facts that occur and grow out of the injury, even up to the day of the verdict. If so, it is clear the damage is not the cause of action. This is fully illustrated by the case from 1 Salk. 11, in which a plaintiff, having previously recovered for an assault, afterwards sought indemnity for a very serious effect of the assault, which could not have been anticipated, and, of consequence, could not have been compensated, in making up the verdict."

The cases are numerous and conclusive on this doctrine. As long ago as 20th Eliz., 1 Cro. 53, this was one of the points ruled in The Sheriff v. Bradshaw. And the case was a strong one; for it was altogether problematical whether the plaintiffs ever should sustain any damages from the injury. The principle has often been applied to the very plea here set up, and in some very modern cases. That of Batlley v. Faulkner, 3 Barn. & Ald. 288, was exactly this case; for there the damage depended upon the issue of another suit, and could not be assessed by a jury until the final result of that suit was definitely known. Yet it was held that the plaintiff should have instituted his action, and he was barred for not doing so. In Howell v. Young, 5 Barn. & Cress. 259, the same doctrine is affirmed, and the statute held to run from the time of the injury, that being the cause of action, and not from the time of damage or discovery of the injury. Demurrer sustained.

In Lathrop v. Snellbaker, 10 Ohio St. 276, the principal case was affirmed, it being again determined that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the negligence causing the injury, and not from the time when the plaintiff acquired knowledge of it: see Gaylor v. Hunt, 23 Id. 255.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Commences to run from what time: see Waln v. Shearman, 11 Am. Dec. 624; Robertson v. Smith, 12 Id. 304; Salisbury v. Black, 14 Id. 279; Jackson v. Johnson, 15 Id. 433.

ROLL V. RAGUET.

[4 OHIO, 400.]

PROMISSORY NOTE, THE CONSIDERATION FOR WHICH is an agreement not to prosecute the maker for a felony, is against public policy, and therefore void.

RAGUET sued Peter Roll and Charles Roll upon a promissory note for the sum of five hundred dollars. Charles Roll was not found, and the declaration was filed against Peter, who pleaded the general issue, and also pleaded specially in bar that at the time the note was given, Charles Roll, who was his son, was

suspected and accused by Raguet of having feloniously taken his goods and chattels; that Raguet threatened to institute a criminal prosecution against Charles, and cause a judicial investigation to be made touching said supposed felony, unless Charles and Peter would pay him five hundred dollars, upon the receipt of which he agreed not to institute such criminal prosecution, and agreed not to appear against Charles as a witness upon any proceedings that might be instituted for said supposed offense, but would endeavor to suppress any investigation concerning it. That thereupon the note in suit was executed for the purpose of preventing any criminal prosecution against Charles. To such special plea there was a general demurrer and joinder. The court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for the defendant in error, Raguet, to reverse which, this writ of error was prosecuted.

Caswell and Starr, for plaintiff in error. The only question for the investigation of the court is, whether the consideration of the note, as set forth in the plea, makes it void. The books lay down the two following propositions, which, if true, dispose of this case: 1. All contracts, agreements, or promises, whose consideration is illegal, contrary to sound policy and good morals, are void: 2 Stark. Ev. 87; 7 T. R. 601; Parsons v. Thompson, 1 H. Bl. 322; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341; 2 Pothier on Ob. 4; Pow. on Con. 185; Story on Plead. 125; Com. on Con. 29, 30; 2. That all contracts made to prevent the due course of justice are void: Stiernhde Jur. Goth. C. 3, 5; Johnson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Wms. 279; Bell v. Woods, 1 Bay, 249; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio, 144.

Storer and Ames, contra.

By COURT. A father and son join in giving a promissory note, for the consideration that the payee will abstain from prosecuting the son for a larceny, and will not appear in a court of justice as a witness against him.

The court are not called upon to decide whether an action may be supported upon a promise to pay for stolen goods, nor whether an action will lie to recover private damages sustained by the commission of a public offense. The only question presented by the record is, whether a court of justice will lend its aid to enforce a promise for the payment of money, the sole consideration of which is another promise, made by the plaintiff, to conceal or stifle the prosecution of a crime perpetrated against the peace and common good of mankind.

The well-being, the existence of every government, obviously depends, in a great measure, upon the due execution of its criminal laws. Any contract, therefore, the consideration of which is to conceal a crime or stifle a prosecution, is necessarily repugnant to public policy; and it is a settled rule of law, that all contracts whose consideration is contrary to public policy are void: 2 Kent Com. 366; 2 Stark. Ev. 87.

It is unnecessary to inquire whether such contracts are posi tively prohibited by law, or whether it is, in all cases, the legal or moral duty of an individual, cognizant of the commission of a crime, to make a disclosure to the proper authorities. Admitting the existence of cases where silence would be excusable, it by no means follows that an express contract to conceal the offense, or smother its prosecution, must be sanctioned by the law, or enforced by the judicial tribunals of the country.

The objection that when the contract was made no suit had been commenced or indictment found, is without foundation. The same, if not stronger reasons of public policy exist, before as after the existence of a prosecution. By a public prosecution the offender becomes notorious, and the community are put upon their guard. By a composition of the felony, in secret, without any prosecution, the true character of the offender is unknown, and the community are subjected to depredations, which might otherwise be anticipated and prevented.

As between the parties to this action, the defense may not be very honest; and we may adopt the language of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, alias Newland, Cowp. 341, "that the objection that a contract is immoral or illegal, as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded on general principles of policy, that ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act."

Whenever an agreement appears to be illegal, immoral, or against public policy, a court of justice leaves the parties as it finds them; if the agreement be executed, the court will not rescind it; if executory, the court will not aid in its execution. Judgment reversed.

In Raguet v. Roll, 7 Ohio, 76, an attempt was made by Raguet, by a scire facias on the mortgage given by Roll to him, to secure the payment of the note, determined in the principal case to be invalid, to charge the lands so mortgaged with an execution to secure the payment of the debt of five hun.

dred dollars, which was evidenced by said note. The same plea interposed in the principal case was again set up, and evidence admitted to sustain it. A verdict having been rendered in favor of defendant, upon appeal it was determined that the mortgage was invalid, and that any defense that might be interposed against the obligation which the mortgage was given to secure, was equally available against it. The principal case has been frequently affirmed and followed in Ohio: Moore v. Adams, 8 Ohio, 375; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Id. 148; Spaulding v. Bank of Muskingum, 12 Id. 548; Goudy v. Gebhart, 1 Ohio St. 265.

There is no doubt of the correctness of the principles upon which the principal case was determined. Any agreement or contract, the consideration of which is immoral, criminal, or unlawful, is void, and no action can be sustained for its enforcement. Contracts not to prosecute a person for the commission of a crime are against public policy and void. This principle was applied in Cameron v. McFarland, 6 Am. Dec. 566, where it appeared that part of the consideration of the bond sued on was an agreement not to prosecute a person for malicious mischief.

REEDER V. BARR.

[4 OHIO, 446.]

NOTICE BY RECITALS IN PATENTS.-A person purchasing land is bound by the recital of all facts contained in any conveyance affecting the title thereto, as if he had actual notice thereof, and where a patent was issued to N., assignee of the administrator of H. R., deceased, it was held that such recital was sufficient to charge a subsequent purchaser with notice of the rights of the heirs of H. R.

BILL in chancery. The only question presented for the determination of the court is stated in the opinion. Defendant Barr filed his plea in bar to the complainants' bill, claiming to be an innocent purchaser of the land for value, under a foreclosure sale against one Newell, for which a reconveyance was sought, without notice of the plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs filed a general replication to this plea.

Storer and Fox, for complainants: 1. It is well settled that where a purchaser can not make out his title but through a deed which leads to a fact, he will be affected with notice of that fact: 2 Madd. Ch. 327; Beames Plead. 252; Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Sch. & Lef. 327; Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 117. Inasmuch, therefore, as Barr can not make out his title without the patent, he is chargeable with notice that Newell purchased, or pretended to purchase, of an administrator. 2. Knowing that Newell purchased of an administrator, Barr was bound to know that no administrator, merely as such, had authority to dispose of real estate, except under an order of court; and in taking the estate, he took it subject to all the equities to which it was

subject in the hands of Newell: Newl. on Cont. 511; Denning v. Smith, 3 Johns. Ch. 344; Lessee of Willis v. Bucher, 2 Binn. 455.

N. Wright, contra.

By COURT. The patent was issued to Newell, as assignee of the administrator of Henson Reeder, deceased; and the only question is, whether this disclosure of the rights of the patentee, and of the manner in which they were acquired, is sufficient to charge a subsequent purchaser, with notice of the equitable rights of the complainants, as heirs at law of Henson Reeder. The true rule upon this subject appears to be, "that the law imputes that notice, which, from the nature of the transaction, every person of ordinary prudence must necessarily have:" Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 120; Madd. Ch. 327; Newl. 511.

If, in the investigation of a title, a purchaser, with common prudence, must have been apprised of another right, notice of that right is presumed. Here Barr, in tracing his title, must have seen from the patent, that Newell's right was derived from an administrator, who possessed no title to the land himself, and whose deed could be available only by a previous compliance with certain legal formalities. If the assignment of an administrator, per se, conveyed the equitable rights of the intestate, the purchaser might stand in a different situation. As it is, we are of opinion that the recital in the patent is sufficient to put a man of ordinary prudence to an inquiry for the rights of the heirs; and that a subsequent purchaser must, at his peril, ascertain whether those rights have been regularly extinguished. Authorities are cited to show that presumptions of regularity are to be made in favor of public officers: Williams v. East India Co., 3 East, 200; Hartwell v. Root, 19 Johns. 347 [10 Am. Dec. 232]. And that the existence of a grant is sufficient ground to presume that every prerequisite has been performed: Polk v. Wendell, 9 Cranch, 98: 5 Wheat 304; King v. Hawkins, 10 East, 216. If this grant were a simple conveyance to Newell, his assignees might perhaps claim the benefit of these rules; but the grant, upon its face, shows that the heirs of Reeder were the owners of the estate, after the death of their ancestor; and it is going too far to say, that there is a legal presumption, not only that the officers of government have performed their duties, but that the rights of the heirs of Reeder have been divested by a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Plen overruled.