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order, by committing for contempt any person who shall violently or indirectly interrupt his proceedings, or conduct himself insultingly towards the Justice. Where any person present behaves himself in such a manner as to obstruct the Justice's proceeding, he may, upon view of the improper behaviour, and without any formal proceeding, order him at once into custody, and direct him to be withdrawn, so as to remove at once the obstruction to the administration of justice, or may commit him till he finds sureties to keep the peace. But he has no power, either at the time of the misconduct, much less on the next day, to make out a warrant to a constable, and to commit the offending party to gaol for any certain time, by way of punishment, without adjudging him formally, after a summons, to appear for hearing to such punishment on account of his contempt, and a hearing of his defence, and making a minute of such sentence. (a)

It has been doubted whether a Justice of the Peace, executing his duty in his own house, and not presiding in any Court, can legally punish for a contempt committed there. (b)

A commitment by a Justice for a contempt, if there be no recorded conviction, should shew that the party was convicted of the contempt, and stating that he is charged with it is insufficient. At any rate, the evidence should in some way shew the fact of conviction, and the manner of it. (c)

A warrant to a constable to commit for contempt, containing a direction to detain the party till he shall pay the costs of his apprehension and conveyance to gaol, is defective.

The Statute 3 James 1, c. 10, only authorizes such ex

(a) Re Clarke, 7 U. C. Q. B. 223.

(b) M'Kenzie v. Mewburn, 6 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 486. (c) Ib.

penses to be levied of the offender's goods; and if he could be imprisoned till he paid them, it would be necessary that the amount of such expenses should be stated, or the gaoler would not know when he might discharge him.

Where a power resides in any Court or Judge to commit for contempt, it is the peculiar privilege of such Court or Judge to determine upon the facts, and it does not properly belong to any higher tribunal to examine into the truth of the case. (a)

Therefore, the Court, in adjudicating on a case of contempt, will not enter into the truth of the alleged facts constituting the contempt.

A Justice's warrant of commitment for an indefinite time is bad. A commitment is also bad which directs the prisoner to be kept in custody until the costs are paid, without stating what is the amount of the costs. The reason is, that, in such a case, the gaoler does not know what sum to accept as sufficient for the prisoner's release. (b)

In respect to warrants committing prisoners on charges of offences committed, it has been held not necessary to state, on the face of them, that the Justice had information on oath, which could justify him in binding the defendant to keep the peace. (c)

A warrant of commitment must state the place where the offence was committed, otherwise it will be defective. (d)

It is a general rule, that, where a man is committed for any crime, either at common law, or created by Act of Parliament, for which he is punishable by indictment,

(a) Re Clarke, 7 U. C. Q. B. 223.

(b) Dawson v. Fraser, 7 U. C. Q. B. 391.

(c) Ib.

(d) Re Becbe, 3 U. C. P. R. 270.

then he is to be committed until discharged by due course of law. But where the committal is in pursuance of a special authority, the terms of the commitment must be special, and must exactly pursue that authority. (a)

It is not necessary that, in the warrant of commitment, the offence should be described with the nicety and technical precision of an indictment; but the prisoner should be charged with some legally defined and wellknown offence, for which he would be subjected to criminal proceedings, either by indictment or otherwise, and that specific offence cannot be included under a general term, which compendiously covers a great variety of criminal offences. (b)

As the term felony includes a number of crimes, ranging between treason and larceny, it is not sufficient simply to designate the offence by the name of the class of offences to which the Justice may find or judge it to belong.

A commitment, in the absence of any statutory provisions prescribing its forms and contents, should state the facts charged to constitute the offence with sufficient particularity to enable the Court or Judge, on Habeas Corpus, to determine what particular crime is charged against the prisoner; and if it fail to do this, the prisoner ought to be discharged. (c)

Defects in stating an offence in a warrant of commitment are not fatal, for there is not the same necessity for adherence to technical terms as in an indictment; and upon the return to a Habeas Corpus, it is the evidence which is the foundation of the warrant the Court looks at, when the evidence is before them on a Certiorari, rather than the warrant itself; and when a legal cause

(a) Re Anderson, 11 U. C. C. P. 54.

(b) Reg. v. Young; The St. Alban's Raid, 3, per Badgley, J. (c) Ib. 3, per Badgley, J.

for imprisonment appears on the evidence, the ends of justice are not allowed to be defeated by a want of proper form in the warrant, but the Court will rather see that the error is corrected. (a)

The Court has authority, in virtue of its inherent jurisdiction at common law, when a prisoner charged with felony is brought up on a Habeas Corpus, to look not merely at the commitment, but also at the depositions; and though the former be informal, yet, if the latter shew that a felony has been committed, and that there is a reasonable ground of charge against the pri soner, he will be remanded, and not bailed, with a view to amending the warrant, as above mentioned. (b)

It would seem that, where proceedings are taken by Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, under the 29 & 30 Vic., c. 45, the evidence may also be looked at on the return to the Certiorari. (c)

This Statute had in view and recognizes the right of every man, committed on a criminal charge, to have the opinion of a Judge of the Superior Court on the cause of his commitment by an inferior jurisdiction. The Judges of the Superior Court are bound, when a prisoner is brought before them, under the Statute, to examine the proceedings and evidence anterior to the warrant of commitment, and to discharge the prisoner, if there does not appear sufficient cause for his detention. (d)

Before section 3 of this Statute, there was no way of enquiring into the truth of the facts, as stated in the return. Section 3 provides that, in all cases coming within the Act, although the return to any writ of Habeas Corpus shall be good, and sufficient in law, it shall be lawful for

(a) Re Anderson, 20 U. C. Q. B. 162, per Robinson, C. J.; Rex v. Marks, 3 Ea. 157.

(b) Re Anderson, 11 U. C. C. P. 56.

(c) Reg. v. Levecque, 30 U. C. Q. B. 509.

(d) Reg. v. Mosier,

U. C. P. R. 64.

the Court, or for any Judge before whom such writ may be returnable, to proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in such return, by affidavit or by affirmation, where an affirmation is allowed by law.

As to the writ of Certiorari, which is always issued along with the Habeas Corpus, in order to bring up the depositions and papers, Chief Justice Draper, in Re Burley, (a) declared that it could not properly be issued in vacation, returnable before a Judge in Chambers, but that the writ must be returnable before the Court in Bane. But now the 29 & 30 Vic., c. 45, s. 5, authorizes a return of the writ "to any Judge in Chambers, or to the Court."

Before this Act, writs of Certiorari had, in practice, issued in vacation, by order of a Judge in Chambers, but, as the power to do so was doubted, the Act was passed to remove the doubt. (b)

The prisoner may contradict the return to the writ of Habeas Corpus, by shewing that one of the persons who signed the warrant was not a legally qualified Justice of the Peace, and it would seem that he could do so, even independent of the above Statute. (c) But, at all events, this section disposes of the point by empowering the Judge to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in the return. (d)

Justices should not omit any part of a prescribed form of commitment, lest the part omitted be material and render the warrant invalid. (e)

When a Justice follows the words used by the Legislature, the Court will hold that he intended them in the same sense, but, if he uses other words, he ought to be

(a) 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 43.

(b) Reg. v. Mosier, 4 U. ('. P. R. 70, per J. Wilson, J.

(c) Bailey's case, 3 E. & B. 614.

(d) Reg. v. Boyle, 4 U. C. P. R. 256.

(e) Re Beebe, 3 U. C. P. R. 373, per Hagarty, J.

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