Palmer and F. A. Schley, for the appellee, cited 1 Chit. Pl. 381; Hawkes v. Hawkey, 8 East, 431; Roberts v. Camden, 9 Id. 93; Rex v. Horn, Cowp. 678, 684; 2 Saund. Pl. and Ev. 365; Chit. Crim. Laws, 1022, 1023; Rex v. Ward, 2 Ld. Raym. 1461; East Crim. Laws, 862; 2 Greenl. 365; King v. Watson, 2 T. R. 206; Stark. on Sland. 54, 55, 290; Goodrich v. Woolcott, 3 Cow. 239; Miller v. Miller, 8 Johns. 59; Nevin v. Munn, 13 Id. 48; Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. 505; Coogan's case, 2 East Crim. Laws, 949; 1 Hawk. 537; 4 Bl. Com. 247; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 349, 350; 2 East Crim. Laws, 852, 854, 860-862; 2 Str. 749.

By Court, BUCHANAN, C. J. It is unnecessary and would be a waste of time, to enter upon an inquiry into the grounds of the doubts, that at one time seem to have been entertained, in relation to what instruments were and what were not susceptible of the crime of forgery at common law. The difficulties that surrounded the question of forgery or not, have been removed by decisions of acknowledged authority; and it is not now held to be essential to the offense of forgery in any one case, that some one must have been injured. The inquiry is not whether any one has been actually injured, but whether any one might have been prejudiced. In Ward's case, 2 Ld. Raym. 1461, which was an information for forging an order to charge certain goods to account, and to appropriate part of the proceeds to the defendant's own use, with intent to defraud, etc., the subject was fully considered. It did not appear that the person in whose name the order was drawn, had received any prejudice; but it was held to be immaterial to the offense of forgery, whether any person had been actually prejudiced or not, provided any person might have been injured by it; and that the counterfeiting of any writing, with a fraudulent intent, whereby another may be prejudiced, is forgery at common law: 2 East Cro. Law, 854, 860, 861, 862; Russ. on Crimes, 351, 352. In 2 Chit. Crim. Laws, 780, 1022, forgery is defined to be: "The false making or alteration of such writings, as either at common law, or by statute, are its objects with intent to defraud another." In Coogan's case, 2 East Cro. Law, 853, by Justice Buller, "the making of a false instrument with intent to deceive," and in 2 East Cro. Law, 852, "the false making of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud and deceit," as resulting from all the authorities, ancient and modern, taken together.

Chitty, in his treatise on Criminal Law, 2d vol. 781, 1022, considers it as settled by Ward's case, that " forgery at common

law might be committed in respect of any writing whatever, by which another might be defrauded;" and in 781, 1023, speaking of Ward's case, and the case of Fawcett, to be found in 2 East Pl. Crown, 862, he says: "Every kind of writing seems, on the doctrine of those cases, to be a thing, in respect of which, forgery at common law may be committed." Hence, it would seem to be settled, that the question, whether a particular instrument is capable of supporting a charge for forgery, is referable, not to the form but to the substance of it, and to be determined alone by that criterion; the chief ingredients of that offense being fraud, and an intention to deceive; to which the principle on which the case of People v. Shall, 9 Cow. 778, cited in behalf of the appellant, was decided, is not opposed. The court there, having gone on the ground that the instrument on the face of the indictment appeared to be one which, if genuine, would have been void; and therefore, an instrument by which no one could have been prejudiced. Applying, then, as a test, the principle established in the cases of Ward and Fawcett, and recognized and adopted by the elementary writers to this, and assuming the position laid down in 3 T. R. 176, and 2 Chit. Crim. Laws, 796, 1036, "that it is not necessary to constitute forgery, that there should be an intent to defraud any particular person, but that a general intent to defraud will suffice;" is the instrument in question a forgery at common law? Which is answered by the solution of another question: Could any person have been prejudiced by it? Of which we think there can be no doubt.

The appellant, who was the owner of the negro man to whom that paper was given, might have been prejudiced by the absconding of his servant, whose escape it might have facilitated. It was calculated to deceive and impose upon most who might see it, and there are few, if any, by whom he was unknown, who would not, on the production of it, have suffered him to proceed. Who can doubt that such a paper, put in the hands of a negro, and purporting to be signed by one or more respectable men known in the community, would be his sufficient passport, by means of which he would be able to effect his escape from the service of his owner? And Johnson also, whose name is subscribed to that paper, might have been prejudiced; for if it had been genuine, that is, if he had written it, and given it to the appellant's negro, who had thereby effected his escape, it is perfectly clear that he would not only have been liable to an action for damages by the owner, but

AM. DEC. VOL. XXII-20

also to a criminal prosecution under the act of 1796, c. 67, sec. 19, according to the case of Duvall v. The State, 6 Har. & J. 9, which act provides against the depriving an owner of the services of his slaves by any unlawful means, which the furnishing a slave with such a paper, by means whereof he escaped from the service of his owner, would be. "The false making,” therefore, of that instrument, by which Johnson and the appellant might have been so injured, was a forgery at common law, for which the defendant, if guilty, would have been punishable by indictment, though it does not appear that anybody was actually injured thereby, which is not necessary to constitute forgery; and it is not like the case of a mere cheat, to constitute which there must be a prejudice received. Hence it follows, if this concise view of the subject be correct, that the words spoken by the appellant, as laid in the declaration, charging the defendant in error with having forged that instrument, are actionable, and that the demurrer was properly overruled. Judgment affirmed.

FORGERY, HOW DEFINED.-Blackstone defines forgery to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another's rights: 4 Bl. Com. 247. Sir J. Stephen says: "Every one commits a misdemeanor who forges any document by which any other person may be injured, or utters any such document knowing it to be forged, with intent to defraud, whether he effects his purpose or not:" Steph. Dig. C. L. art. 366. The following definition of this crime is given by Willes, J., in Regina v. Epps, 4 Fost. & F. 81: "Forgery consists in drawing an instrument in such a manner as to represent fraudulently that it is a true and genuine document, as it appears on the face of it, when in fact there is no such genuine document really in existence as it appears on the face of it to be." Mr. Justice Dillon, in State v. Wooderd, 20 Iowa, 541, after citing the principal case, among others, says: "The making or alteration of any writing with a fraudulent intent, whereby another may be prejudiced, is forgery. It is not essential that any person should be actually injured." Wharton's definition of the offense is: "Forgery is the fraudulent falsifying of an instrument to another's prejudice:" 1 Whart. C. L. sec. 653 (8th ed.) Mr. Bishop defines it as follows: Forgery, at the common law, is the false making or materially altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal liability;" or more briefly: "Forgery is the fraudulent making of a false writing, which, if genuine, would be apparently of some legal efficacy:" 2 Bish. C. L., sec. 523. From all these definitions, we gather that the essential ingredients of the crime are: 1. A false making of some instrument; 2. A fraudulent intent; 3. An instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.

FALSE MAKING NECESSARY.-It is of the very essence of forgery that there should be a false making or counterfeiting of an instrument apparently genuine. In the civil law, this offense is one form of the "crimen falsi." Lord Coke says, that "to forge is metaphorically taken from the smith, who beateth upon his anvil and forgeth what fashion or shape he will," and that

the terms appropriate to the act are falsare, fabricare, while the forger is falsarius: 3 Inst. 168, 169. The act done must be performed with the intent that it shall appear to be the act of another, or other than it really is. Hence it is not forgery to sign one's own name, though with a false pretense of authority to bind another person thereby. Thus, in Regina v. White, 1 Den. C. C. 208, it appeared that the prisoner went to get a bill discounted, representing that it belonged to one Tomlinson, and that he was authorized to indorse it for him. The banker thereupon wrote on it, "Per procuration, T. Tomlinson," to which the prisoner signed his own name, and this was held not to be forgery. It is clear that in this case there was no false making. The falsehood preceded the making. The indorsement itself was precisely what it purported to be. So it is not forgery to make a false charge in one's own book: State v. Young, 46 N. H. 266. In that case Sargent, J., who delivered the opinion, after reviewing the authorities, said: "The rule, then, seems to be that the writing or instrument which may be the subject of forgery, must generally be, or purport to be, the act of another, or it must at the time be the property of another, or it must be some writing or instrument under which others have acquired some rights, or have become liable in a certain way, and where these rights or liabilities are sought to be affected or changed by the alteration without their consent.' In People v. Fitch, 19 Am. Dec. 477, it appeared that after an order drawn by the defendant had been satisfied and returned to him, he altered the date of it for the fraudulent purpose of using it in evidence as a defense to a note made by him, and the court held that there was no forgery, one of the reasons assigned for the decision being that "there was no false making. The order purported to be drawn by the defendant, and it was so drawn. It purported to be dated the fourteenth of November, and it was so dated."

Undoubtedly, however, there may be a false making of an instrument in the defendant's own name. Thus, for instance, in a case referred to in People v. Fitch, above cited, where it was held to be forgery for a grantor in a deed to antedate it to the prejudice of a prior grantee. So it was held a forgery for a grantor thus to antedate his deed in Regina v. Ritson, 39 L. J. M. C. 10; S. C., L. R. 1 C. C. 200, where Kelly, C. B., said: "Every instrument which purports to be what it is not, whether executed by a person who is not the person purporting to execute it, or bearing a date which is not the true date, is a forgery." This, however, is altogether too broad a statement of the doctrine. So where one signs his own name to an instrument with intent to have it received as having been executed by another person of the same name. Thus where one came into possession of a bill payable to another person of the same name, and fraudulently indorsed and passed it away, it was held forgery: Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28. So where coal was consigned to George Peacock, of New York, and the defendant having the same name, but knowing that he was not the person intended, obtained an advance of money by indorsing the permit for its delivery with his own proper name, he was held guilty of forgery: People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. 72. So where one signed his own name to a draft, and pretended that it was made by his brother, whom he represented to be a man of wealth: Parkes and Brown's case, 2 East C. L. 963; S. C., 2 Leach, 775. But where one signs his own name to a paper, pretending to be another person whose name, though somewhat similar in sound, is not the same, it seems that there is no false making. Thus, where a post-office clerk negligently delivered a letter addressed to John Storer to one John Story, and the latter took out of it a postal order and drew the money on it, indorsing it with his real name, John Story, it was held not to be forgery: Rex v. Story, Russ. & Ry. 81. A some

what peculiar case is that of Brittain v. Bank of London, 3 Fost. & F. 465; S. C., 11 W. R. 569, where the drawer of a check, which had been paid, altered the handwriting of his signature so as to make it appear not to be genuine, for the purpose of charging another person with the forgery of it, and of obtaining credit for the amount of it with the bank, and the court held this not to be forgery in such drawer. This case is said by Wharton not to be sustainable: 1 Whart. C. L. sec. 661. The ground of the decision is not stated in the report. It is certainly not clear why the fraudulent alteration of a genuine instrument so as to make it appear not genuine is not forgery. The falsity must exist in the making of the instrument, or in some alteration of it to constitute forgery. If the writing itself is genuine, a collateral false pretense, by means of which it is made an instrument in perpetrating a fraud, does not make the act forgery; as where an indorsement on a note is genuine, and one personates the indorser and thus accomplishes a fraudulent design: Ilevey's case, 2 East C. L. 856; S. C., 1 Leach, 229.

SIGNING A FICTITIOUS NAME IS A FALSE MAKING.-It is unquestionably forgery to sign a fictitious name to an instrument with intent to defraud: Rex v. Shepherd, 2 East C. L. 967; S. C., 1 Leach 226; Wilks' case, 2 East C. L. 957; King v. Lockett, 1 Leach, 94; Regina v. Rogers, 8 Car. & P. 629; Regina v. Ashby, 2 Fost. & F. 560; United States v. Mitchell, Bald. C. C. 366; though some doubt seems to have been entertained on this point in Rex v. Aickles, 2 East C. L. 968; S. C., 1 Leach, 438. Thus, where the prisoner signed the name of Elizabeth Tingle, as administratrix of her father, Richard Tingle, to a power of attorney, for the collection of money due the intestate, with intent to defraud the heirs, it appearing that the intestate never had a daughter, it was held forgery: Lewis' case, Fost. 116. So where one indorsed a note with a fictitious name, and negotiated it, representing the pretended indorser to be a person of credit, and denied all knowledge of the instrument when it was presented to him after a failure to find the supposed indorser, he was held guilty of forgery: Bolland's case, 2 East C. L. 958; S. C., 1 Leach. 83. So where the person accepting the instrument knew the prisoner only by his assumed name, it appearing that it was assumed for the purpose of fraud: Rex v. Francis, Russ. & Ry. 209. So where the prisoner was unknown to the person on whom the instrument was passed, who had never heard of the name assumed, and would have trusted the prisoner just as readily by his real name: Rex v. Marshall, Russ. & Ry. 75; Rex v. Whiley, Id. 90. But where one subscribed a fictitious name to a check and passed it as his own, and the credit was given to him and not to the name, it was held not to be forgery in Queen v. Martin, 49 L. J. C. C. R. 11; S. C. 41 L. T. (N. S.) 531; 21 Alb. L. J. 91; 4 Va. L. J. 115; 1 Crim. L. Mag. 266, a decision which seems to be directly opposed to some of those already cited. Signing the name of a fictitious magistrate to an order for the reimbursement of funeral expenses for the burial of a body cast on shore by the sea, under 48 Geo. III. c. 75, was held a forgery in King v. Froud, 1 Brod. & B. 300; S. C., Russ. & Ry. 389. So it is forgery to make note purporting to be that of a bank which has no existence: State v. Hayden, 15 N. H. 355. Signing the name of a pretended firm composed of the prisoner and another person, with intent to defraud, was held not to be forgery in Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 11 Gray, 197. In that case it appeared that the prisoner, Baldwin, signed the note in question, "Schouler, Baldwin & Co.," representing that the firm was composed of bimself and one William Schouler of Columbus. It further appeared, either that there never had been any such partnership, or that it had been dissolved. The court held that there was no forgery, but simply a fraud in the representation as to the existence of the partnership. Dr. Wharton is of the