eral's authority would be limited to petitioning those courts which have jurisdiction of the parties. This interpretation seems strengthened by the fact that the language reads further that if the court finds the requisite standards set forth in sections 208(a) (i-ii) to exist, then it shall have jurisdiction to grant the injunction. The only identification of the court empowered to act in the fashion per mitted by the statute is the court that would have jurisdiction of the parties.

While section 208(b) is a specific waiver of the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the subsection begins with "In any case," and, since it is obviously not a general waiver of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it must be read to mean in any such case, referring, therefore, to the cases arising under the conditions specified in section 208 of the act.248 The cases referred to then would be those instituted by the Attorney General at the direction of the President, after receipt of a report from a board of inquiry, in the district court or courts having jurisdiction of the parties. It would seem, therefore, that the jurisdiction of a court (power) to grant the injunctive relief requested is dependent upon the jurisdiction of the court (territorial) over the parties involved in the dispute.

B. Jurisdiction of the Courts

There are numerous provisions in Title 28 of the United States Code that deal with jurisdiction of the district courts. In section 1345,240 the act provides "except as otherwise provided by act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by act of Congress."250 This provision, or one substantially similar, goes back at least as far as 1911.251 While the term "jurisdiction" is used variously, it seems pertinent that the removal of (or limita tion on) jurisdiction referred to in the Norris-LaGuardia Act seems to go to the actual power and authority of the courts of the United States with regard to injunctions in labor disputes.2

252

Section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act seems to be a limited restoration of such

248 It could be read "in any event" but that reading would not seem to alter the interpretation.

249 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964).

250 Ibid.

251 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964 (revisor's note of the legislative history).

252 See 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).

power, that is, it vests the court with jurisdiction to enjoin such strike or lockout and to make other orders as may be appropriate. Such limited jurisdiction seems to be conditional. The conditions are that the court should have jurisdiction of the parties, that it must find that the strike or lockout affects an entire industry or substantial part thereof, and that if permitted to occur or continue, it would imperil the national health or safety.

No special provision is made for service of process upon a defendant in any district outside of that court "with jurisdiction of the parties." It is significant to note that sections 1692, 1694, and 1695253 of Title 28 deal with service of process in situations in which the defendant may not be a resident of the district in which the action is commenced. Where it so intended, Congress has also recognized special situations in dealing with venue of the district courts under chapter 87 of Title 28.25

It is reasonably clear that a suit to enjoin a strike or lockout under section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act is one requiring in personam jurisdiction. The statute makes this clear by seeming to limit the power to grant the injunction to that particular court. Congress clearly has the power to authorize a suit under federal law to be brought in any inferior federal court and to provide that the process of every district court shall run to every part of the United States.255 On the language of section 208, however, no such specific authorization has been given.

As the Supreme Court said in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd.250

In a civil suit in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, as distinguished from venue, implies, among other things, either voluntary appearance by him or service of process upon him at a place where the officer serving it has authority to execute a writ of summons. Under the general provisions of law, a United States district court cannot issue process beyond the limits of the district, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476; Ex parte Graham 3 Wash. 456; and a defendant in a civil suit can be subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within the district. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330. Such was the general rule established by the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20 section 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79, in accordance with the practice at the common law. Piquet v. Swan, 5 Mason 35, 39 et seq. And such has been the general rule ever since. Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276, 279. No distinc

253 28 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1694-95 (1964).

254 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-93 (1964).

255 United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).

25€ 268 U.S. 619 (1925).

tion has been drawn between the case where the plaintiff is the
Government and where he is a private citizen.257

In this case there was an attempt to require the defendant to respond to a subpoena served upon him by the marshal for the Northern District of Ohio in Cleveland, where he was a citizen and an inhabitant, commanding him to appear at the office of the board in Chicago, Illinois. The defendant appeared specially by an attorney and challenged the jurisdiction of the board over him and declined to appear and testify. Thereupon the suit was begun by the board in the Federal District Court for Northern Illinois. A summons issued by the court directing the defendant to appear and answer was likewise served upon him in Cleveland by the marshal for the Northern District of Ohio. His attorney again appeared and moved to quash the service on the ground that, being an inhabitant of Ohio and served there, the defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court in Illinois. The Supreme Court sustained the defendant, pointing out that by the general rule in personam jurisdiction of the district court has been limited to the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he can be found. The Court indicated the instances in which Congress had made clearly expressed exceptions to the general rule of in personam jurisdiction. No such exceptions appear in the national emergency disputes provisions.2

258

The Supreme Court also went on to deal with venue in the Robertson case, pointing out that section 51 of the Judicial Code was a general provision regulating venue.259 The Court pointed out that a part of the general provision regulating venue pertinent to the case before it, with certain inapplicable exceptions, provided that "no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant."260 This seems equally pertinent in the

257 Id. at 622.

258 It should be noted that this 1925 Supreme Court case is still very much alive It was quoted with approval in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black in National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 328 (1964) and followed in KadetKruger & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 216 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1963). B see Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).

259 See the revisor's notes tracing § 51 of the Judicial Code back to 36 Stat. 1101 (1911) which contained the section entitled "Section 51 of the Judicial Code." 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964).

260 Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 623 (1925). See Male v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 240 U.S. 97 (1916); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 215 U.S. 501 (1910); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496 (1894). Compare Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893).

discussions of section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act. It is obvious that jurisdiction, in the sense of personal service within a district where suit has been brought, does not dispense with the necessity of proper venue. It is equally obvious that proper venue does not eliminate the requisite personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The general provision as to venue contained in the Judicial Code has been departed from in various specific provisions261 which allow the plaintiff, in actions not local in nature, some liberty in selection of venue. The rule applies even where it may result in barring the jurisdiction of every federal court because all of the defendants are indispensable parties.2

262

The Court has said:

When it appears to a court of equity that a case, otherwise presenting ground for its action, cannot be dealt with because of the absence of essential parties, it is usual for the court, while sustaining the objection, to grant leave to the complainant to amend by bringing in such parties. But when it likewise appears that necessary and indispensable parties are beyond the reach of the jurisdiction of the court, or that, when made parties, the jurisdiction of the court will thereby be defeated, for the court to grant leave to amend would be useless.263

The Court in this case also stated that the general rule of equity is that all persons with a material interest, either legal or beneficial, in the subject matter of the suit are to be made parties to it.264 Moreover, if it appears that to grant the relief prayed for would injuriously affect persons materially interested in the subject matter but not made parties to the suit, the court may dismiss the action on its own motion although the issue is not raised by the pleadings or suggested by counsel.265 Although this was an injunction matter, it involved circumstances which were substantially different from a national emergency dispute. It is also a 1902 case. None the less, the basic principle is still valid.266 The Court indicated that, with regard to indispensable parties, the cases did not rest on the ground of juris

261 E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1392-96 (1964).

262 Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U.S. 603 (1893); Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 140-42 (1854). Compare Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 311, 314 (1919); Clearwater v. Meredith, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 489 (1859); see Judicial Code §§ 50, 52, 63 Stat. 101 (1949).

263 Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 184 U.S. 199, 246 (1902).

264 Id. at 235.

265 Ibid. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)-(b).

266 Charles Keeshin, Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 199 F. Supp. 478, 486 (W.D. Ark. 1961), quoting Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1936).

diction, but upon the much broader ground that no court could adjudicate directly upon a person's right unless the party was either actually or constructively before the court.

A search of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act uncovered no meaningful discussion of the details of the jurisdiction of the court under the provisions of section 208. It is clear, however, that the curious language with regard to jurisdiction has been recognized as a problem in litigation. In the 1948 maritime industry dispute,207 suit was instituted in three district courts in the same dispute.2 Again, as late as the atomic energy dispute of 1954,2 consideration was given to instituting actions in two district courts.

268

269

270

It seems easy to determine the reason for the institution of mul tiple suits in these cases. The records reveal that there were multiple unions involved and they, being subject to the jurisdiction of different courts, were less likely to waive a jurisdictional challenge than defendants in suits involving multiple employers.

In the first seven instances in which the act was used, only four involved injunctions the atomic energy dispute, the coal miners' pension dispute, the maritime dispute, and the dock workers' dispute. Of the four, three involved multiple-party disputants and in the two in which the unions were multiple, litigation was instituted in the respective courts having jurisdiction over the areas in which the unions' national offices were located. This is an interesting aside in view of the voluminous number of employers in the coal dispute and in the 1948 dock workers' dispute.

C. Injunction by Sufferance

The question is whether in view of the peculiar conditional ju risdiction bestowed upon the courts by section 208, actions with multiple-party disputants instituted in a district court that lacks jurisdiction over all the parties could be subject to fatal challenge?

A threshold difficulty in unscrambling this question is deter mining the legal limits of terms such as "strike or lockout" and

267 See Exec. Order No. 9964, 13 Fed. Reg. 3009 (1948).

268 United States v. National Maritime Union, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. 73870 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); United States v. National Maritime Union, 22 L.R.R.M. 2306 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. Warehousemen's Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal 1948).

269 See Exec. Order No. 10542, 19 Fed. Reg. 4117 (1954).

270 United States v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., Civil No. 2456, E.D. Tenn., Sept. 1954. Subsequently, at the hearing on the injunction, representatives of the unioned venue for the defendant-union local located in Kentucky and thereby vol untarily submitted to jurisdiction of the court.