and not dependent on the will of the officer, who is charged with the imprisonment. Every judicial act is supposed to happen the first instant of the day it takes place. The imprisonment of a person, therefore, is deemed to commence at the beginning of the day, on which he was adjudged to be imprisoned, and he will be entitled to his discharge, not at the same hour of the day he was brought to prison, but on the first opening of the prison, on the day after his imprisonment expired. (a)

An adjudication mentioned in the margin of the warrant of commitment, where there are several warrants each for a distinct period of imprisonment, that the term of imprisonment mentioned in the second, and third warrants shall commence at the expiration of the time mentioned in the warrant immediately preceding is valid. An adjudication, so stated in the margin, properly forms a part of the warrant, and, even if the portions in the margin of the second, and third warrants could not be read as parts of these warrants, the periods of imprisonment would nevertheless be quite sufficient, the only dif ference being that all the warrants would be running at the same time, instead of counting consecutively. (b)

A witness, who, on the usual application, has been ordered to withdraw from the Court Room, is guilty of contempt, if after his examination he communicates facts disclosed in evidence at the trial, to another witness not examined at the time of the disclosure. (c) In this case, the rule for attachment was discharged, the defendant swearing, in answer, that he did not enter the Court Room during the trial, till called as a witness, that he communicated the fact without any intention of in

(a) Reg. v. Scott, 2 U. C. L. J. N. S. 324, per J. Wilson, J.

(b) Re Crow, 1 Ú. C. L. J. N. S. 302; 1 L. C. G. 189. See 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 63.

(c) Reg. v. M'Corkill, 8 L. C. J. 282.

fluencing the evidence to be given by the witness, or of committing a contempt of Court, and in utter ignorance of there being any impropriety in so doing. The affidavit, further, stated that the deponent was wholly unconscious of the possibility of his conduct being considered a contempt.

An attachment will not be granted against a witness, for not obeying a subpœna, unless there is a clear case of contempt, but, if his absence is wilful, the Court will not, in general, look to the materiality of his testimony. (a)

A subpoena, to attend on the 10th September, and so from day to day, was served on the 11th September, and the witness attended for several days, and knew that the cause was not tried :-Held, that he was guilty of a contempt in subsequently absenting himself. Where a witness accepted the conduct money, and went with the person who served him with the subpoena, and remained at the Court several days, an attachment was granted against him, for subsequently absenting himself, though he and another person swore in contradiction to the party, who, served the subpoena that the original was not shewn to him, and he also swore that he attended the Court as a Juror, and left in consequence of ill health with the intention of returning, his absence appearing to be wilful. (b)

Where a party is served with a subpœna to attend as a witness, and accepts a sum of money which is tendered to him for his expenses, without objecting to the amount, but refuses to attend on account of his own business, he is liable to an attachment for the non-attendance, even though the sum tendered be less than he is entitled to receive. (c)

(a) Meloney v. Morrison, 1 Allen, 240.
(b) Johnson v. Williston, 2 Allen, 171.
(c) Gilbert v. Campbell, 1 Hannay, 258.

But, if he had objected to the sum when tendered, it would have been an answer to the application. (a)

It is not necessary to shew that the witness was called on his subpœna, if it is shewn by other satisfactory evidence that he did not attend. (b)

An attempt, by a third person to prevent a suitor from laying his case before the Court, by threats of bringing him into disgrace and disrepute, is a contempt of Court and subjects the offender to a heavy fine. (c)

A frivolous opposition, made to retard a judicial sale, is a contempt of Court. (d)

An advocate who publishes in a public newspaper letters containing libellous, insulting and contemptuous statements, and language concerning one of the Justices of the Court, in reference to the conduct of said Justice, while acting in his judicial capacity, on an application made to him in Chambers for a writ of Habeas Corpus is guilty of contempt. (e)

In this case, it was held in the Privy Council, reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Quebec, (Crown side) that a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench, in Quebec, whilst sitting alone, in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction conferred upon him by Con. Stats. L. C. c. 77, s. 72, has no power to pronounce such advocate in contempt for conduct of the above description, or to impose a fine, and that the proceedings for such contempt could only be legally, and properly, taken in the full Court of Queen's Bench. (ƒ)

An order was made for the delivery of infant children by the father to the mother. On an application to com

(a) Gilbert v. Campbell, 1 Hannay, 258. (b) Meloney v. Morrison, 1 Allen, 240.

(c) Re Mulock, 13 W. R. 278; 1 L. C. G. 25. (d) Thomas v. Pepin, 5 L. C. J. 76.

(e) Reg. v. Ramsay, 11 L. C. J. 152; S. C. L. R. 3 P. C. App. 427. (f) Ib.

mit the father for a contempt, in not obeying this order, it appeared that, in his absence from home, the children had been removed from his house, and taken to the United States by his son aged fifteen. They denied collusion, the son saying that he acted without his father's knowledge or consent, but the father took no steps to bring the children back, and did not offer to do so, if time were given him. To a demand made for the children, the father replied that they were not in his custody :-Held, that he was not excused from obeying the order, and was in contempt. (a)

Affidavits disingenuously drawn up, with a view of presenting inferences, and giving colour to the transactions, to which they refer, inconsistent with the whole truth, even through true as far as they go, should be read with suspicion and carry but little weight. (b)

A contempt of Court being a criminal offence, no person can be punished for such, unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated, and an opportunity given him of answering. (c)

To contempts of Court committed by an individual, in his personal character only, there has been attached by law, and by long practice, a definite kind of punishment by fine and imprisonment. (d)

An order suspending an attorney, and barrister of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, from practising in that Court, for having addressed a letter to the Chief Justice reflecting on the Judges and the administration of justice generally in the Court, was discharged by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as it substituted a penalty and mode of punishment, which was not the appro

(a) Reg. v. Allen, 5 U. C. P. R. 453.

(b) Ib.

(e) Re Pollard, L. R. 2 P. C. App. 106.

(d) Re Wallace, L. R. 1 P. C. App. 295, per Ld. Westbury.

priate and fitting punishment for the offence. The letter, though, a contempt of Court and punishable by fine and imprisonment, having been written by a practitioner, in his individual and private capacity as a suitor, in respect of a supposed grievance as a suitor, of an injury done to him as such suitor, and having no connection, whatever, with his professional character, or anything done by him professionally, either as an attorney or barrister, it was not competent for the Supreme Court, to go further than award to the offence, the customary punishment for contempt of Court, or to inflict a professional punishment of indefinite suspension for an act not done professionally, and which, per se, did not render the party committing it unfit to remain a practitioner of the Court. (a)

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all Courts, and is a necessary condition of their existence. In Canada, this power is not confined to contempt in the face of the Court, or to pending cases, or to resistance to process; but it extends to the punishment of all contemptuous publications, calumniating or misrepresenting its judicial opinions as a Court, or the opinion or order of any Judge of the Court, pronounced or made either in term, or in vacation, whether in Chambers, or at his own residence, or in any other place, where, within the jurisdiction of the Court, he may be called upon to perform any judicial duty, and to all publications tending to cast ridicule or odium upon the Court, or any of its Judges, in reference to their judicial acts, or to impair the respect and confidence of the public, in the purity and integrity of the tribunal, or any of its members. (b) An attachment against a Sheriff, for not obeying a rule

(a) Re Wallace, L. R. 1 P. C. App. 283; 1 Oldright, 654. (b) Reg. v. Ramsay, 11 L. C. J. 158.