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Whereupon plaintiff sued out this writ of, they are not included within the plain purport error to review the amended decree. and intent thereof."
On March 28th, 1912, the record on error was filed in this court and the writ of error issued. Defendant appeared specially and moved a dismissal of the writ, upon the ground that more than six months had elapsed after the date of entry of the decree before the writ was sued out. May 9th, 1912, this court entered an order overruling the motion to dismiss, without prejudice, however, to the right of defendant to argue such motion at length upon final hearing on the merits. The cause was transferred by this court to the Court of Appeals and remanded on petition of defendant, pursuant to Section 5 of an act entitled Court of Appeals, Session Laws 1911, page 266.
 The main contention involves a construction of Section 8 of Chapter 6, Session Laws 1911, concerning appeals and writs of error, which reads as follows:
"A writ of error shall not be sued out after the expiration of three years from the making or entering of the judgment or decree complained of; but when a person thinking himself aggrieved by any judgment or decree that is the subject of review in the Supreme Court shall be an infant, non compos mentis or imprisoned when the same was so made or entered, the time of such disability shall be excluded from the computation of the said three years."
Section 25 of the act repeals all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith. The question is whether section 2123, R. S. 1908, providing that a writ of error from any decree granting a divorce shall be sued out within six months from the date of such decree and not after, was thereby repealed.
The Code of Civil Procedure enactment of 1887 contained a provision fixing the time at three years in which to sue out a writ of error. This general provision remained intact for six years. Its vice was soon detected when applied to proceedings in divorce, and consequently the legislature, in 1893, limited the time for suing out the writ in such cases to six months. This provision is Section 2123, supra. The act of 1911 expressly repealed the entire subdivision of the Code of 1908 entitled Appeals and Writs of Error, which included the provision of 1887 upon that subject. This court, in the case of Denniss v. People, 55 Colo. 120, 133 Pac. 741, considered the purpose and effect of this act, and held that, although its language is, perhaps, broad enough to apply to criminal cases if such was the intention of the legislature, it nevertheless purports to be an amendment to the civil code and does not apply to such cases. The court said:
"The foregoing considerations and many others that might be mentioned make it appear plain that it was the intention to gather in one body as much as possible the provisions of the civil code relating to the review of civil causes, amend them where amendment seemed desirable and to make the writ of error the sole method of review. The whole act purports to be an amendment to the civil code without specifically saying so, and while criminal cases may be included within some of the words of the act,
If, for the reasons stated, the act does not alter or repeal statutes governing criminal cases, they being governed by special provisions, it is equally true, upon like considerations, that it does not alter or repeal the special provisions relating to divorce proceedings. The primary purpose and effect of the act was to amend the civil code, and it cannot be held to amend or repeal statutes controlling proceedings to which the civil code does not apply, unless it does so directly. Section 6 of the new act expressly repeals "all statutes granting and regulating appeals from district, county and juvenile courts, in all actions, suits and proceedings, both civil and criminal." This indicates that the legislature, in thus specifically abolishing. the right of appeal given by Section 2123, supra, in divorce proceedings, intended, by the very fact that it does not refer to the provision of that section relating to writs of error, to permit it to stand undisturbed. Moreover, as the later act expressly repealed the entire subdivision of the Code of 1908 relating to appeals and writs of error and is in purpose and effect limited to amending the civil code, the provision therein that "all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed" must be held to apply only to all acts and parts of acts of the civil code inconsistent with the new act.
Section 8 of the act of 1911, supra, is substantially identical in word and line with the provision of 1887 upon the subject of writs of error, as the same appears in the Code of 1908. Nowhere in the act is there any reference made to Section 2123, supra, and if it repealed this section, it did so purely by implication. That such is its effect cannot be conceded, for it would be illogical to so hold in view of the construction already given the act by this court. In other words, since it has been held that the primary purpose and effect of the act of 1911 was to repeal and amend the civil code, it could repeal no provision outside of the Code except by express reference. In Lewis' Sutherland's Statutory Construction these general rules are stated concerning repeals by implication:
"If, by fair and reasonable interpretation, acts which are seemingly incompatible or contradictory may be enforced and made to operate in harmony and without absurdity, both will be upheld, and the later one will not be regarded as repealing the others by construction passed with deliberation and with a full knowlor intendment. As laws are presumed to be edge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. the endeavor to harmonize statutes seemingly incompatible, to avoid repeal by implication, a court will reject absurdity as not enacted, and accept with favorable consideration what is reasonable and convenient. *** The act being silent as to repeal and affirmative, it will not be held to abrogate any prior law which can
reasonably and justly operate without antagonism. It is a reasonable presumption that all laws are passed with a knowledge of those already existing, and that the legislature does not intend to repeal a statute without so declaring." Volume 1 (2d Ed.) § 267.
Thus it will be observed with what high degree of disfavor repeals by implication are regarded. An application of these rules to the present case can result in no other conclusion than that no repeal of Section 2123, supra, in so far as it relates to writs of error in divorce proceedings, has been ef
[2, 3] Considering the question from a standpoint of repugnancy, the terms and necessary operation of the earlier statute can be readily harmonized with those of the later act. Plainly there is no necessary contradiction between the affirmative provision of the divorce act, that a writ of error to review a decree in such proceedings shall be sued out within six months from the date of the decree and not after that time, and of the new act, that writs of error shall not be sued out after three years from the making and entering of the judgment or decree of which complaint is made. There is a general principle, supported by numerous authorities, that a statute without negative words will not repeal existing statutes unless there is an unavoidable repugnancy. 1 Lewis' Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 258. The language of the provisions under consideration is affirmative. The earlier one treats of writs of error in divorce proceedings and operates in such cases only, while the later treats of writs of error in general and operates in cases where there is no special, inconsistent provision. Courts should be reluctant to sanction the repeal of an existing legislative enactment unless it clearly appears by the terms or operation of the later pronouncement that it was the unmistakable intention of the legislature to accomplish that end, and this is especially true where, as here, the earlier act is founded in experience and grave considerations of public welfare. In cases of this sort the intention of the legislature should prevail over a literal interpretation. Hogg v. Board of Com'rs of San Miguel County, 141 Pac. 478.
 It is further contended by plaintiff in error that, in any event, the filing in the Court of Appeals of the petition to remand the case constituted a general appearance, by which the right to invoke the six-month limitation of Section 2123; supra, was waived. This contention is evidently urged upon the erroneous presumption, since the cases cited in support of it so indicate, that the question is a jurisdictional one. Such is not the fact. This statute is one of limitation, affording purely defensive matter, and was properly and in apt time raised by the motion to dismiss. Rudolph v. Rudolph, 50 Colo. 243, 114 Pac. 977.
 The remaining contention of plaintiff in error relates to alleged error committed in amending the decree of divorce. It is sufficient to say in this connection that the record affirmatively shows that the judgment or decree of divorce was allowed and rendered on December 6th, 1910, and by its express terms became effective ten days thereafter. The matter of its formal entry was purely clerical or ministerial, and whenever done in conformity with the affirmative showing of the record related back to the date of actual rendition.
The writ of error is, therefore, dismissed at the cost of plaintiff in error.
Where, a husband and wife having separated, the husband proposed a reconciliation not in good faith, and, on her refusal to live with him again, induced her to execute a deed releasing her interest in their homestead and community property for an inadequate consideration, and immediately thereafter sued her for divorce, and obtaining it, at once ceased contributing to her support, the deed would be set aside.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 242-248; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE (§ 232*)-CONVEYANCE BY WIFE TO HUSBAND-INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION-Burden of PROOF.
The burden is on a husband to show that a transfer made to him by his wife for an inadequate consideration is made freely, and that the transaction is fair and just.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 844-848, 981; Dec. Dig. § 232.*]
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; County; W. O. Chapman, Judge.
Action by Minnie R. Yeager against Frank F. Yeager. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
L. C. Stevenson and C. M. Phoenix, of Tacoma, for appellant. Frank D. Nash, of Tacoma, for respondent.
PER CURIAM. The appellant and respondent were formerly husband and wife. They intermarried in Douglas county, Wash., on September 16, 1905. At that time the appellant owned 160 acres of land which he had theretofore acquired under the homestead laws of the United States. The respondent prior to the marriage had entered under the homestead act 160 acres of land adjoining that of the appellant, title to which she acquired subsequent to the marriage. The parties lived together on the property until the year 1909, when they exchanged it, with certain personal property, for city property, situated in the city of Tacoma. They
thereafter removed to Pierce county, taking the appellant for that purpose, and was held up their residence at Orting. At the last- just after the respondent had returned from named place they lived together until the a private sanitarium. The ostensible pursummer of 1912, when the respondent left pose of procuring the meeting was to effect the appellant. On September 12, 1912, short- a reconciliation between the appellant and ly after the separation, the appellant pro- respondent and induce her to live with him cured from the respondent a deed to the again as his wife, and at the meeting this Tacoma property, purporting to convey to proposition was made to respondent by the him the community interest of the respond- appellant. On her refusal to again live with ent therein, executing to her an agreement the appellant, a settlement was proposed, and wherein he promised to pay her $15 per the deeds and contract were then executed. month so long as she conducted herself with But we cannot believe that the effort at If propriety and remained his wife. After pro-reconciliation was made in good faith. curing the deed and executing the agreement, the appellant's witnesses are to be believed, he commenced an action of divorce against he then knew that the respondent had not her, obtaining a decree therein on February conducted herself with propriety since their 4, 1912. Subsequent to the separation, and prior to the divorce, the appellant gave the respondent small sums of money and paid small bills for her, and subsequent to the execution of the deeds and the agreement paid the sums stipulated to be paid in the agreement until the entry of the divorce decree; the whole aggregating, as the court found, about $65. The decree of divorce made no mention of the property rights of the parties, and the appellant has contributed nothing to the support of the respondent since its entry.
On July 12, 1913, the respondent began the present action against the appellant to set aside the conveyances made by her purporting to convey to the appellant her community interest in the Tacoma property, basing her cause of action upon want of consideration, and fraud and deceit on the part of the appellant. Issue was taken on the complaint, and a trial had which resulted in a decree canceling the conveyances. From the decree this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant's assignments of error question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decree. This evidence we shall not review in detail, but, in our opinion, it fully justifies the conclusion of the trial court.
separation; that she had been "consorting" with Greek men, and that "Greeks were running to her room." Again he testifies that he figured he could not get ahead by being married; that he wanted deeds so he could handle the property, so he could do something, and not "set there like a bump on a log." With this knowledge and this idea in mind, it is hardly possible that he desired a reconciliation, and we can but believe that his object in broaching it was to distract his wife's mind, which, perhaps, is not of the strongest, from his real purpose. This thought is supported by the haste in which he began an action for divorce against her after the instruments were executed.
 But we shall not pursue the inquiry. The law is well settled that the burden is upon the husband to show that a transfer made to him by his wife for an inadequate consideration was made freely, and that the transaction was fair and just.
There is no such showing in the present case, and the judgment will stand affirmed.
(82 Wash. 235)
BERNE v. MAXHAM et al. (No. 12182.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Nov. 14, 1914.)
1. INJUNCTION (§ 252*)-BOND FOR TEMPOBARY INJUNCTION LIABILITY COUNSEL FEES.
 In the first place, the property was conveyed for a wholly inadequate consideration. It is true the appellant testified that the greater part of the property given in exchange for it was his separate property, retained counsel who successfully procured the Where defendants, in an injunction suit, but it was not denied that his wife's home-dissolution of the temporary injunction, wherestead went with his in the exchange, and the cash differences were paid out of moneys earned during the marriage relation. His homestead may have been of greater value than hers, but her interest in the property, if less than an entire community interest, was certainly much greater than the inconsiderable sum she received for it.
Again, we think the evidence justifies the conclusion that the respondent did not fully understand the effect of the instruments executed. They were executed at a meeting of the parties held in the office of the appellant's attorney, at which the respondent had no representative or legal adviser. The meeting was brought about by a person employed by
upon the plaintiff dismissed his suit, the counsel fees were expended solely in procuring the dissolution of the injunction, and recovery may be had therefor on the injunction bond.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 586-598; Dec. Dig. § 252.*] 2. INJUNCTION (§ 252*)-BOND FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION LIABILITY FEES.
The fact that one of the defendants ememployed by the other defendant, and made no ployed the same attorney who had already been agreement for the compensation of such attorney, does not affect the liability of that defendant for a reasonable attorney's fee, nor the right of the defendant to recover such fee, in an action on the bond.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 586-598; Dec. Dig. § 252.*]
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
Department 2. Appeal from Superior | pany had assigned its claim to the plaintiff Court, Pierce County; W. O. Chapman, Berne. Judge.
Action by Frederick Berne against Charles W. Maxham and others. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Marx & Conger, of Tacoma, for appellants. L. B. da Ponte and J. W. Quick, both of Tacoma, for respondent.
MOUNT, J. This action was brought to recover damages upon an injunction bond. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $650. The defendants have appealed.
It appears from the record in the case that on July 29, 1913, the defendant Maxham brought an action in the superior court for Pierce county against Frederick Berne, the city of Tacoma, and the Bankers' Trust Company, praying for an injunction restraining Berne from collecting about $13,000 from the city of Tacoma, also restraining the Bankers' Trust Company from collecting any part of that sum. Upon an ex parte application in that action, the court granted a temporary injunction, as prayed for in the complaint. A bond was fixed in the sum of $3,000, which was executed by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. This bond recites that:
"In consideration of the premises and for the issuing of the said injunction do hereby jointly and severally undertake in the sum of $3,000 and promise to the effect that, in case said injunction shall issue, the said plaintiff will pay to the said defendants enjoined such damages, not exceeding the sum of $3,000, as such parties may sustain by reason of the said injunction, if the said superior court finally decide that the said plaintiff was not entitled thereto."
The appellant here makes three assignments of error: First, that there is no liability upon the bond as a matter of law; second, that the findings of the court to the effect that the plaintiff had incurred an expense of $500 as attorneys' fees, that said sum was reasonable, and that the Bankers' Trust Company had incurred $150, and that the same was reasonable and incurred solely in procuring the dissolution of the injunction, are not supported by the evidence; and, third, in any event, the damages allowed were excessive and not warranted by the evidence.
 In support of the first assignment, counsel for the appellants argue in effect that no attorneys' fees are recoverable, because the attorneys were employed to defend the whole case rather than to obtain a dissolution of the restraining order. Donahue v. Johnson, 9 Wash. 187, 37 Pac. 322, Collins v. Huffman, 48 Wash. 184, 93 Pac. 220, and White Pine Lbr. Co. v. Etna Indemnity Co., 42 Wash. 569, 85 Pac. 52, are cited in support of this contention. stated in Donahue v. Johnson, supra:
"The commonly accepted rule is that reasonable compensation paid as counsel fees, paid in procuring the dissolution of an injunction, may be recovered in an action on a bond. 2 High, Injunctions (3d Ed.) § 1685. But counsel fees thus allowable must be those connected with the motion, or other similar proceeding for the dissolution of the injunction, and do not cover the general expenses of defending the merits of the action."
It is plain, from these decisions, that, if counsel fees are incurred solely in the dissolution of the injunction, they are recoverable against the bond. It is also plain from Upon the service of a show-cause order, the evidence in the case that counsel were the plaintiff Berne and the Bankers' Trust employed by the two defendants named in Company employed counsel to resist the in- the injunction suit to dissolve the injunc junction and to have the temporary order tion; that the only services they performed dissolved. Proceedings were thereafter had in the case were in procuring the dissolution in the case, and on August 29th the tempo- of the injunction; and that these services rary order was modified, so that the defend-were successful. The court found upon their ants were restrained from collecting any motion that the injunction was wrongfully part of $2,250. Thereafter, on September 2, 1913, on motion of the defendants, the injunction was dissolved. The order entered recites:
"That the injunction heretofore issued herein was wrongfully sued out as to both defendants, F. Berne and Bankers' Trust Company, *** and that the same should be dissolved and set aside; and it is so ordered, adjudged, and decreed."
sued out as to both defendants. They were clearly entitled, therefore, under these cases, to recover counsel fees therefor.
 On the next assignment of error it is argued that the evidence fails to show that either Mr. Berne or the Bankers' Trust Company incurred any liability for attorneys' fees.
It is true that the Bankers' Trust Company agreed upon no specific fee with their counsel. But the evidence clearly shows that they employed the same counsel that Mr. Berne had employed, and it was clearly liable for a reasonable fee which it was obligated to pay. The evidence also shows that the agreed fee between Berne and the same counsel was $500 for representing his separate interests.
Thereupon the plaintiff in that action upon motion caused the case to be dismissed. This action was thereupon brought against Maxham and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, surety upon the bond. The plaintiff alleged that he had been damaged in the sum of $500 for attorneys' fees in securing the dissolution of the injunction, and that the Bankers' Trust Company had been It is finally argued that the damages aldamaged in the sum of $150 for the same lowed are excessive and unwarranted by the
the testimony upon the question of what the respondent's claim to the commissions would be a reasonable fee in the case. But agreed upon, and the respondent brought the we are satisfied that the trial court found present action to recover the same. The in accordance with the weight of the evi- cause was tried, after issue joined, by the dence. The amount allowed is not unrea- court sitting with a jury, and a verdict resonable, in our opinion. turned in the respondent's favor for $500. The judgment of the trial court is there- From the judgment entered upon the verdict, fore affirmed. this appeal is prosecuted.
 In their first assignment of error the CROW, C. J., and MAIN, FULLERTON, appellants question the sufficiency of the eviand ELLIS, JJ., concur.
(82 Wash. 222)
BAGLEY v. FOLEY et al. (No. 11863.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Nov. 14, 1914.)
1. BROKERS (§ 88*) - COMPENSATION-EVI
In an action by a broker for compensation, evidence held sufficient to go to the jury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 121, 123-130; Dec. Dig. § 88.* 2. BROKERS (§ 88*) - COMPENSATION-RIGHT TO "PROCURING CAUSE" EFFICIENT CAUSE."
Though there may be a shade of difference between the expressions "procuring cause" and "efficient cause," the expressions are substantially the same, and an instruction authorizing a verdict for a broker in case he was the procuring cause of the sale is correct; for in such case he is entitled to his commission.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 121, 123-130; Dec. Dig. § 88.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Procuring Cause, Efficient Cause.]
3. TRIAL (8 260*)-INSTRUCTIONS-REFUSAL. Where the instructions given fully covered the case, the refusal of other requests is not
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. $$ 651-659; Dec. Dig. § 260.*]
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; Thos. E Grady, Judge.
Action by H. N. Bagley against Francis Foley and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Stephen E. Chaffee, of Sunnyside, for appellants. O. L. Boose, of Sunnyside, for respondent.
FULLERTON, J. In June, 1912, the appellants listed with the Sunnyside Land & Investment Company, a real estate broker, certain lands owned by them, situated in Yakima county, for sale on terms expressed in a written memorandum, agreeing to pay, in case a purchaser should be found for the property, a stated commission. On September 6th of the same year the appellants listed the same property with the respondent, Bagley, likewise a real estate broker, to be sold on substantially similar terms. The property was subsequently sold to one G. F. Randel, on terms satisfactory to the owners; each of the brokers contributing towards the result, although acting separately, and not jointly. The appellants refused to recognize
dence to justify a recovery on the part of the
which an answer was returned which proved
 The court, among others, gave to the jury the following instructions:
case, he must prove to your satisfaction by a "In order for the plaintiff to recover in this fair preponderance of the evidence that he was employed to procure a purchaser for the property in question, and that, pursuant thereto, he did find a purchaser ready, able, and willing to purchase, and brought such purchaser and defendants together. And in this connection you are instructed that, if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was employed to find a purchaser for the property of the defendants, and, pursuant thereto, did find a purchaser who, through the efforts of the plaintiff, purchased defendants' property upon the terms specified in the listing contract, or as subsequently modified, or upon different terms agreed to between the defendants and such purchaser, and that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff."
"A seller is not obliged to pay two commissions where two brokers are engaged in selling his property, unless, after one has procured a
•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes