they do it against the choice and consent of the aged sufferers themselves. Such being the circumstances, under which they are exposed, the most that can justly be said, is, that the feelings of nature, (for they love, although they do not respect and honour the aged,) are made to bow to the exigencies of their situation. It may appear, that they have a wrong or perverted conscience in permitting the sacrifice of the aged in preference to that of the young, but it by no means follows, that they have no conscience at all. Especially as they are described as being hospitable, so far as they have any thing to give; courteous and respectful in their general intercourse; affectionate in their families; and not wanting in justice in the ordinary distribution and management of what little they

possess.

While we contend, therefore, for an original susceptibility of moral emotions, it must be admitted, that its decisions are sometimes perverted by the violence of momentary passions; the uniformity of its decisions is interrupted also by complexity in the action and a complication of good and evil in the results; and some partial and erroneous judgments may be attributed to the influence of association. To these causes are to be ascribed those instances of striking deviation from moral rectitude, which the opposers of an original susceptibility of moral emotions are fond of bringing up. Those instances, we apprehend, do not disprove the existence of the susceptibility, but merely show, that it is sometimes liable to perversions.

S. 229. Of the relation of the reasoning power to conscience.

The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that our moral judgments are the result of reasoning. It is not surprizing on the whole, that this mistake, which is a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider, how close the relation is, which reason sustains to conscience. This subject is worthy of our attention.

In the first place, reasoning is purely an intellectual

process; consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions, but involving nothing, which is properly called an emotion. Our moral sentiments are emotions; and probably every one can say with confidence, that he is conscious of a difference in the moral feelings of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement, which are characteristic of reasoning. Our consciousness assures us, that they are truly diverse in their nature; and cannot be interchanged with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the intellectual perception or suggestion, involved in reasoning, is another.

And yet it must be admitted, that reasoning has very much to do with the decisions of conscience. For instance, when one man is alleged to have put another to death, we find the conscience ready to discharge the duty, which the author of our nature has assigned it; but not unfrequently its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us perhaps, that the murder was premeditated and committed in cold blood; and in view of this fact, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us, that the murder was committed under the reception of unreasonable injuries and the influence of excited passion; and conscience here, as in the other case, condemns the criminal, but with a mitigated sentence. It may be, that we learn from our inquiries, which of course always imply the exercise of the reasoning power, that the murder was committed at dead of night, in the necessary defence of the criminal's own life, his home, and his family; and the circumstances may be so peculiar, that conscience, instead of condemning, may approve the action.

Conscience, therefore, however distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by reason. reasoning power, which is not unfrequently lauded as the glory of man, is the servitor and hand-maid of the conscience; and the decisions of the latter will vary in exact

proportion with the new facts and the new views, which are presented by the former. In the constitution of things they are destined to go together; and while conscience is most justly characterized as the propitious and guiding light of the soul, it must undoubtedly be admitted, that it is the agency of reason, which feeds and sustains its lustre.

It is in consequence of this close connection and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind, that this erroneous notion should be corrected, and that the relation, existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature, should be fully understood.

§. 230. Of enlightening the conscience.

It clearly follows from the views which have been taken, that the moral susceptibility will operate with the greater readiness and efficiency, in proportion as the knowledge of ourselves and of our relations to other beings is increased. And the knowledge to be acquired with this end may be stated in some particulars.—(1) As the Being, who gave us life, has given us conscience, and,consequently, could not intend, that conscience should act in opposition to himself, it seems to be an indispensable duty, that men should be acquainted with his character. His character is made known to us in those works, of which He is the author, and in the Scriptures. If we have right views of the Supreme Being, and of the relation, which we sustain to Him, our conscience will infallibly approve what he has enjoined, and disapprove what he has forbidden.(2) Inasmuch as it results from the relation, which we sustain to the Supreme Being, that correct decisions of conscience are not, and cannot be at variance with his laws, but will agree with them, whenever they are made known, it follows,that all should be made acquainted with the moral and religious precepts, which he has communicated to us. To every mind, that has proper views of the self-existence of

God and our dependence upon Him, it will be enough to justify any action, that He has said it. The mere disclosure of his will cannot but render, in all cases, an action approved in the sight of conscience, whatever may be our ignorance of the consequences connected with it. Hence, in order to prevent erroneous decisions of conscience, it is exceedingly important, we should know not only what God is in himself, but every thing, which he has expressly commanded.

(3) As all duties, which truly result from the relations we sustain to our fellow beings, are expressions of the will of God, who is the Creator of all around us as well as of ourselves, we should earnestly inquire what those relations and duties are. We are to inquire what duties devolve upon us in respect to our immediate circle, to the poor and the sick, to our neighbourhood, and to society in general. Our feelings in respect to the performance of such duties cannot be so clear and vivid, if we exclude the Supreme Being from our consideration of them, as they would otherwise be. A knowledge of the will of God, from whatever other source it is obtained, will tend to guide and strengthen the inward moral feeling.

(4) Since the decisions of conscience are often exceedingly perverted by the undue influence of passion, men should both guard against the recurrence of passionate feelings in general; and when at any time they have reason to suspect themselves of being under the influence of such passion, the decision on the merits or demerits of any particular action ought to be put off to a more favourable period. Nor are we less to guard against prejudices, -the prejudices in favour of friends, and against those, whom we may imagine to have injured us, the prejudices of sects, political parties, &c; for they often give the mind a wrong view of the action, upon which it is to judge. Also when actions are complex, either in themselves or their results, the greater care is requisite in properly estimating them.

§. 231. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously.

The question has sometimes been started, Whether a person is in any case to be considered as guilty and to be punished for actions done conscientiously; for instance, when certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act conscientiously in putting their aged and infirm parents to death. Undoubtedly, in many cases, where people act conscientiously, there is great guilt. And the reason of it is evident. We have seen, that conscience, is in some measure under our control; it may be enlightened; it may be strengthened; or it may be greatly weakened, and in some cases be made to approve of actions of the most unworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are to have a right conscience; this great and exalting principle is to receive and ought to receive the very first attention; and they are accountable whenever it is neglected. Otherwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse to the iniquitous perpetrators of all the cruelties of the Inquisition, of all the persecutions of the Protestants, of all the acts of unkindness and tyranny, which have ever been exercised upon individuals and communities.

And the position, that men are accountable and guilty for having a wrong conscience in proportion to their means of knowledge, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degraded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations. It is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judging, what that degree of guilt is; for no one is competent to it. All, that is meant to be asserted, is, that when persons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong, (that is, in doing what is condemned by the general moral sentiments of mankind, and by the will and law of God;) and yet have within their reach neglected sources of knowledge, which, on being laid open to the mind, would have caused different feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the information before them, and, consequently, cannot under such circumstances be rendered otherwise than criminal by any internal approbation.