JUDGMENT FOR CONTEMPT IS VALID WITHOUT ANY RECITAL OF FACTS CONSTITUTING THE CONTEMPT: Easton v. State, 87 Am. Dec. 49; contra, see note to People v. Turner, 52 Id. 303. Statement of facts need not be made unless the statute requires it: Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 340.

No APPEAL, WRIT OF ERROR, OR OTHER PROCESS OF REVIEW IS ALLOWED FROM JUDGMENT OF FINE OR COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT: See note to State v. Woodfin, 42 Am. Dec. 162; note to Neel v. State, 50 Id. 218; Easton v. State, 87 Id. 49; extended note to Clark v. People, 12 Id. 184, 186, showing some cases to the contrary.

HABEAS CORPUS MAY BE USED TO ATTACK JUDGMENTS OF CONTEMPT which are void for want of jurisdiction: See note to Easton v. State, 87 Am. Dec. 51; Williamson's Case, 67 Id. 374, note 395; Ex parte Shaw, 70 Id. 55; note to Commonwealth v. Lecky, 26 Id. 49; note to People v. Turner, 52 Id 303; note to Ex parte Grace, 79 Id. 536.

APPEAL FROM Judgment DISMISSING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS will not be entertained by the supreme court of Tennessee: Lea v. White, 67 Am. Dea. 599. For statutory provisions concerning appeals in habeas corpus cases, see Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 388.

ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES ARE NOT REVIEWABLE ON HABEAS CORPUS: See notes to Ex parte Gibson, 91 Am. Dec. 553; Commonwealth v. Lecky, 28 Id. 49.

EVIDENCE IN CASE OF COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT CANNOT 23 RE-EXAMINED ON HABEAS CORPUS BY ANOTHER COURT: See Williamson's Case, 67 Am. Dec. 374.

HABEAS CORPUS IS REMEDY FOR EVERY ILLEGAL IMPRISONMENT: See collected cases in note to Williamson's Case, 67 Am. Dec. 395.

ASSAILING JUDGMENTS FOR CONTEMPT BY HABEAS CORPUS: See Church on Habeas Corpus, secs. 306-346.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE WAS CITED in each of the following authorities, and to the point stated: The power to punish for contempt is absolutely essential to the exercise of judicial authority, and is inherent in every court. So vital is this power to the respectability, safety, and existence of the judicial department of the government that it has been held that the judgment of a court in punishment for contempt is not subject to revision by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or otherwise, although such judgment may be void on its face. The remedy to test the legality of the imprisonment is by the writ of habeas corpus: Sanders v. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. 428. A court of equity has authority to punish by imprisonment a violation or disregard of its decrees; and though the phraseology of the decree violated is inartificial and obscure, it does not excuse the party if its spirit and intent is manifest and free from doubt. His simple duty is to obey: Blair v. Nelson, 8 Baxt. 5. Action of judge or court on writ of habeas corpus cannot be reviewed by any form of procedure: State v. Warner, 13 Lea, 71, 77, 82; State v. Taxing District, 16 Id. 243. In commenting upon the principal case in State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 442, 443, S. C., 49 Am. Rep. 257, President Johnson of the supreme court of appeals considered that it properly decided nothing, except that a judg. ment for contempt by an inferior court could not be reversed.

POWER OF COURT TO PREVENT PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE OR PROCEEDINGS. -The freedom of the press is the keystone of liberty; and the constitu. tional provision, "that every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty,” applies to

judicial conduct and character: Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45. It must be and is cheerfully conceded that public journals have the right to criticise freely the acts of all public officers, executive, legislative, and judicial. It is a constitutional privilege that even the legislature cannot abridge. The press has a right to comment upon the proceedings and decisions of courts, to discuss their correctness, and the fitness and unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important trusts reposed in them. But such criticism should always be just, and with a view to promote the public good. The press may even suggest error. But all this must be done in a decent and temperate manner, in the language and with the views of fair criticism, and with a view to censure what is apparently wrong. No false or dishonest motives must be assigned to any party: State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 478; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Dussault v. Belleau, 10 Quebec L. R. 247. While the press has a right to criticise judicial proceedings, any material departure from the trut in doing so may be punished by the courts as a contempt: Dussault v. Belleau, 10 Id. 247; and a court will punish as for a contempt those who make the public action of its proceedings the vehicle of a libel; but while it has the power to restrain the publication of its proceedings pending litigation, it will not restrain the publication of every unfair report purporting to represent what takes place in court: State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Brook v. Evans, 29 L. J. Ch. 616; S. C., 6 Jur., N. S., 1025; 8 Week. Rep. 688. But while the courts treat the press with charitable consideration, they recognize thei dstinction between the liberty of the press and its unbridled license; and it is evident to even a casual observer of the present day that the press is attempting to usurp the functions of the courts. It is intruding into legal affairs, and the administration of justice is threatened by sensational and unscrupulous newspapers. Newspapers should not be allowed to invade the sanctity of courts of justice, assail litigants, intimidate witnesses, and dictate the verdict of juries and the judgments of the courts. They should not, when they deem it necessary to suit their fancy or increase their circulation, be permitted to pour into a community their opinion of cases about to be tried. The great journals of different cities are breaking down the barriers of the past and assuming authority to comment on, criticise, condemn, or approve proceedings pending in our courts of justice. They pour into every home their opinion of an undetermined cause. They condemn the accused before the evidence is heard, name the amount the verdict ought to be, and the day the jury will decide. Through the long struggle of months to secure twelve impartial jurors, newspaper attacks are read by the summoned citizens. If a citizen, through ignorance or worse, chances to say a word in favor of defendant to any one summoned as a juror, the press, amazed at the villainy, demands that an example shall be made of the offender. Yet the press, with magnificient audacity, taints the panel every day.

This unbridled license of the press is wrong, and should be checked before the waning powers of the courts are impotent to stop its progress. All good citizens will admit that he who willfully and wantonly assails the courts by groundless accusations, and thereby weakens the public confidence in them, commits a great wrong, not alone against the courts, but against the people of the state. The remedy for this wrong is either by injunction, exclusion of reporters from the bar, or by punishment for contempt. The last remedy is the most speedy and efficacious, and has been repeatedly resorted to to prevent the publication of judicial proceedings tending to check or obstruct the administration of justice. The power of courts to punish for such

contempts is unquestioned, in the absence of statutory provisions withdraw. ing or limiting it, but this power can be justified by necessity alone, and should rarely be exercised, and never, except when the necessity is plain and unmistakable. "It is not given," said President Johnson, in the well-con■idered case of State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 477, S. C., 49 Am. Rep. 257, “for the private advantage of the judges who sit in the court, but to preserve to them that respect and regard of which courts cannot be deprived and maintain their usefulness. It is given that the law may be administered fairly and impartially, uninterrupted by any influence which might affect the rights of the parties or bias the minds of the judges; that the court may command that respect and sanctity so essential to make the law itself respected; and that the streams of justice may be kept pure and uncorrupted. If the court is scandalized, and its motives or integrity impeached, in regard to official acts or conduct, the consequences cannot be otherwise than baneful. The administration of the law is embarrassed and impeded, the passions often unconsciously roused, the rights of the parties endangered, and a calm and dispassionate discussion and investigation of causes prevented. The public have a profound interest in the good name and fame of their courts of justice, and especially of the courts of last resort. Everything that affects the wellbeing of organized society, the rights of property, and the life and liberty of the citizen is submitted to their final decision. The confidence of the public in the judiciary should not be wantonly impaired. It is all-important to the due and efficient administration of justice that the courts of last resort should possess in a full measure the entire confidence of the people whose laws they administer." Courts, therefore, look with great disfavor upon the publication of pending proceedings; and there is abundant authority to support the proposition that the publication in a newspaper of an article commenting upon proceedings in court then pending and undetermined, or reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, or the officers of the court, with reference to the suit, in such a way as to influence the decision of the controversy, by prejudicing the public mind with respect to the parties to the cause or the merits thereof, or to otherwise impede, embarrass, obstruct, or corrupt the administration of justice, and with that obvious purpose, is a contempt of court, and punishable by attachment: Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. C. C. 77, 102; Cooley on Torts, 424; Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 339; State ▼. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416; S. C., 49 Am. Rep. 257; Matter of Impeachment of Parsons, 1 Cal. app. 541, 545; Champion's Case, 2 Atk. 469; People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 484, 518; Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 441; S. C., 2 Am. Dec. 388, note 391; Tenney's Case, 23 N. H. 162; In Matter of Moore, 63 N. C. 397; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; 8. C., 1 Am. Dec. 246; Sturoc's Case, 48 N. H. 428; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 528; Regina v. O'Dougherty, 5 Cox C. C. 348; Tichborne v. Tichborne, 22 L. T., N. S., 55; S. C., 39 L. J., N. S., Ch. 398; 18 Week. Rep. 621; Vernon v. Vernon, 40 L. J., N. S., Ch. 118; S. C., 23 L. T. 696; 19 Week. Rep. 404; Brook v. Evans, 29 L. J., N. S., Ch. 616; S. C., 8 Week. Rep. 688; 6 Jur., N. S., 1025; Felkin v. Her bert, 33 L. J., N. S., Ch. 294; Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox C. C. 474; Ex parte Turner, 3 Mont. D. & D. 523; Kitcat v. Sharp, 52 L. J., N. S., Ch. 134; S. C., 48 L. T., N. S., 64; 31 Week. Rep. 227; Regina v. Onslow, 14 Cox C. C. 358; Regina v. Skipworth, 14 Id. 371.

Thus newspaper articles commenting on affidavits pendente lite, and attributing falsity to them, or holding up the makers to ridicule, and characterizing their conduct as utterly disgraceful, constitute a contempt of court for which the printers may be committed to prison: Felkin v. Herbert, 9 L. T.,

N. S., 635; S. C., 12 Week. Rep. 32; 10 Jur. 62; 33 L. J., N. S., Ch. 294. So charging a court, officially, in a newspaper, with bribery, is a punishable contempt: State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; or to publish that the judges of the supreme court, singly or en masse, "moved from that becoming propriety so indispensable to secure the respect of the people, and throwing aside the ermine, rushed into the mad contest of politics, under the excitement of drums and flags,” etc.: Ex parte Moore, 63 N. C. 397; or to publish an article representing proceedings as vexatious, and that the witnesses have, in their evidence, been guilty of perjury: Littler v. Thompson, 2 Beav. 129; or an article calculated to excite feelings of hostility towards persons who are liable to be tried on a criminal charge: Regina v. O’Dougherty, 5 Cox C. C. 348; or to publish in a newspaper, in extenso, a petition for winding up a company, containing charges of fraud against the directors, and before the petition is heard in court: In re Chettenham etc. C. & W. Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 580. So to assert of and concerning the grand jury as a body, while they are sitting, that they are incompetent to discharge their duty, or to make such an assertion concerning any individual on the jury, in his official capacity, is contemptuous: In re Hook, 3 City Hall Rec. 64; so is an article in a public newspaper commenting on the disagreement of the jury in a criminal case in a manner calculated to influence against the accused the minds of persons who might subsequently be called on to act as jurors in that and other cases of a similar nature which are pending: Regina v. O'Dougherty, 5 Cox C. C. 348. So where the proprietor of a newspaper publishes in his journal, during the pendency of an election petition, a series of articles calculated to interfere with the due course of justice, intended to prejudice the public mind against the petitioner, to prevent witnesses affording him their evidence, to deter him from prosecuting his petition, and, if abandoned by him, to deter any other qualified person from becoming a petitioner in his stead: Macartney v. Corry, 7 I. R. C. L. 242. A publication in a newspaper when and where a court is sitting, referring to a case pending therein, and charging the judges with having, in a political caucus, advised the action out of which the case arose, and with having pledged themselves to the caucus to adjudge its action legal, and to decide the case before an approaching political convention, is a contempt which may be summarily punished: State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416; S. C., 49 Am. Rep. 257. A person who threatened a petitioner to publish concerning her a statement of facts, unless her petition were withdrawn, was held guilty of contempt of court, and sentenced to pay a fine of three hundred pounds: Ex parte Chetwynd, 10 Jur., N. S., 1188. So is it a contempt, punishable by attachment, for a father, who has no interest in a pending suit in equity containing serious charges against respondents, but who was interested in a suit at law brought by his son against one of the respondents, in which his son was unsuccessful, to cause copies of the bill to be printed and extensively circulated among the persons with whom the respondents had business relations, saying that he would and could stop the proceedings in equity, if the respondents would pay him one thousand dollars, which was the sum he had been compelled to pay in his son's lawsuit: Tenney's Case, 23 N. H. 162.

And the publication of an article by any person, oven in a newspaper at a place remote from that where the court is being held, concerning a case pending in court, and which has a tendency either to prejudice the public, to corrupt the administration of justice, to influence the court by a threat of "popular clamor," or to reflect on the tribunal, the parties, the jurors, the witnesses, or the counsel, is a contempt of court punishable by attachment: AM. DEC. VOL. XCVIII-27

People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 528. Very closely allied with the publication of proceedings in court is the making of inflammatory speeches concerning them. As hostile criticism in public newspapers on the conduct of persons against whom a criminal information for conspiracy is pending is a contempt: Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox C. C. 474; so it is to address public meetings, exciting agitation, and alleging that the defendant, against whom an indictment for crime has been found, is not guilty; that there is a conspiracy against him, and that he cannot have a fair trial. The court may fine or imprison in its discretion: Regina v. Onslow and Whalley, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219; S. C., 5 Moak Eng. Rep. 443; 12 Cox C. C. 358; Regina v. Skipworth and De Castro, L. K. 9 Q. B. 230; S. C., 5 Moak Eng. Rep. 456; 12 Cox C. C. 371; contra: Rex v. Gilham, 1 Moody & M. 165. In Henry v. Ellis, 49 Iowa, 205, it is held that in a proceeding for the punishment of a contempt growing out of publications alleged to be false, scandalous, and defamatory, evidence is admissible to show the meaning and intent of the publications. But the better opinion seems to be that a good intent is no justification for publications reflecting upon pending judicial proceedings. It may mitigate the punishment, but does not excuse the crime. The meaning and intent of a published article are to be determined by a fair interpretation of the language used, and are matter of law for the court as to whether or not they constitute a contempt; and any disclaimer on the part of the publishers as to any intentional disrespect to the court is not a sufficient ground for discharging a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue. But courts are lenient, and are not disposed to press this class of contempts to extreme measures. If the publication hardly amounts to a criminal contempt, or though the printer has commented in severe and opprobrious terms upon pending judicial proceedings, if he appears and disclaims any disrespect towards the court or its officers, or the jury, counsel, etc., asserts that he had no intention of interfering with the due course of justice, and makes an humble apology, the court will seldom go further than to reprimand him, and impose costs upon him, or apportion the costs in its discretion. But the publisher is sometimes fined, and may even be committed to prison: People v. Wilson, 64 IIL. 195; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 528; People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 484, 518; Morrison v. Moat, 4 Edw. Ch. 25; Tichborne v. Tichborne, 22 L. T. 55; S. C., 39 L. J., N. S., Ch. 398; 18 Week. Rep. 621; People v. Few, 2 Johns. 290; In re Chel tenham etc. C. & W. Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 580; Regina v. O'Dougherty, 5 Cox C. C. 348; Dussault v. Belleau, 10 Quebec L. R. 247; Felkin v. Herbert, 9 L. T., N. S., 635; S. C., 12 Week. Rep. 332; 10 Jur., N. S., 62; 33 L. J., N. S., Ch. 294; Ex parte Moore, 63 N. C. 397.

In cases not aggravated, the court will sometimes refuse to make absolute the rule for an attachment: People v. Few, 2 Johns. 290; and will under the proper circumstances refuse a motion to commit without costs: Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox C. C. 474; Daw v. Bley, L. R. 7 Eq. 49; Morrison v. Moat, 4 Edw. Ch. 25; Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde, 29 Week. Rep. 43. But where a printer is under a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for a contemptuous publication, a mere excuse, without appearance, is not a sufficient ground for discharging the rule, and will only affect the question of punishment: People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 528. Where a newspaper publisher has been committed to prison for commenting upon affidavits pendente lite, holding up the makers thereof to ridicule, and characterizing their conduct as utterly disgraceful, ten days lying in prison and an humble apology to the court is sufficient to purge his contempt. It is not necessary that he should apologize to those