more precise. (a) It is, however, the duty of the Court to take care that, in all cases brought before them, Justices shall have the full protection to which the law entitles them. (b)

A warrant of commitment, under 31 Vic., c. 16, signed by one qualified Justice of the Peace, and by an alderman who has not taken the necessary oath, is invalid to uphold the detention of a prisoner confined under it, though it might be a justification to a person acting in virtue of it, if an action were brought against him. (c)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 86, provides that, after a case has been heard and determined, one Justice may issue all warrants of distress or commitment thereon.

By s. 87, it shall not be necessary that the Justice who acts before or after the hearing be the Justice, or one of the Justices, by whom the case is or was heard and determined. It is, therefore, not necessary that a warrant of distress or commitment should be signed by two Justices, though two are required to convict; nor is it necessary that the Justice who commits should also have heard and determined. (d)

The issuing of a warrant of commitment, under 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 75, is discretionary and not compulsory upon a Justice of the Peace. The Court will, therefore, upon this ground, as well as upon the ground that the person sought to be committed has not been made a party to the application, refuse a Mandamus to compel the issuing of the warrant. (e)

The Con. Stats. U. C., c. 126. s. 6, was passed expressly for the protection of Justices of the Peace; and when it is desired to compel a Justice to issue a warrant of commit

(a Re Anderson, 11 U. C. C. P. 63.

(b) Croukhite v. Sommerville, 3 U. C. Q. B. 131, per Robinson, C. J.
(c) Reg. v. Boyle, 4 U. C. P. R. 256.

(d) Re Crow, 1 Ú. C. L. J. N. S. 302.

(e) Re Delaney v. Macnab, 21 U. C. C. P. 563.

ment against a person, proceedings should not be taken by Mandamus, but a rule should be issued, under this clause, and the person to be affected should be made a party to the rule. (a)

Where the defendant, a Justice of the Peace, issued his warrant, under Con. Stats. Can., c. 103, s. 67, to commit the plaintiff for thirty days, for non-payment of the costs of an appeal to the Quarter Sessions, unless such sum and all costs of the distress and commitment and conveying the party to gaol should be sooner paid, but omitted to state in the warrant the amount of the costs of distress, commitment and conveyance to gaol :Held, that it was the duty of the Justice to ascertain and state the amount of these costs; yet the omission to do so, though it might have occasioned the plaintiff's discharge, did not shew either a want or excess of jurisdiction, but the warrant was irregular in omitting these particulars, and there was, consequently, an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. (b)

Where an Act, passed by the Provincial Legislature, was subsequently disallowed by Her Majesty, but, while it was in force, the plaintiff had been convicted under it by the defendants, as Justices of the Peace, and directed to pay a fine, to be levied according to the Act, and, the fine not having been paid, a warrant was properly issued, by the defendants, for his arrest and imprisonment, which, however, was not executed by the officer to whom it was directed, until after the disallowance of the Act was published in the Gazette, and from its publication, only, the the Act ceased :-Held, that the defendants were justified in making the conviction and issuing the warrant, and

(a) Re Delaney v. Macnab, 21 U. C. C. P. 563. (b) Dickson v. Crabb, 24 U. C. Q. B. 494.

could not be held liable by reason of the warrant being executed after the Act ceased. (a)

The warrant of commitment should shew before whom the conviction was had. It lies on the party alleging that there is a good and valid conviction to sustain the commitment to produce the conviction. (b)

Where a prisoner is in custody of a gaoler, under several warrants, the Magistrate cannot withdraw them, or any of them, from the gaoler's hands, because they are for his protection; but the gaoler ought to know which is the operative warrant, otherwise he may not know whether he is to discharge the prisoner from custody at the end of the time specified in one or in the other. (c)

A warrant ought to set forth the day and year wherein it was made, and it is safe, but perhaps not necessary, in the body of the warrant, to shew the place where it is made, yet it seems necessary to set forth the county in the margin, at least, if it be not set forth in the body.

In strictness, it is not indispensable that the authority of the Magistrate should be shewn on the face of the warrant, for the omission may be shewn by averment and parol evidence. A commitment must be in writing, under the hand and seal of the person by whom it is made, expressing his office or authority, and the time and place at which it is made, and must be directed to the gaoler or keeper of the prison. (d)

A final commitment, for want of sureties to keep the peace, must be in writing. Where, however, a person had been brought up before a Justice, on a charge of threatened assault, and was ordered, by the Justice, to find sureties to keep the peace, he offered bail, who

(a) Clapp v. Lawrason, 6 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 319. See 31 Vic. c. 1, s. 7, thirty-fifthly, sixthly, and seventhly.

(b) Re Crow, 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 302; 1 L. C. G. 189. (c) Re McKinnon, 2 U. C. L. J. N. S. 329.

(d) Reg. v. Reno, 4 U. C. P. R. 292, per Draper, C. J.

were rejected as not being householders, and, being thus prevented from immediately obtaining bail, he remained in custody of a police constable for three hours, during which time the Justice frequently visited him, to ascer tain if he had found bail, and at night he was taken to the gaol, where he remained until the following morning, when he was discharged on bail being procured :— Held, that this was not a final commitment for want of sureties, and that, consequently, it did not require a written warrant, for the detention was no longer than might be reasonably necessary for ascertaining whether the party could find some one who would become his surety. (a) The time allowed for this purpose must always de pend on the circumstances of each case. (b)

A commitment in default of sureties to keep the peace should shew the date on which the words were alleged to have been spoken, and contain a statement to the effect that complainant is apprehensive of bodily fear. (c)

When articles of the peace have been exhibited in open Court against a person, the Court will direct that he do stand committed until security to keep the peace be given. (d)

Sometimes, in cases of indictable offences, an inquisition is taken by a Coroner, and the prisoner is committed for trial on the verdict of the Coroner's jury. The finding of a Coroner's inquest is equivalent to the finding of a Grand Jury, and a defendant may be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter upon an inquisition, which is the record of the finding of a jury sworn to enquire concerning the death of the deceased, super visum corporis. Such an inquisition amounts to an indictment. (e)

(a) Lynden v. King, 6 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 566.

(b) 16.

(c) Re Ross, 3 U. C. P. R. 301.

(d) Reg. v. Vendette, 8 L. C. J. 284.

(e) Reg. v. Ingham, 5 B. & S. 257; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 183; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 116.

An inquest held by a Coroner on a Sunday, being a judicial act, is invalid. (a) A Coroner cannot take a second inquisition on the same body, the first inquisition being valid and subsisting. (b)

A Barrister cannot insist on being present at a Coroner's inquest, and upon examining and cross-examining the witnesses. (c)

Imprisonment is imposed for different purposes. It may be for prevention, as by a constable, to hinder a fray, or, by any person, to restrain a misdemeanor or prevent a felony, or for security, in criminal cases, before investigation or trial, or until sureties for the peace are given; or in coercion, to ensure the performance of some particular act, as in cases of actual contempt, until the contempt be purged, and in cases of supposed contempt, as for not making a return of legal process, or for not paying over moneys raised by such process, by officers of the Court, until return of payment is made, and to enforce the payment of pecuniary fines, or punitive, as in criminal sentences. (d)

Where a party, undergoing an imprisonment on conviction of felony, has been released on bail, in consequence of the issue of a writ of error, and such writ of error is subsequently quashed, he may be re-imprisoned for the unexpired term of his sentence, on a warrant of a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench, signed in Chambers, and granted in consequence of the Court having ordered process to issue to apprehend such party, and bring him before the Court," or before one of the Justices thereof to be dealt with according to law." (e)

The period of a man's imprisonment must be certain,

(a) Re Cooper, 6 U. C. L. J. N. S. 317.

(b) Reg. v. White, 7 U. C. L. J. 219; 3 E. & E. 137; 29 L. J. (Q. B.) 257. (c) Agnew v. Stewart, 21 U. C.. Q. B. 396.

(d) M'Innes v. Davidson, 4 U. C. P. R. 189, per A. Wilson, J. (e) Ex parte Spelman, 14 L. C. J. 281.