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IX-b. (Source: Edward B. Shils. In Labor Law Journal, vol. 15, No. 6 (June 1964), pp. 337-367)

Industrial Unrest in the Nation's
Maritime Industry

By EDWARD B. SHILS

INCE 1947, TAFT-HARTLEY emergency disputes provisions S employed 24 times in

Eight cases involved the maritime industry, either merchant marine or dockworkers. In only six of the 22 disputes, where a board of inquiry was appointed and a Taft-Hartley injunction issued, did a strike commence, recur or run its full course after exhausting all the procedures of the Act. "The significant and suggestive thing about these six strikes is that every one of them occurred in phases of the maritime industry."1

As this article goes to press (March 6, 1964), a 33-day tugboat strike by Local 333, United Marine Division of the National Maritime Union, has just terminated. The strike which denied tugboat assistance to large vessels docking in the New York Harbor also could have affected public health in New York since it barred fuel oil shipments by tug-hauled barges.

Another distressing item in the maritime picture was the recent nine-day "strike" or "boycott" by members of the Maritime Trades Department-SIU, MEBA, ILA, etc., Longshoremen,' against the loading of vessels bound with wheat for Russia and its satellites. The East Coast Longshoremen have effectively blocked these shipments, as the maritime unions continue to insist "that 50% of all shipments should be made in U. S. flag vessels." It appears that the Administration will have to go along with this demand if wheat is to be shipped per commitments. The continual flight of American owned ships to "foreign flags" is making the availability of "American bottoms" questionable.

'Charles M. Rehmus, "Taft-Hartley Title II: An Emergency at Sea," 14 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 869, October, 1963.

'SIU, Seamen's International Union; MEBA, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association; ILA, International Longshoremen's Association.

1021

Introduction

This article will attempt to explore the reasons for labor unrest in the maritime industry by treating the following areas:

Fractionalized Bargaining.-A multitude of unions in the maritime in dustry contribute to labor unrest and work interruptions. This fact stems in part from the historic evolution of labor organizations in the maritime industry, some of which were craft unions belonging to the American Federation of Labor, while others such as the West Coast Longshoremen and the National Maritime Union came to power in the 1930's and aligned themselves with the Council of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

The maritime industry is also characterized by two powerful coalitions of seafaring and officer craft unions, each headed by an important leader. Joseph Curran is the President of the National Maritime Union (NMU) and Paul Hall is the President of the Seafarers International Union (SIU). Their bitter rivalry has created duplicate unions in every craft, which are now allied with one leader or the other. Jurisdictional disputes which could normally be handled by legal machinery become complex and insoluble, in the face of retaliatory measures applied by opposing craft unions simultaneously on all three coasts.

Maritime unions have also been divided by ideological differences,

with certain craft unions labeled as "conservative" and others as "radical.”

Sales, Mergers, Amalgamations and the Fleet-Wide Principle.—For some years the rivalry of these craft unions has been brought into open warfare by the sale of single ships under contract to SIU, to larger fleets under contract to NMU, or vice versa. The crew iding the contract on the

single vessel insists on a retention of trol of the fleet wants to add to its its autonomy while the union in conmembership on a basis of the “feetwide" principle.

Owing to the change of political composition of its membership during the past five-year period, the National Labor Relations Board has reversed itself several times on this issue and has contributed materially to the unending jurisdictional disputes and confusion which almost regularly tie up our merchant marine. The Seafarers International Union (SIU) under Hall, constantly refers what it terms "unfair practices" by NMU, to the internal disputes mechanism of the AFL-CIO, and recently the awards of the internal disputes arbitrator have been at variance with current rulings of the NLRB on the "fleetwide" principle-thus complicating the picture and providing more stimuli for an extension of bitterness and unrest.

Changing Technology.-American shipowners whose vessels fly the United States flag have been adamant that the only way to compete with other

maritime nations, in view of the fact

that the American seafaring wage levels are now three to four times those of foreign vessels, would be to

automate the American Merchant Marine in order to reduce the unit cost of operation. This has been met by undercover union resistance, since each labor leader is involved in a competitive battle with rival unions for more membership rather than less.

Another illustration of resistance to change in this industry is the attitude of the East Coast Longshoremen (ILA) to reducing "gang" size and adopting automated techniques to cut down the cost of operating the loading and unloading facilities at East Coast ports. The disastrous strike of East Coast Longshoremen in the

closing months of 1962 and early months of 1963 was responsible for an economic loss to the nation of over $1 billion and effectively throttled all shipping on several United States

coasts.

Seamen refuse to cross a dockworkers' picket line. The ILA, which is friendly to Paul Hall's SIU, for six months in 1963 effectively blocked the loading and unloading of ships in the Great Lakes ports when these vessels were manned by NMU seafarers "crewing" vessels arriving from Canada, the scene of bitter bloodshed between SIU and NMU throughout 1962 and 1963.

Foreign Flag Vessels.-For some years certain nations, principally

Panama, Honduras and Liberia, have permitted ships of foreign nationals to be registered under their respective flags. Many of the vessels never touch ports in the land of their registry. Many of the PANHONLIB vessels, as they are called, are owned by American companies, either directly or through subsidiaries, but there are also Greek and English owned vessels in the fleets. Liberia, whch leads the world in tanker tonnage, alone accounts for over 11,000,000 registered deadweight tons.

Foreign flag registry in PANHONLIB countries has been severely criticized by maritime labor unions for some time. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) which enrolls the maritime unions of each nation in its membership, includ

'For a complete discussion of the foreignflag issue, please see: Edward B. Shils, "The 'Flag of Necessity' Fleet and the American Economy," 13 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 151, February, 1962; Edward B. Shils, "Flags of Necessity, 'Flags of Convenience' or Runaway Ships"? 13 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 1009, December, 1962; and Edward B. Shils and Sidney L. Miller, Jr., "Foreign Flags of U. S. Ships: Convenience or Necessity?" Industrial Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, May, 1963.

ing the National Maritime Union (NMU), calls such flags "flags of convenience" and the ships "runaway" ships. On the other hand, the American Committee for Flags of Necessity (ACFN), as well as the United States State and Defense Departments, defend foreign flag registry of certain types of American vessels as essential and call them "flags of necessity."

The efforts of the NMU to organize "runaway" vessels were supported by a series of decisions by state and local courts and by the NLRB, which in effect, encouraged such unionization attempts. Appeals to the federal courts from these rulings culminated in a decision by the United States Supreme Court on February 18, 1963,

that American unions do not have the

right to employ the machinery of the Taft-Hartley Act to organize the crews of foreign flag ships merely because the vessels are American owned or engaged extensively in United States. trade. The vote was unanimous, with Justice Goldberg abstaining.

The response of Joseph Curran, NMU President, was as follows:

"This, of course, is a blow to our effort to raise the standards and security on American owned run-away flag ships. But it will not stop those efforts." " 6

If the American maritime unions were able to organize the foreign flag ships flying the PANHONLIB flags, which are approximately 450 in number, this would provide American unions with an additional 25,000 to

[blocks in formation]

30,000 jobs. The fact that many American seamen are dockside or on furlough accounts in part for the antagonism directed to the PANHONLIB fleet as well as to the lack of acceptance by American unions to a cooperative effort in automating our vessels in order to compete with the flags of other nations.

Volatility and Lack of Rationale in Maritime Labor Relations.-In February 1964 vessels such as the world's biggest liner, the Queen Elizabeth, had to undertake a docking responsibility in the Port of New York without the assistance of tugs. Three thousand tugboat tanker and barge workers belonging to Local 333, of the United Marine Division of the National Maritime Union, went out on strike after turning down a contract offer by the Marine Towing and Transportation Employers Association. This strike idled 350 tugboats, tankers and barges operated by 65 companies, and could very well have resulted in a shortage of fuel oil in New York City.

Despite a contract offer which seemed rather inflationary to this reviewer and apparently acceptable to the leadership of Local 333, the offer was turned down flatly and the members went out on strike. This strike con

tinued for 33 days and could certainly have damaged the economy of the New York area and possibly have affected its public health. The right of a member to reject a contract is a foundation stone of democratic unionism, but the inability of management and labor to get together in advance of an important contract expiration is the rule rather than the exception in turbulent maritime labor-management relations. There would be no excuse for this type of impasse were there more intelligent and mature bargaining in the industry.

As of this writing, March 6, 1964, the vessel America has not yet sailed. It has

been laid up for months a victim of warring maritime labor unions, in which the public has had to suffer because the America's crew included the MEBA as a representative of the engineers. MEBA is a union friendly to Paul Hall, head of the SIU, and in direct opposition to Curran's National Maritime Union, NMU, which represented seamen on the America.

The Savannah, a costly government sponsored nuclear vessel has been the prey of repeated interunion bickering and selfishness. In this case, the SIU union coalition was ultimately ousted by an NMU coalition and a change made by the government with respect to a new contractor-operator.

During 1963 the vessel Maximus made headlines when the sale of this ship by Grace Lines to Cambridge Carriers resulted in a displacement of the MEBA by an NMU coalition. Result: retaliatory picketing which tied up 15 vessels in four Gulf ports.

These incidents are not few and far between. During the last few months, notwithstanding the terrible financial loss caused by two national maritime strikes and a dock strike in the years 1961-63, a serious tie-up has existed in the Great Lakes ports where dockworkers have refused to interfere in a

between the two major maritime unions dispute having its origin in Canada SIU and NMU. The Canadian gov teeship over maritime unions in that ernment had recently imposed a trus

country with the result that NMU has been designated by the government to replace SIU seamen on most ships entering the Great Lakes.

The American Federation of Labor under President Meany has shown a friendlier attitude toward the SIU than to the NMU and this has not helped matters.

This Great Lakes dispute has caused a daily loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars and has also created labor

divisiveness among nonmaritime unions in the United States, who support either Hall or Curran. Furthermore

there has been a further degeneration of diplomatic relationships between the United States and Canada as a result of these incidents.

Recently, we learned that Thomas Gleason, President of the East Coast Longshoremen (ILA) and Paul Hall, President of the SIU, also the head of the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, joined together to prevent the loading of foreign flag ships committed to carrying wheat to Russia or its satellite nations.

This writer is not at issue with respect to the anti-Communistic ideology of these unions, but simply reports the fact that despite government commitments, maritime unions make up their own minds as to what is "proper public policy." This is an awesome power when it is found in the hands of one individual. Actually, the reaction to the wheat shipment pro gram is an extension of the bitter attitudes of all maritime unions to the carrying of American cargo in foreign "bottoms." The government initially indicated to these unions that at least one half of the cargoes would be car

ried in American flag ships. A comment is now in order; namely, that the decision to contend with the government's present policy is one emanating from the ILA, SIU and MEBA coalition and has not yet been confirmed by the NMU group. This gives further credence to the writer's contention that the maritime industry is so badly fragmented that it is virtually impossible to procure unanimity on any matter of vital importance to the United States or the public.

FRAGMENTATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE
MARITIME INDUSTRY

Fragmented Employer and Employer
Groups in the 1961
National Strike

The difficulty of approaching labor management relations in the maritime industry on an integrated basis was obvious in the 1961 maritime strike. During this strike, six employer groups had to be consulted on three different coasts on subjects which varied greatly in the impact on each group. Exhibit No. 1 lists these employer groups:

EXHIBIT NO. 1

Employer Groups Involved in the 1961 National Maritime Strike'

(1) Pacific Maritime Association (mostly dry cargo).

(2) Harrison Group (Gulf and Atlantic Coasts-tankers, etc.).

(3) American Merchant Marine Institute (dry cargo-East Coast and Gulf). (4) Tanker Labor Service Committee.

(5) Colliers.

(6) Alcoa.

The American Merchant Marine Institute vessels had about 40 per cent of all seamen involved in the strike and

'Research in maritime union files and discussions with United States Department of Labor officials.

the majority of these seamen were on subsidized ships.

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