2 ploys a broker on the Stock Exchange, he impliedly authorises him to act in accordance with the rules there established, provided only that they be reasonable, or, in other words, legal;' and in such case it matters not whether the principal be himself acquainted with the rules by which such brokers are governed. But this doctrine will not be carried too far; and therefore where goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the bill of lading was indorsed to parties residing in New South Wales, evidence of a local usage to Liverpool, which was tendered with the view of affecting the construction of the written contract, was held to be inadmissible as against the indorsees, in the absence of proof that they were acquainted with the usage. So, it has on several occasions been ruled that "Lloyd's" at the Royal Exchange is not a market within the rule, and that the usage there prevalent among insurance brokers, is not such a general usage as to bind merchants and shipowners unacquainted with its existence." It may also admit of doubt, whether the doctrine would be held to apply in its full force to cases of maritime insurance, as authorities are not wanting, which, in the language of Lord Wensleydale, "look the other way.' 4 99 7 § 182. Again, if letters or notices properly directed to a gentle-148 1 See Pierson v. Scott, 47 L. J., Ch. 705, per Fry, J.; L. R, 9 Ch. D. 198, S. nom. Pearson v. Scott. 2 Sutton v. Tatham, 10 A. & E. 27; recognised in Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1 Ex. R. 425; Pollock v. Stables, 12 Q. B. 765; Bayley v. Wilkins, 7 Com. B. 886: Taylor v. Stray, 2 Com. B., N. S. 175; Hodgkinson v. Kelly, 37 L. J., Ch. 837, per Ld. Romilly, M. R.; 6 Law Rep., Eq. 496, S. C.; Coles v. Bristowe, 4 Law Rep., Ch. Ap. 3; 38 L. J., Ch. 81, S. C.; Bowring v. Shepherd, 40 L. J., Q. B. 129; Grissell v. Bristowe, 38 L. J., C. P. 10; 4 Law Rep., C. P. 36, S. C. in Ex. Ch.; Duncan v. Hill, 40 L. J., Ex. 137; 6 Law Rep., Ex. 255, S. C. See Merry v. Nickalls, 7 Law Rep., Ch. Ap. 733; 41 L. J., Ch. 767, S. C.; and Nickalls v. Merry, 7 Law Rep., H. L. 530; and 45 L. J., Ch. 575, S. C. in Dom. Proc * See Robinson v. Mollett, 7 Law Rep., H. L. 802. Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moo. P. C. R. 361. But see The Steamship Co. Norden v. Dempsey, 45 L. J., C. P. 764. 5 Sweeting v. Pearce, 7 Com. B., N. S. 449; 9 Com. B., N. S. 534, and 30 L. J., C. P. 109, S. C. in Ex. Ch.; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Ad, 605; Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & A 210; Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793; 5 D. & R. 641, S. C. Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793. man be left with his servant, it is only reasonable to presume, primâ facie, that they reached his hands.' The fact, too, of sending a letter to the post office will in general be regarded by a jury as presumptively proved, if the letter be shown to have been handed to, or left with, the clerk, whose duty it was in the ordinary course of business to carry it to the post, and if he can declare that, although he has no recollection of the particular letter, he invariably took to the post-office all letters that either were delivered to him, or were deposited in a certain place for that purpose.2 § 183. Akin to this presumption is that which is sometimes recognised with respect to the working accuracy of certain scientific instruments. For example, a jury would be advised, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to rely on the general correctness of a watch or a clock, which had been consulted for the purpose of fixing the time when a certain event happened. So, a thermometer would be regarded as a sufficiently safe indication of the heat of any liquid in which it had been immersed, and a pedometer might be used as evidence of the distance between two places which had been traversed by the wearer. Blood stains are every day detected by means of known chemical tests. So aneroids, anemometers, and a variety of other ingenious contrivances for detecting different matters, will occasionally play an important part as furnishing presumptive proof in Courts of Justice. In a few instances this mode of proof has been recognised by the Legislature. Thus, under "The Gas Works Clauses Act, 1871," and the Public Health Acts of 1875 for England, and 1878 for Ireland, the register of a gas or 14A 1 Macgregor v. Kelly, 3 Ex. R. 794. This presumption is sometimes conclusive, as, for instance, in the case of a notice to quit served at the tenant's house on one of his servants. Tanham v. Nicholson, 5 Law Rep., H. L. 561; I. R., 6 C. L. 188, S. C. per Dom. Proc., reversing S. C. as reported in I. R., 4 C. L. 185. 2 Skilbeck v. Garbett, 7 Q. B. 846; Hetherington v. Kemp, 4 Camp. 193, Trotter v. Maclean, L. R., 13, Ch. D. 580, per Fry, J.; 49 L. J., Ch. 256, S. C.; Ward v. Ld. Londesborough, 12 Com. B. 252; Spencer v. Thompson, 6 Ir. Law R., N. S. 537, 565. So, in Scotland, "where there is proof of the regular practice of a house of business to depatch its letters in a particular manner to the post-office, it is not necessary to prove that the individual letter in question was so despatched." Dickson, Ev. 6, and cases cited in n. e. water meter "shall be primâ facie evidence of the quantity" of gas or water consumed.1 § 184. The law of partnership recognises certain presumptions, 149 but before referring to these it will be convenient to notice one which, contrary to former decisions,2-is no longer regarded as of binding force. Prior to the year 1860, the mere fact of participation in the net profits of a business was held, by virtue of an arbitrary presumption of law, to constitute a partnership. In Cox v. Hickman, however, the House of Lords denied the existence of any such legal presumption; and the result of that decision would seem to be, that, although a right to share in the profits of trade is a strong test of partnership, and even when standing alone will justify a jury in presuming its existence, yet the question whether or not several persons are partners must in each case depend on the real intention and contract of the parties. Turning now to the presumptions which still prevail in partnership law, it may first be noticed, that, -in the absence of any contract between partners, or any dealing from which a contract may be implied,-the common law as best interpreted both in England, and in America," would seem to infer,like the civil law,'-that the business has been conducted on terms of an equal partnership; and, consequently, that each partner has a right to insist on an equal participation in profit and loss. Lord 5 134 & 35 V., c. 41, 20; 38 & 39 V., c. 55, 59; 41 & 42 V., c. 52, 69, Ir. 2 Waugh r. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235; Pott v. Eyton, 3 Com. B. 32. 38 H. of L. Cas. 268. See, also, 28 & 29 V., c. 86. 4 Mollwo, March & Co. v. The Ct. of Wards, 4 Law Rep., P. C. 419, 435; 5 Stewart v. Forbes, 1 Hall & T. 461, 472, per Ld. Cottenham, C., recognising the result of Ld. Eldon in Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49, 56; Webster v. Bray, 7 Hare, 159; M'Gregor v. Bainbrigge, id. 164, n. a; Robinson v. Anderson, 20 Beav. 98; 7 De Gex, M. & G. 239, S. C.; Collins v. Jackson, 31 Beav. 645; Story, Part., 24. But see, contra, Peacock v. Peacock, 2 Camp. 45, per Ld. Ellenborough; and Tompson v. Williamson, 7 Bligh, 432. Gould v. Gould, 6 Wend. 263. Inst. lib. 3, tit. 26, 1; Dig., lib. 17, tit. 2, ? 29. Wensleydale has even held at Nisi Prius, that, in the absence of all evidence on the subject, partners must be presumed to be interested in equal proportions in the partnership stock.1 3 § 185. Again, every member in an ordinary trading copartnership & 149 is presumed in law to be intrusted with a general authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the firm for the usual purposes of the business, and, consequently, to be empowered to borrow money, and to contract or pay debts, on account of the partnership, and to make, draw, indorse, and accept negotiable securities in the firm's name.' Similar powers, however, are not presumed to exist in the case of mining copartnership; and it is now determined that one of several co-adventurers in a mine has no authority, as such, to negotiate any bill on behalf of his fellows, or to pledge the credit of the general body for money borrowed for the purposes of the concern.* Still less have the members of a firm, which is not established for trading purposes, as, for example, a firm of solicitors, any implied authority to bind each other by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, or making promissory notes or even post dated cheques. Neither in an ordinary partnership has one member of the firm power to bind the others by contracts out of the apparent mode of the partnership dealings, merely because they are reasonable acts towards affecting the partnership purposes; and, therefore, where a partner signed a guarantee in the name of the firm for the purpose of giving effect to a transaction within the scope of the partnership dealings, the court, in the absence of proof of any usage, and of any recognition by the other partners, refused to infer that he was authorised to act in this manner, and held that the firm was 5 1 Farrar v. Beswick, 1 M. & Rob. 527. 2 Jenkins v. Morris. 16 M. & W. 877, 880; Ex parte Darlington, &c., Bank Co., re Riches & Marshall's Trust Deed, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 581; Story, Part, 102, 124, 125; Bk. of Australasia v. Breillat, 6 Moo. P. C. R. 152, 193, 194. See Maclae v. Sutherland, 3 E. & B. 1. * Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128; 5 M. & R. 126, S. C. Ricketts v. Bennett, 4 Com. B. 686; Burmester v. Norris, 6 Ex. R. 796. See, In re German Mining Co., 22 L. J., Ch. 926; and post, & 1185, ad fin. 5 Foster v. Mackreth, 2 Law R., Ex. 163; 36 L. J., Ex. 94, S. C.; Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316; 11 L. J., Q. B. 293, S. C. not bound by the guarantee.' Had any evidence been given of the adoption of the act by the other partners, the result would, of course, have been different.2 3 § 186. With respect to the law of agency, it may be noted, that ? 149A when the seller deals with an agent resident in this country, and acting for a foreign principal, the ordinary presumption is that he does not contract with the foreigner, but that he simply trusts the party with whom he actually makes the bargain. This rule, however, is by no means what Mr. Justice Story represents it to be,"a presumption so strong, as almost to amount to a conclusive presumption of law;" but it is at best a mere presumption of fact, liable to be rebutted by any evidence, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, which tends to show that credit was really intended to be given to the foreign principal." § 187. One or two presumptions may here be mentioned, which ? 150 attach to particular trades, and which, though apparently harsh, are in reality founded on just principles of public policy. For instance, if goods intrusted to a common carrier be lost or damaged, the law will conclusively presume that the carrier has been guilty of negligence, unless he can show that the loss or damage was occasioned by what is technically called "the act of God," or by the Queen's enemies. So, the loss or damage of luggage, while under 8 1 Brettle v. Williams, 4 Ex. R. 623; overruling Ex parte Gardom, 15 Ves. 286. See, also, Hasleham v. Young, 5 Q. B. 833; Duncan v. Lowndes, 3 Camp. 478. One partner has no implied authority to bind another by submission to arbitration, Hatton v. Royle, 27 L. J., Ex. 468. 2 Sandilands r. Marsh, 2 B. & A. 673. See Maclae v. Sutherland, 3 E. & Green . Kopke, 18 Com. B. 549; Mahoney v. Kekulé, 14 Com. B. 390. 6 Best, Ev. 528-530. 7 This rule does not extend to a passenger's luggage placed in the same carriage with him on a railway; and if such luggage be lost or injured the Company will only be liable for the damage on proof of the negligence of their servants; Bergheim v. Gt. East. Ry. Co., 47 L. J., C. P. 318, per Ct. of App.; L. R., 3 C. P. D. 221, S. C. Ross v. Hill, 2 Com. B. 890, per Tindal, C. J.; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 918, per Ld. Holt; 1 Smith, L. C. 171, S. C. See post, & 1172. The Scotch law on this subject is now embodied in 17 of 19 & 20 V., c. 60, |