the same time says he wants to make sure local government can reduce property taxes. Let me say I consulted yesterday with the commissioner of education from the State of Minnesota, and if this budget. goes through, the State of Minnesota is going to have to raise property taxes because our school program is predicated on a flow of Federal funds into a program of education in our State.

This budget emasculates the educational opportunity in this Nation. Any votex schools, those schools are reduced to a subsistence. Your manpower training funds are out of this budget. All of this affects State programs; and by the way, States have already figured in their revenue sharing. So it is not quite as simple as the nice rhetoric, as the Office of Management and Budget would have you believe.

These are some of the questions that ought to be asked. What about the $305.7 billion in the pipeline? What kind of control will Congress have over that spending? We should seek answers independently and not ask somebody in the executive branch to give us the data.

A number of Senators and Congressmen have given this a look. Congressman Reid in the other body, along with Senators Tunney and McClellan of this body, have all made worthwhile proposals.

I simply want to add my thoughts to this agenda of proposed action. First, we can and we must open up the budget process. The budget is public business, and it ought to be public before it gets to Congress. The budget comes to Congress as a secret document; before it arrives in Capitol Hill, it is already determined.

The Federal budget process does not have to be closed. Mayors and Governors have open budget processes. There isn't a mayor in the United States who does not have to have his budget examined in public as I did when I was the mayor of a city, as the mayor of New York, as the mayor of Chicago, from day 1, from the beginning of the budget process right through to conclusion. May I say not a single mayor has been consulted about the urban programs in this budget. Under this new super-Cabinet, Congress must know what policy and expenditure tradeoffs are being made by HEW and Labor, by super-Secretary and Weinberger, what tradeoffs between human resources, such as HEW and Labor and natural resources. Within the confines of the Cabinet, when the budget is finally prepared in the presence of the President and his immediate aide, there are tradeoffs. I participated in some of those, and those tradeoffs are more secret than anything that takes place in the National Security Council, and that is not right. This should be public information.

Secondly, I think we have to create an Office of Budget Analysis and Public Information.

I am with Arthur Vanderberg. I want to be on the takeoffs instead of the crash landings. We are in on the crash landings. We come here and the Presidents says this is the way this is to be. I will have to raise taxes, inflation, et cetera, et cetera. I think we have got to have a mechanism where we can help in the preparation, particularly in the ascertainment of priorities and goals in the budget process.

We should have a congressional Office of Budget Analysis which would be attached to the Joint Economic Committee. This office should have proper staff and resources comparable to OMB, an analysis section to relate to economic problems and social problems to those of

revenue.

I am unable to accept from the executive branch the edict that a program is not working. So I prefer we have some kind of joint operation to monitor to see whether or not programs are working.

Congress should not be placed in the position of taking the executive's word that the programs enacted in the past don't work. We might want to provide a fraction of every appropriation for evaluation. We need to realine our committee structures and jurisdiction. We can't continue to worry about jurisdiction. If we stop worrying about it, each committee will wind up with all the jurisdiction it wants, but no power over policy. Then we must limit authorizations to 3 years. I say we need to do this if we are to reassert congressional control. It will force us into an oversight program.

There are other organizational changes that some of us have recommended; for example, a blue ribbon citizens committee to study Congress, and a joint committee on national security. And, I happen to believe we do need a planning mechanism for growth and development at both the executive and congressional level, to take a long look down the road. For example, this budget commits us to programs 3 or 4 or 5 years in future. We need a method of planning within a time frame and a set of priorities.

Finally, let me just get down to what the Senator from North Carolina has spoken to us about, Senator Ervin's Impoundment Procedures Act. I think it can be the beginning of the reassertion of congressional authority. It preserves the dictum of final congressional authority and ends all this talk about whether the President is acting legally or not. It boils down to one question: Does the impoundment practice result in an item veto? If it does, then it is unconstitutional because the result is unconstitutional; what the method is, is really secondary.

The fact of the matter is, what is the result? I believe impoundment can only occur without detriment to the legislative program in question, and we must state no program authorized by Congress can be terminated or eliminated through any executive action except as provided by Congress.

The other day the administration terminated the REA program. Now that's what it did, terminated a program without the use of a veto, without ever coming to the Congress.

Now the Ervin impoundment procedures bill incorporates what I consider to be the important elements of this imbalance.

Senator ERVIN. Pardon me a minute. I have to go, gentlementhe majority leader, but I want to commend you for the interest and action you have taken in this field. This bill has some of the amendments that you had adopted on the Senate floor with respect to this question. You have done a great service. I hate to have to go.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am going to be through in just a few minutes, and I want to thank the Senator very much.

Let me ask the Senators to examine this question very thoroughly. What is the authority that this President, not only other Presidents have used for impoundment? I think they are the Anti-Deficiency Acts in 1905 and 1906 and updated in the revision of the Anti-Deficiency Acts, of the anti-appropriation bill. That is the real meat. Now they also use the 1946 Full Employment Act.

The President has to take measures to stop inflation, the President's overall inherent powers to protect the national interests. But let's

take a look here. I had an evaluation and analysis made of all the laws that have been passed since 1905 relating to impoundment. What does the Anti-Deficiency Act provide? It does not authorize the President to willy-nilly impound, not a bit. It allowed monthly allotments to prevent undue proportions in one fiscal year-in other words, orderly expenditure of funds. Second, apportionment could be waived or modified in the event of some extraordinary emergency or unusual circumstances which could not be anticipated at the time of making such an apportionment, and third, these acts were later used to effect savings when the required purpose was accomplished for a sum less than the apportionment.

Now, that is a far cry, Mr. Chairman, from the President moving in to impound funds, cut back funds for the rural environmental program or for the rural housing program or whatever else program it may be.

What does the act of 1950 provide? Congress directed the President to cut the budget-now listen to this-Congress directed the President to cut the budget. The President did not walk in and say, "I don't like the size of the budget. I am going to cut it." Congress directed President Truman to cut the budget by at least $550 million without impairing national defense. He cut $119 million in contract authority and $110 million in authorizations to borrow from the Treasury for a total of $573 million.

Congress expressly gave the President this authority in section 1211 of the 1950 omnibus appropriation bill. That was for the appropriations of that year. This President is using the Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906 and the Expenditures Reduction Act of 1950 as the blanket authority to willy-nilly move in and impound funds that not only slow down a program, that not only thwart the express desire of the Congress in relation to a program, but for all practical purposes in many instances exercise a complete veto of the program.

I submit there is no such authority in law. If the President can stretch the words the Congress authorizes and empowers to mean that that is a budget ceiling-for example, after the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 Charles Dawes, the first Budget Director, set policy that the appropriation of Congress should be viewed as a maximum allowable expenditure. It was referred to as the maximum available during the fiscal year. That is when we started to get into this trouble. Impoundment other than the instances we have talked about has been primarily where the President has exercised his authority as the Commander in Chief, in his role as the head man. The Commander in Chief of the armed services.

I think the time is at hand to do the following:

No. 1, take remedial action by writing new law to prevent Presidential impoundment of appropriated funds, Congress to lay down specific guidelines and terms and directions:

Second, I think it is imperative that the Congress get its house in order so that it can deal as a co-equal with the President of the United States. We are going to look bad, in a weak and untenable position, as long as this Congress continues to operate on a budget that approaches $270 billion as if it were a $10 billion budget.

The appropriations operations have not fundamentally changed in 50 years. We are still going through the same busines as we did back

in the 1920's and the 1930's with the House on one hand and Senate on one hand and hopefully working out our differences.

Without the use of computers, without the adequate staff that is required, without any chance for preaudit, depending on the General Accounting Office, without the Congress ever insisting that we have an input in the budget process before it becomes a finalized document, and I appeal to this excellent Committee on Government Operations to take a look at the possibility of setting up within the Congress today not only what was mentioned today, a general counsel, which surely a general counsel office is absolutely vital; but, also, we should set up an office of budget analysis and program evaluation.

What should go in a budget for the current fiscal year and then to monitor, have the oversight of programs to see whether or not they are working properly, whether there is cost effectiveness, whether or not they are meeting the goals Congress has authorized and designed, and I would also hope that the Congress would take a look at the what we call regulation of delegation, regulation of powers to the Congress.

You and I have been around here, many of us, in governmental process for years. We have watched bills and laws passed only to find out in their application they have no relationship to what was going to happen.

The Congress must find a way in its mechanism to supervise or at least have input on the regulations that are to effectuate basic law.

Senator CHILES. Senator, we want to thank you very much for your testimony. I know the members would like to have the time in which to question you. I am afraid we are going to have to recess because we do reconvene at 2 o'clock.

Senator METCALF. I do thank him for the most helpful testimony. As you know, on the Senate floor a bill requiring confirmation of the Director and Deputy Director of OMB will be debated and discussed, and many of the graphic descriptions you have made will be useful in the discussion of that bill.

Your statements are very helpful.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to thank the Senator from Montana, who has been very active. This is one that is really needed. This gives us some input in the legislative level in the budgetary process.

Senator CHILES. Senator Percy, I understand you have an appointment; you may proceed at this point.

Senator PERCY. I would like to ask you a couple questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. I think we ought to be, first of all, sure we get double pay, whatever you testify.

But your knowledge in this field was such that it flowed and it was very stimulating indeed. As Vice President-and you are uniquely qualified because you have been Vice President and a Member of the Senate-as Vice President did you consider yourself more a part of the administration or as President of the Senate a part of the legislative body?

Senator HUMPHREY. I considered myself part of the administration for one simple reason: For he who giveth can take it away. The staff which a Vice President has is primarily provided by the executive branch. Interestingly enough, the budget process, the line item for a

Vice President in the budget, is the legislative funds the Senate provides for him as its presiding officer. But a Vice President who is doing his job in this day and age is doing his duties in presiding over the Senate.

There is no line item in the budget for him. He borrows one from HEW. He borrows one from Commerce. Say he gets one from the Labor Department and you are dependent on a whole galaxy of agencies of Government to provide you, so you look upon your job as an elective office job.

Senator PERCY. Elmer Staats has testified in 1966 and I quote:

The Administration reduced the abrogations available under the Highway Trust Fund and sizable cut-backs in . . . et cetera, and Interior.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. Were you consulted and can you tell us what was the range of the Johnson administration in impounding those funds and making substantial cutbacks in those funds?

Senator HUMPHREY. The President ordered those cutbacks on the basis of controlling what was appearing to be inflationary pressures. He made them, however, temporarily, might I add. They were held back for periods of time and then released.

Might I add that I had prepared in a memorandum relating to this testimony that there are ways other than the passage of law to bring pressure to bear to get impoundment provisions or impoundment procedures lifted.

For example, I remember Senators coming to see the late President Johnson about the impoundment of highway funds. If you look at the record in the year 1966, before the year was over the funds were being released.

Senator PERCY. Do you feel, Senator Humphrey, that the President acted illegally or without justifiable reason when he impounded those funds.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think he had reason to do it, but I think he operated, from my point of view as I look at it, beyond the law. Now, he could use the act of 1905 and 1906, saying that there were extenuating circumstances because of our deep involvement in 1966 in the war in Vietnam, and of course that related to it, but it is my judgmentI am not a lawyer, I was not asked at the White House, but looking at it as a Senator now and standing in judgment of past actions of Presidents, that the President stretched the authority he had in impound

ment.

Senator PERCY. Would you favor preventing that stretching of the authority and preventing any President from again doing what President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey did at that time?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir; I surely would. I think the early amendment provides the answer.

In other words, if the President exercises his impoundment, he has to get a consent from both Houses to do it.

President Truman exercised impoundment, but at the direction of the United States. The Congress said in the act of 1950 you must use the budget of $550 million. I have had a complete review and in most instances the use of impoundment other than the military, where the President has unique powers because he is Commander in Chief and

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