the instance of the appellant, and satisfactorily accounting for his non-appearance, be reinstated. (a)

The 4 Wm. 4, c. 4. ss. 17 and 18, were, in substance, the same as the Con Stats. U. C., C. 114. On an appeal to the Sessions, under the 4 Wm. 4, c. 4, evidence, differing from, or additional to, that produced before the convicting Justice, might have been received and gone to the jury, although the general principle of appeals is, that a judgment is to be rendered upon the same facts that were before the inferior tribunal. It was held to be the intention of the Legislature, in passing the above Statute, to allow an open trial, by a jury, upon such evidence as might be adduced there. (b)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 66, now provides that no witnesses shall be examined who were not examined before the Justice, on the hearing of the case, and this whether the appeal is tried by the Court or a jury. The Con. Stats. U. C. c. 114, contains no analogous provision.

When a prisoner had been convicted before Justices of the Peace, under the Petty Trespass Act, and fined, and on appeal to the Quarter Sessions, the Justices there admitted more evidence than had been heard on the conviction, and this fresh evidence adduced, evidently, influ enced the verdict of the jury at the Sessions, and the accused was acquitted; but, on receiving the opinion of the Attorney-General that the additional evidence should not have been admitted, they confirmed the conviction and ordered it to be recorded, but took no notice of the acquittal. The Court made absolute a rule for a manda mus, compelling them to enter the acquittal. (c)

Where a rule nisi, for a mondamus to the Sessions, commanding them to hear an appeal, called upon the

(a) Re Smith, 10 U. C. L. J. 20.

(b) Rex v. Justices of Bathurst, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 74. (c) Rex v. Justices, Bathurst, 4 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 340.

Court of Quarter Sessions, in and for the United Counties, etc., instead of the Justices of the Peace for the United Counties, and the rule had been enlarged in the prior term. On objection to the rule, on the above ground, it was replied that the enlargement waived the objection, and this seems to have been acquiesced in by counsel and by the Court. (a) In fact, it seems that, in all cases, formal and technical objections are waived by an enlargement. (b)

The appellant having been convicted of an assault, under the Con. Stats. Can., c. 91, s. 37, appealed to the Quarter Sessions. On the first day of the Court, after he had proved his notice of appeal, at the respondent's request, the case was postponed until the following day, and the respondent then objected to the jurisdiction, as it was not shewn that the appellant had either remained in custody, or entered into a recognizance, as required by Con. Stats. Can., c. 99, s. 117. The Court held that this objection was not waived by the application to postpone. (c)

For the purpose of preventing frivolous appeals, the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 69, enables the Court of Sessions, on proof of the giving of notice of appeal, though such appeal was not afterwards prosecuted or entered, if it has not been abandoned according to law, to order the payment of reasonable costs, by the party giving the notice.

There is nothing in the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 114, to authorize an order that a defendant, who has appealed and been acquitted by a jury, upon his trial, shall pay the costs of the appeal and trial, or any portion of them.

Where the Court of Quarter Sessions ordered a party to pay certain costs of an appeal, and, they not being paid,

(a) Re Justices, York, 13 U. C. C. P. 159.
(b) Reg. v. Allen, 5 U. C. P. R. 453-8.
(c) Re Meyers, 23 U. C. Q. B. 611.

an indictment was preferred for non-payment thereof, and, on this indictment, the defendant was found guilty; -Held, that the indictment could not be supported, either at common law or under the Statute. (a)

The Court will not give costs, on adjourning an appeal, unless the objection is made at the time of the adjournment. (b)

Under the English Act, 20 & 21 Vic., c. 43, the Court will not entertain an application for costs of an appeal against a decision of a Justice, in the term after that in which judgment is pronounced. (c)

It seems doubtful whether, under the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 74, an order of Sessions, simply ordering costs of an appeal to be paid, without directing them to be paid to the Clerk of the Peace, as required by the Act, is regular. (d)

Where a rule for amendment is opposed, the costs must be paid by the successful party. (e)

Where one of the Justices, before whom a person was convicted for breach of the license laws, stated that all the papers necessary to perfecting the appeal, were filed, except the bond telling the party it was all right, the Court allowed the appeal, though no affidavit had been filed. (f)

Under the Rev. Stat., c. 95, an appeal under the River Fisheries Act, must be made to the Sessions. (g)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 30, s. 41, empowers the Justice before whom a prisoner is charged with an indictable offence, to remand, from time to time, for such period as

(a) Reg. v. Orr, 12 U. C. Q. B. 57.

(b) Re M'Cumber, 26 U. C. Q. B. 516.

(c) Budenberg and Roberts, L. R. 2 C. P. 292.
(d) Re Delaney v. Macnab, 21 U. C. C. P. 563.

(e) M'Kay v. M'Kay, 2 Thomson, 75.

(f) M'Kay v. M'Kay, 21 homson, 75.

(g) Gough v. Morton, 2 Thomson, 10.

may be reasonable, not exceeding eight clear days at any one time. S. 42 authorizes a verbal remand where the time does not exceed three clear days.

A remand for an unreasonable time would be void. (a) It seems doubtful whether a Judge sitting in Chambers has power, on an application of a prisoner for his discharge on a bad warrant, to remand him. (b)

On discharging a jury charged with a prisoner, because they are unable to agree, the Court has power, and it is the duty of the Judge, to remand the prisoner to gaol until delivered in due course of law, or to the next sessions of the Court, fixing or not fixing the day, as the case may be. (c)

When prisoners are remanded to prison, after the disagreement of the jury on the trial, they are detained, not upon the indictment, which is only the accusation and charge found for their trial, but upon the original commitment for the offence originally charged. (d)

It would seem that the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 112, as to the reservation of points of law in criminal cases, only confers on the Sessions authority to state a case for the opinion of the Superior Court, where the original hearing and conviction is, at the Sessions, and that, when a summary conviction is appealed to the Sessions, there is no power to reserve a case on such appeal. (e)

The appellant, having been convicted before Justices of having pretended to be a physician, contrary to 29 Vic., c. 34, s. 34, appealed to the Quarter Sessions and was found guilty. The chairman having reserved certain questions for the opinion of the Court, it was held that the Sessions had no power to reserve a case for the

(a) Connors v. Darling, 23 U. C. Q. B. 547-51, per Hagarty, J.

(b) Re Carmichael, 10 U. C. L. J. 325.

(c) Ex parte Blossom, 10 L. C. J. 32, per Monk, J.

(d) Ib. 41, per Badgley, J.

(e) Pomeroy and Wilson, 26 U. C. Q. B. 45.

opinion of the Court, under the Statute, for the appellant was not a person "convicted of treason, felony, or misdemeanor," within the Statute, nor would the case fall within ss. 3 or 4 of the Statute. (a)

Prior to the passing of the 20 Vic., c. 61, Con Stats. U. C., c. 113, it was doubtful whether, after the affirmance of a conviction by the Sessions, a further appeal lay to either of the Superior Courts of common law. (b)

The 20 Vic., c. 61, has been repealed, (c) and it would seem that the law now stands as before the passing of this Statute.

The Court would not hear an appeal under this Statute, unless its provisions, and the rules of Court prescribing the preliminary steps, were strictly complied with. (d)

In this case, the rule or order appealed from was made before Hilary Term, 1865. The case was not transmitted to the Superior Court, pursuant to s. 2, on or before the first day of the term next after the making of the rule or order appealed from. Second, the notice required by the first rule of Court, dated 13th February, 1858, was not transmitted with the papers. Third, the third rule was not complied with, as the papers sent to the Superior Court shewed that, on a motion for a new trial, the defendants were to appear on the 27th December, and were bailed to appear for sentence; but it was not shewn whether they appeared for sentence, or were sentenced, or were in prison, or discharged on bail, to appear and receive judgment. Fourth, nor was the fourth rule observed, as the papers therein referred to were not deli

(a) Pomeroy and Wilson, 26 U. C. Q. B. 45; See also Yearke v. Bingleman, 28 U. C. Q. B. 551.

(b) Reg. v. Watson, 7 U. C. C. P. 495; Victoria P. R. Co. v. Simmons, 15 U. C. Q. B. 303; Reg. v. Hussey, 2 U. C. P. R. 194.

(c) See 32 & 33 Vic., c. 36, Sched. B.

(d) Reg. v. Hatch, 15 U. C. C. P. 461.