that may be put to you, you will answer truthfully, so that, if you have committed a fault, you may not add to it, by stating what is untrue." The master afterwards added, "Take care; we know more than you think":-Held, that the words imported only advice on moral grounds, and that the statement was admissible against the prisoner on his trial for larceny. (c)

The case would have been different if it had appeared that the words used were, "It is better for you to tell the truth." (d)

The prisoners, two children-one aged eight, and the other a little older-were tried for attempting to obstruct a railway train. It was proved that the mothers of the prisoners, and a policeman, being present, after they had been apprehended on suspicion, the mother of one of the prisoners said, "You had better, as good boys, tell the truth." Whereupon both the prisoners confessed:-Held, that this confession was admissible in evidence against the prisoners. (e)

Upon an indictment of two brothers-J. for stealing, and G. for receiving-it was proved that J. and a third brother, W., were in the service of the same master; that

(a) Reg. v. Berube, 3 L. C. R. 212.
(b) Reg. v. Tufford, 8 U. C. C. P. 81.
(c) Reg. v. Jarvis L. R. 1 C. C. R. 96.
(d) See Reg. v. Baldry, 2 Den. C. C. 430.
(e) Reg. v. Reeve, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 362.1

J., G., and W., were at G's house when a policeman found the stolen goods there, and sent for J. and G.'s master, and the five having gone together into G.'s parlour, charged W. and J. with stealing, and G. with receiving; that, upon this, W. said, "Well, J., you had better tell Mr. W. (their master) the truth." Neither the master nor the policeman dissented, nor made any remark, whereupon J. confessed. On his way to the station, J., of his own accord, made a further confession. Upon being taken before the Magistrates, they discharged W., but committed J. and G. for trial:-Held J. and G., having been convicted on the evidence above, that the conviction was right. (a)

A confession is admissible in evidence made to one in authority, although the prisoner was immediately, before such confession, in the custody of another person not produced, and although it is not shewn that such person did not hold out a threat or inducement. The rule is that for the purpose of introducing a confession in evidence, it is unnecessary, in general, to do more than negative any promise or inducement held out by the person, to whom the confession was made. If, however, there be any probable ground to suspect collusion, in obtaining the confession such suspicion, it is said, ought in the first instance to be removed. (b)

It may be generally laid down that, though an inducement has been held out by an officer or prosecutor or the like, and, though a confession has been made in consequences of such inducement, still if the prisoner be subsequently warned by a person in equal, or superior authority that what he may say, will be evidence against himself, or that a confession will be of no benefit to him,

(a) Reg. v. Parker, 8 U. C. L. J. 139; L. & C. 42; 30 L. J. (M. C.) 144. (b) Reg. v. Finkle, 15 U. C. C. P. 455, per Richards, C. J.; Phillips, Ev. 430; and see R. v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221.

or if he be simply cautioned by the Magistrate, not to say anything against himself, any admission of guilt, afterwards made, will be received as a voluntary confession. More doubt may be entertained as to the law, if the promise has proceeded from a person of superior authority, as a Magistrate, and the confession is afterwards made to the inferior officer; because a caution from the latter person might be insufficient to efface the expectation of mercy, which had had been previously raised in the prisoner's mind. (a)

It is for the Judge to decide whether the prisoner has been induced to confess, by undue influence or not.(b) The confession of a third person is not sufficient to implicate a party, on a charge of stealing. (c)

The jury are not bound to believe the whole statements of a prisoner, in making a confession. The exculpatory, as well as the implicative, portions therof, should be left to the jury, and they must exercise their own judgment as to whether they believe the whole, or only a part, (d)

The correct course to be taken by the Judge, when evidence has been received, which it is afterwards shewn not to be properly receivable, is to treat it as if it had been inadmissible in the first instance, and the effectual way of doing this is to tell the jury not to consider the inadmissible evidence, and to dispose of the case on the other evidence; a similar principle is acted on, when the names of other prisoners are mentioned in confession, and the proper course seems to be to read the names in full, the Judge directing the jury, not to pay any attention to them. (e)

(a) Reg. v. Finkle, 15 U. C. C. P. 457, per Richards, C. J.

(b) Ib. 453; R. v. Garner, 1 Den. C. C. 329.

(c) Blair v. Hopkins, 1 Kerr, 540.

(d) Reg. v. Jones, 28 U. C. Q. B. 416.

(e) Reg. v. Finkle, 15 U. C. C. P. 459, per Richards, C. J.; Rex v. Jones, 4 C. & P. 217; Rex v. Mandesley, 2 Lew. C. C. 73.