ordinary indictments; except, only, that, on these more serious occasions, they will not supply the want of the two witnesses, whose testimony is required by the Act of William the Third. Consequently, whether these confessions be proved by one witness or two, they can only be treated as corroborative evidence of the overt act charged;' unless such overt act be the assassination of the Queen, or any attempt to injure her person, in which event the accused may be convicted on the same evidence as an ordinary murderer.2 § 868.3 Whether on ordinary indictments for felony or mis- 794 demeanor, extra judicial confessions, uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, are of themselves sufficient to justify a conviction of the prisoner, has been gravely doubted. In the Roman law, such naked confessions amounted only to a semiplena probatio, upon which alone no judgment could be founded; and at most, the accused, in particular cases, could only be put to the torture. But if voluntarily made in the presence of the injured party, or if reiterated at different times in his absence, and persisted in, they were received as plenary proof. In each of the English cases usually cited in favour of the sufficiency of this evidence, some corroborative circumstance will be found. Thus, in the case of Eldridge,' who was indicted for horse-stealing, the horse was found in his possession, and he had sold it for 127., after asking 351., which was its fair value. In the cases of Falkner and Bond, the person robbed was called upon his recognizance, and it was proved that one of the prisoners had endeavoured to send a message to him to keep him from appearing. In 8 6 1 R. v. Willis, 15 How. St. Tr. 623-625; Fost. C. L. 240-243; R. v. Crossfield, 26 How. St. Tr. 55-57. 239 & 40 G. 3, c. 93; 1 & 2 G. 4, c. 24, ¿ 2, Ir.; 5 & 6 V., c. 51, ¿ 1. 3 Gr. Ev. 217, in part. As to when the corpus delicti need not be proved, see ante, 141. See, also, R. v. Unkles, I. R., 8 C. L. 50. 5 Everh. Conc., Concl. xix. 8, lxxii. 5, cxxxi. 1, clxiv. 1, 2, 3, clxxxvi. 2, 3, 11; 1 Masc. de Prob., Concl. 347, 349; Van Leeuw. Comm. b. 5, ch. 21, 8 4, 5; Carpz. Pract. Rer. Cr., Pars II.. Quæst. 60, n. 8. See R. v. Sutcliffe, 4 Cox, 270. 7 R. & R. 440. 8 Id. 481. 3 1 2 White's case there was strong circumstantial evidence both of § 869. Whatever may be the correct rule with respect to 794 uncorroborated confessions as recognised by courts of criminal jurisdiction, the Divorce Division has held, that a decree for the dissolution of marriage can legally rest on the respondent's 1 R. & R. 508. 3 Dyer, 215, pl. 50. 2 Id. 509. 5 Guild's case, 5 Halst. 168, 185; Long's case, 1 Hayw. 524 (455); 4 Hawk. P. C. 425, B. 2, c. 46, 36; 2 Russ. C. & M. 825, 826, n. b.; and R. v. Edgar, there cited. admission of adultery, though unsupported by any confirmatory evidence. Still, proof of this nature ought to be received with the utmost caution, and no judge would feel justified in acting upon it, unless the admission bore internal evidence of being trustworthy, and, moreover, amounted to an unequivocal acknowledgment of adultery.2 § 870.3 In the proof of confessions, as in the case of admissions 795 in civil causes,-the whole of what the prisoner said on the subject, at the time of making the confession, should be taken together. This rule is the dictate of reason, as well as of humanity. The prisoner is supposed to have stated a proposition respecting his own connexion with the crime; but it is not reasonable to assume, that the entire proposition, with all its limitations, was contained in one sentence, or in any particular number of sentences, exclud ing all other parts of the conversation. As the meaning of a writing must, in civil cases, be collected from the whole taken together, and as, when several instruments relating to the same matter have been executed at one time, they are all resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties; so here, if one part of a conversation is relied on, as proof of a confession of the crime, the prisoner has a right to lay before the court the whole of what was said in that conversation; or at least so much as is explanatory of the part already proved, and perhaps, in favorem vitæ, all that was relative to the subject-matter in issue. For, as already observed respecting admissions, unless the whole is considered, the true meaning of the part which is evidence against him cannot be ascertained. 6 5 § 871. But if, after the entire statement of the prisoner has been 1 Robinson v. Robinson & Lane, 1 Swab. & Trist. 362; 27 L. J., Pr. & Mat. 91, S. C.; Williams v. Williams & Padfield, 35 L. J., Pr. & Mat. 8; 1 Law Rep., P. & D. 29, S. C.; Le Marchant v. Le Marchant & Radcliff, 45 L. J., P. D. & A. 43. 2 Id. 3 Gr. Ev. 218, in great part. Ante, 2725-734. 5 Per Ld. C. J. Abbott, in the Queen s case, 2 B. & B. 297, 298; as qualified by the court in Prince r. Samo, 7 A. & E. 634, 635; R. v. Jones, 2 C. & P. 629; R. v. Higgins, 2 C. & P. 603. 6 Ante, 8 725-729, and cases there cited. 1 795 2 given in evidence, the prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he is at liberty to do so; and then the whole testimony is left to the jury for their consideration, precisely as in other cases where one part of the evidence is contradictory to another.' Even without such contradiction it is not to be supposed that all the parts of a confession are entitled to equal credit. The jury may believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his favour, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing. If what he said in his own favour is not contradicted by evidence offered by the prosecutor, nor is improbable in itself, it will be naturally believed by the jury; but they are not bound to give weight to it on that account, being at liberty to judge of it, like other evidence, by all the circumstances of the case.3 And if the confession implicate other persons by name, still it must be proved as it was made, not omitting the names; but the judge will instruct the jury, that it is not evidence against any one but the prisoner who made it. This last proposition was strikingly illustrated in the case of Robinson v. Robinson and Lane, which was a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery, and in which a private diary kept by her, describing her intrigues with the co-respondent, was received as a confession against herself, though it was held to be inadmissible as evidence against her paramour. § 872. Before any confession can be received in evidence in a ? 796 criminal case, it must be shown to have been voluntarily made; for, -to adopt the somewhat inflated language of Chief Baron Eyre,— 1 R. v. Jones, 2 C. & P. 629. 2 R. v. Higgins, 3 C. & P. 603, per Parke, J.; R. v. Steptoe, 4 C. & P. 397, per Park, J.; Kesp. v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86, 88. 3 Per Littledale, J., in R. v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221. R. v. Hearne, 4 C. & P. 215, per Littledale, J.; R. v. Clewes, id. 221, 225, per id.; R. v. Fletcher, id. 250, per id.; 1 Lew. C. C. 107, S. C., R. v. Hall, 1 Lew. C. C. 110, per Alderson, B; R. v. Foster, id. per Ld. Denman, R. v. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175, per Gurney, B., who said it had been much considered by the judges; Parke, J., thought otherwise in Barstow's case, 1 Lew. C. C. 110. 527 L. J., Pr. & Mat. 91; 1 Swab. & Trist. 362, S. C. Gr. Ev. 219, in part. 66 - 1 a confession, forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected." The material question, consequently, is, whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear; and the evidence to this point, being in its nature preliminary, is, as we have seen,2-addressed to the judge, who will require the prosecutor to show affirmatively, to his satisfaction, that the statement was not made under the influence of an improper inducement, and who, in the event of any doubt subsisting on this head, will reject the confession. As the admission or rejection of a confession rests wholly in the discretion of the judge, it is difficult to lay down particular rules, à priori, for the government of that discretion; and the more so, because much must necessarily depend on the age, experience, intelligence, and character of the prisoner, and on the circumstances under which the confession was made. Language sufficient to overcome the mind of one, may have no effect upon that of another; a consideration which may serve to reconcile some contradictory decisions, where the principal facts appear similar in the reports, but the lesser circumstances, though often very material in such preliminary inquiries, are omitted. Still, it cannot be denied, that this rule has been sometimes extended much too far, and been applied to cases where no reason could be given for supposing that the inducement had had any influence upon the mind of the prisoner. § 873. Difficult as it is to lay down any definite rule on this % 797 subject, which can be used as an unerring guide in every supposable case, there are still some points, both in regard to the person by whom the promise or threat is made, and also in regard to the nature of the inducement itself, on which the judges appear to be 1 In Warickshall's case, 1 Lea. 263, 264; McNally, Ev. 47; Knapp's case, 10 Pick. 489, 490; Chabbock's case, 1 Mass. 144. Ante, 23. 2 3 R. v. Warringham, 2 Den. 447, per Parke, B. 496. 5 See the observations of the judges in R. v. Baldry, 2 Den. 430. |