my

I

have received my letters, informing you of my having defeated Mugdum Saheb, and afterwards Goolam Odin, before the rains and of my intention of going up to Palia catcherry this campaign, the fortress which commands the pafs, through the Balagate Mountains, to the Coromandel Coaft. have told you in other letters, how my march to this important fortrefs drew upon me Tippco Saheb, Hyder's beft general, and eldeft fon, with an army of 30,000 men and 24 pieces of artillery; and I have given you the circumftances of our retreat before this formidable army, with only 2000 men ; in which we marched 36 miles without ftopping, and croffed 3 large rivers in their face, without lofing a fingle piece of baggage or artillery. I juft mention the heads of these circumftances, left you should not have received my other letters; and I shall continue what has fince happened.— The place to which I directed my retreat is a town, called Paniani, about a degree and to the fouth of this place, a strong poft, and in which I had my magazines. On my arrival there, I found Colonel Macleod, of the 42d, who being my fenior

officer, of courfe, took the command. A few days after our arrival, and before we had time to ftrengthen ourselves by any works, Tippoo Saheb attempted to force us. Monf. Lally planned and conducted the attack; they were repulfed with the lofs of upwards of 1000 men killed and wounded; amongst whom were two French captains of Monf. Lally's corps, Goolam O'Din, commiffioned officer for Hyder before Tip- : poo's arrival, and feveral 'principal officers. On this fevere check, Tippoo retired about eight miles from us, and lay there inactive feveral days during that time we worked hard, and intrenched ourfelves completely. We expected and wifhed he would again attack us, instead of which he at once moved off to the eastward by very rapid marches, and, to our furprife, withdrew his whole force to the other coaft. We have received intelligence of Hyder's death, though not yet pofitively confirmed, which accounts for his conduct. It is too long a detail for me to explain to you all the reafons which induced me to undertake this expedition, or the political confequences it may have, (or even has had) on the gene

ral iffue of the war. The Presidency of Bombay, under whofe orders I am placed by the commander in chief, is extremely mortified, that a King's officer fhould, in fpite of them, retain, for fo long a time, the command of their troops; they, therefore, very generously left me 12 months without money, or ftores, or orders, fully determined to disapprove of any plan I adopted. The Prefidency of Madras, on the contrary, have the fame opinion of the expedition that I have, and have felt the good confequences of it, although not fuccessful. I have, therefore, general cenfure from Bombay, and thanks from Madras. The prefent plan of the Presidency of Bombay will, I fhould imagine, be liable to much cenfure. They have withdrawn all the troops from the Callicut territories, and have fent down their Commander in Chief, Brigadier-General Mathews, with a very confiderable addition of force to attack Hyder's provinces, to the northward of Mangalore. The confequences of abandoning Callicut are terrible; we have used every means in our power to induce the Nairs, the inhabitants of that province, to

join us; in confequence of which, they revolted from Hyder's Government, and gave us every supply and affiftance, and joined us in confiderable numbers: in return, we abandoned them, without remorse, to the mercy of a most implacable enemy; and any man who is acquainted with the maxims of Hyder's Government, and has been witnefs to the cruelty of his punishments, must be fhocked when he reflects on the sufferings that will inevitably be inflicted on these unfortunate people. It must be totally deftructive of all future confidence on this coaft, as to our alliance alone they will very juftly attribute the calamities they will fuffer.. If, however, the abandoning our friends and allies was justified by state neceffity, or even by the attainment of any much more important object, it might be vindicated by the maxims of Machiavelian policy; but I think this does not appear to be the cafe. The only object of military operations against Hyder's poffeffions on this coaft, is to compel him to quit the Carnatic; for the people have at last discovered, that Sir Eyre Coote's excurfions in the Carnatic, and his

fruitless victories, have very little effect on

While Hyder con

he is, and must be,

the iffue of the war. tinues in the Carnatic, abfolute master of the country; our garrifons, even Madras itfelf, can protect only within the reach of its guns: when our army marches out, they are pretty much in the fame fituation, and furrounded on every fide by innumerable bodies of cavalry, command only the ground they occupy, They derive no advantage from these excurfions; they find the country laid waste on every fide of them; nor can they procure a day's provifion beyond what they bring with them from Madras. Our army has never been poffeffed of conveyance for above 20 days' provifion, and confequently never equal to any enterprise of moment. Hyder, on the contrary, has the most ample conveyance for artillery, ftores, and provifions; poffeffed of this advantage, and commanding an army of natives of the climate, and confifling chiefly of cavalry, he can march 30 males while we march 10, and confequently carries on the war in the manner he prefers. He knows, as well as Sir Eyre, the day on which he will