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after the expiration of the time allowed for filing claims, and directed that the amount awarded by the auditor for its payment should be applied to the claim of Stone and McWilliams.

The petitioners, Lee and wife and Richard Jordan, appealed to the court of appeals from the orders of January 18, February 7, and March 26, 1831, and said orders were, at December term, 1832, of that court, affirmed: Lee et ux. and Jordan v. Stone and Mc Williams, 5 Gill & J. 1.

JUDGMENT LIEN ON REALTY.-Land was not liable to sale on execution at common law: Jones v. Jones, 18 Am. Dec. 327. But in Maryland a debtor's whole realty was, at an early day, made subject to the lien of judgments: Id., Hanson v. Barnes, post. So, in Ohio: Pads v. Symmes, 13 Id. 621. This lien attaches at the date of the judgment. Jones v. Jones, 18 Id. 327. But the lien of a justice's judgment does not, in any case, attach until levy: Jackman v. Hallock, 13 Id. 627. A judgment lien continues, notwithstanding the abatement of the cause by the death of a party, but execution can not issue until the judgment has been revived: Jones v. Jones, 18 Id. 327. The lien of a judgment does not, at law, attach to an equitable interest: Jackman v. Hallock, 13 Id. 627; Roads v. Symmes, Id. 620. But in equity the lien of a judgment extends to the debtor's whole equitable estate: Haleys v. Williams, 19 Id. 743. The reason given in the principal case for the existence of a judgment lien upon land, that it is founded in the creditor's right to resort to the land on execution, is referred to with approval in Davidson v. Myers, 24 Md. 555. In Anderson v. Tuck, 33 Id. 233, the case is also recognized as authority on the point that the lien of a judgment attaches on land at the date of such judgment.

PRICE V. TYSON.

[3 BLAND CH. 392.]

ON A BILL OF DISCOVERY THERE CAN BE NO HEARING ON THE MERITS, unless relief as well as discovery is asked.

BILL OF DISCOVERY LIES ONLY to obtain a disclosure of facts in relation to a civil, and not to a criminal case.

WHERE IT APPEARS FROM THE BILL THAT THERE IS NO REMEDY, the plaintiff can not have a discovery.

BILL OF DISCOVERY DOES NOT LIE AGAINST ONE NOT INTERESTED, and who may be made a witness, and enough must be stated to enable the court to judge of the alleged liability of the defendant.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A FULL ANSWER, WHERE RELIEF MAY BE HAD in chancery, as to every material allegation of his bill.

DEFENDANT MAY STATE MATTERS IN BAR OR AVOIDANCE of the plaintiff's claim, by way of further answer, after having answered all the allega

tions of the bill.

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN ALLEGATION NOT MADE or relied on in a bill or

answer in equity is inadmissible.

BILL OF DISCOVERY PERFORMS THE OFFICE OF A SUMMONS when used in

aid of an action or suit in another court.

ANSWER TO A BILL OF DISCOVERY may introduce matters in avoidance of the plaintiff's claim.

RULE AS TO IMPERTINENT MATTER IN ANSWER.-The general rule is that if the answer goes out of the bill to state anything not material to the defendant's case, it will be deemed impertinent, and may be expunged. NOTHING IS IRRELEVANT THAT MAY HAVE INFLUENCE upon the suit attend. ing to the nature of it.

WHERE PERTINENT MATTERS ARE MIXED WITH IMPERTINENT, so that they can not be separated, the whole shall be expunged.

CO-DEFENDANT OR A STRANGER MAY HAVE SCANDALOUS MATTER, which is also impertinent, stricken out of an answer, at the cost of the party filing it.

PERTINENT MATTER, THOUGH SCANDALOUS in itself, is not to be so considered.

ANSWERS TO IMPERTINENT QUESTIONS, though reflecting and impertinent, are not scandalous.

ON AMENDMENT OF A BILL OF DISCOVERY AFTER ANSWER, so as to pray relief, the defendant can not put in a complete answer over again; and if he does so, that part of it answering anything beyond the amended bill will be expunged as impertinent.

MATTERS UPON WHICH THE DEFENDANT INTENDS TO RELY as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, stated in answer to a bill of discovery, are not impertinent.

RELEVANCY, LEGALITY, AND COMPETENCY OF TESTIMONY brought out by a bill of discovery, are to be determined by the court for whose use the discovery is required.

PLAINTIFF MUST GENERALLY PAY ALL THE COSTS of the defendant on a bill of discovery.

COSTS OF EXCEPTIONS MAY BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF in Maryland, under the statute, on a mere bill of discovery, where he has been put to the expense and trouble of extracting a sufficient answer, and pruning away its impertinences.

BILL for discovery filed February 8, 1831, by William Price, administrator of John Price, deceased, against Mary and Isaac Tyson and Moses Sheppard, administrators of Nathan Tyson, deceased. The bill set out, in substance, that in 1817 the plaintiff's intestate instituted a suit against the defendants' intestate, to recover the freight of a vessel chartered by the plaintiff's intestate to the defendants' intestate, which suit was still pending in Harford county court; that the defendants, as administrators of the said Nathan Tyson, deceased, pretending to have been ignorant of the institution of said suit in their intestate's life-time, had pleaded in bar thereof, that they had fully administered the estate, without any knowledge of the plaintiff's claim, or of the institution of said suit; but that the said Mary, being the widow of the intes

tate, and the said Isaac, his brother or near relation, they were both intimately acquainted with his affairs, and knew of the existence of the controversy in relation to said freight, and that, though it had once been referred to arbitration, it had never been settled; and, further, that the defendants, prior to October 10, 1821, had employed counsel to attend to the interests of the estate in said controversy. The bill prayed a discovery of the defendants' knowledge in the premises, to enable the plaintiff to protect himself against the said plea in bar.

The defendants answered jointly July 11, 1831, admitting that they then knew of the institution of said suit, but alleging that beyond a reference to arbitration mentioned in the bill, nothing had been done in said suit during the intestate's lifetime or since, until after the final distribution of his personal estate. They admitted, also, their appointment as administrators, and set forth with great particularity that due notice was given and published as required by law, warning those having claims against the estate to present the same to the administrators, with proper vouchers, etc.; that the plaintiff's intestate Price was a resident of Baltimore at the time, and until October 14, 1821, and a subscriber of one of the papers in which the said notice was published, which was delivered daily at his residence during the period of said publication; that neither the said Price, nor any one on his behalf, presented any claim to the administrators, or either of them, in writing or otherwise, against the said estate, or made mention of any claim to the administrators, or any of them, before the final distribution of the estate; that on the tenth day of October, 1821, after due publication of the notice aforesaid, and after the expiration of more than six months from the first publication thereof, the defendants, under the direction of the orphans' court of Baltimore county, made a final division and distribution of all the personal estate of the intestate among his heirs; and they exhibited as part of their answer a certified copy of the account of such distribution. The defendants jointly and severally denied that they, or either of them, prior to the distribution aforesaid, did apply to or converse with any counsel or attorney in regard to any claim or action of the plaintiff's intestate, or that they had conversed with any counsel, attorney or other person, or with each other, concerning the said claim or action.

The defendant, Mary Tyson, answering for herself, admitted, among other things, that she knew in the life-time of her husband, the intestate, early in the year 1815, that an agreement

was about to be made between her husband and Price, relating to the freight of a quantity of flour to be shipped by her husband in one of Price's vessels from Baltimore to the West Indies. She further said that she was present at a conversation between Price and her husband on that subject, the substance of which she stated, and the effect and tenor of which was that they agreed that there should be a reduction of freight to peace rates, in the event of peace being declared between Great Britain and the United States, and known in Baltimore before the sailing of the vessel, and that this agreement should form a part or condition of the contract with respect to the freight. She further admitted that she knew from her husband that Price had brought suit against him for all or part of the freight of said flour, and that it was referred to arbitration, but declared that she did not know that it had not been settled, but supposed, from her having heard nothing further about it, that the suit and controversy were then ended.

Isaac Tyson, answering for himself, admitted that he knew of the dispute about the freight in the life-time of his brother, the intestate, which he heard was referred to arbitration and which he fully believed had been settled. Moses Sheppard also said, answering for himself, that owing to his intimacy with the deceased, he supposed that he heard of the dispute, though he had no recollection of it, and that he now believed that if he had any knowledge of it at the time, he considered it to have been settled before Tyson's death.

The plaintiff excepted to the answer, alleging that portions of it were impertinently introduced and were foreign to the matters inquired of in the bill; and averring that what was said by the defendant Mary, as to the verbal agreement between Price and Tyson, was improper and inadmissible, because the contract was in writing and contained no such stipulation.

Copies of the exceptions having been served on the defendants by order of the chancellor, the case was brought to a hearing, and the chancellor delivered his opinion, August 3, 1831.

BLAND, Chancellor. The exceptions to the answer standing ready for hearing, the solicitors of the parties were fully heard and the proceedings read and considered.

This is properly a bill of discovery, and nothing more; and therefore the case must finally terminate here with the answer; it can go no further; there can be no hearing upon the merits, as where relief as well as discovery is asked for: Hindman v. Taylor, 2 Bro. C. C. 8; Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith, 4 Ves. 71.

This court, having no criminal jurisdiction itself, meddles with no cases of that description which may be brought before any other tribunal; and therefore, a plaintiff here can only obtain a disclosure of facts by a bill of discovery in relation to a civil case; either to enable him to commence his action aright, or to prosecute it with effect. If, upon the face of the bill, it appears that there can be no remedy, the plaintiff here can not have a discovery, which in such case would be useless and altogether impertinent; nor can a bill of discovery be sustained against any one not interested in the matter in dispute, who may be examined as a witness; and consequently, the plaintiff must by his bill point out the individual whom he has already sued, or against whom he means to bring his action; and also so state the nature of his case as to enable the court to judge of the alleged liability of the person designated as a defendant: Rondeau v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. C. C. 155; The Mayor of London v. Levy, 8 Ves. 404; Cartwright v. Hateley, 1 Ves. jun. 292.

This plaintiff states that he is seeking the relief he claims by an action now depending in a court of common law; and although he has, by very brief and general expressions, stated the nature of his case, yet its character and object are sufficiently shown to enable this court to judge of the bearing of the liability, and to see that if his claim has any foundation whatever, in point of fact, the action at common law has been properly originated, and now revived, against these defendants; and therefore he is entitled to the discovery he asks from them.

This, it has been urged, being a mere bill of discovery, in which the plaintiff asks only for a disclosure of the defendant's knowledge of a specified fact, they can not be permitted to set forth, in their answer, anything foreign to that special inquiry. If this position be correct, then everything in an answer to a bill of this kind, which can not be comprehended within the terms of the interrogatories propounded, no matter what may be the nature of the case, must be rejected as irrelevant. The validity of this position, therefore, presents a preliminary question, which must be determined before any inquiry can properly be gone into as to how far the matter objected to may be considered as impertinent in regard to the whole case, as stated by this bill.

If a plaintiff has a right to relief in this court, he has a right to an answer from the defendant to every allegation of his bill, the admission of the truth of which, or the proof of the truth of which, is necessary to entitle him to relief: Cooth v. Jackson,

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