price." Sherwood v. Landon, S. C. Mich., June 10, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 778.

[Damages.]-Action for Damages Caused by Railroad Bed.- With respect to damages to drainage, caused by the road-bed of a railway crossing a plantation, the time for prescription or limitation begins to run, not from the date the road is built, but from the time damage is caused by it. Heath v. T. & P. R. Co., S. C. of La., Opelousas, July, 1885.

[Sheriff.]-When Statute Begins to Run in Respect of an Action on a Sheriff's Bond for Non-Payment of Money.-On December 11, 1878, damages were duly assessed for condemning a right of way over plaintiff's land, and on the following day paid to the sheriff, as required by Code Iowa, § 1244. No appeal was taken from the assessment, but plaintiff refused to receive the money, and sought, by injunction, to restrain the construction of the road, but failed. The sheriff deposited the money in a bank, and on October 5, 1882, the bank failed. The sheriff was elected in 1879 and qualified in January, 1878, by giving bond; was re-elected in 1879, gave bond in January, 1880, and his second term of office expired in January, 1882. On March 20, 1883, plaintiff demanded the money, and brought suit on the bond given in January, 1880, to recover it, on April 5, 1883. Held, that the right of action accrued at the expiration of the time allowed for an appeal from the assessment, and that the action was barred. [Extract from the opinion of the court by Rothrock, J.: "In Wood, Lim. § 154, it is said: "The statute does not begin to run against a sheriff for moneys collected on an execution until a demand has been made upon him therefor, or until he has made a proper return of the execution as required by law, or, if no return has been made, until the lapse of time within which, by law, the return is required to be made.' If this be the law-and it appears to us that it is a fair and just rule-upon principle an execution creditor may maintain an action for money made on execution at any time after the return of the execution is required by law to be made. Upon the same principle the plaintiffs in these cases could have maintained an action against the sheriff for what they now claim, at any time after the expiration of the thirty days allowed for an appeal. But it is claimed that the sheriff, upon his re-election, received the money from himself, and that the rights of the parties should be determined the same as if another person had been elected sheriff, and received this money and gave this bond. It seems to us that would raise a different question. In that case no right of action would exist against the new sheriff until he was elected and qualified. In the case at bar the right of action existed during the first term, and it is very clear to us that his reelection did not arrest the operation of the statute of limitations. And the liability of his sureties cannot be greater than his own. But suppose that it should be conceded that the statute did not commence to run until a demand was made upon the sheriff; and suppose that the sheriff should be reelected for a number of successive terms, and three years after his last election, which would be one year after the expiration of his last term of office, the plaintiffs should make the demand and bring their action within three years after that, alleging that the money was received by the sheriff some eight or ten years before, and that he had failed to pay it over to the plaintiffs. No person

has the right to postpone the operation of the statute of limitations in that manner by failing to make the demand. In Prescott v. Gonser, 34 Iowa, 175, it is said: 'It is certainly not the policy of the law to permit a party against whom the statute runs, to defeat its operation by neglecting to do an act which devolves upon him in order to perfect his remedy against another. If this were so, a party would have it in his power to defeat the purpose of the statute in all cases of this character. He could neglect to claim that to which he is enti tled for even fifty years, unaffected by the statute of limitations, thereby rendering it a dead-letter. In such a construction we cannot concur.' See, also, Baker v. Johnson Co., 33 Iowa, 151; Hintrager v. Hennessy, 46 Iowa, 600; Beecher v. Clay Co., 52 Iowa, 140; s. c., 2 N. W. Rep. 1037; First Nat. Bank of Garrettsville v. Greene, 17 N. W. Rep. 86."] Lower v Miller, S. C. Iowa, June 6, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 897.

10. LOCAL BOARDS. [County Supervisors.]-Decision of County Supervisors, when Conclusive.The decision of the board of county supervisors as to the ability of a small-pox patient to pay for his care, nursing, and medical attendance, as well as the amount of compensation to be allowed, is conclusive. [Following People v. Supervisors, 3 Mich. 475, 478.] Farnsworth v. Supervisors, S. C. Mich., May 13, 1885; 23 N. W. Rep. 465.

11. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. [Probable Cause.]Judgment in Former Suit in Favor of Plaintiff Therein Conclusive, Although Reversed on Appeal. -In an action for malicious prosecution brought by A against B, a judicial finding in the former action in favor of B and against A by the court of original jurisdiction is conclusive of probable cause, when such finding is not procured by unfair means, even if such finding is reversed on appeal. [In the opinion of the court by Carpenter, J., it is said: "It was early decided in Reynolds v. Kennedy, 1 Wils. 232, that the finding against the plaintiff by the tribunal before which the complaint was made is conclusive evidence that there was probable cause for the complaint, even although that finding was afterward reversed on appeal. This case is cited with apparent approval by Lord Mansfield and Lord Loughborough in Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 Term Rep. 510. The same doctrine has been applied in numerous cases in this country. Whitney v. Peckham, 15 Mass. 243; Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray, 201; Palmer v. Avery, 41 Barb. 290; Spring v. Besore, 12 B. Monr. 551; Griffis v. Sellars, 4 Dev. & Batt. 176. In Burt v. Place, 4 Wend. 591, the court carefully examine and expound the doctrine of Reynolds v. Kennedy, and sustain the declaration on the clear ground that it goes beyond the declaration in that case; inasmuch as it alleges that the defendant, well knowing that the plaintiff had a good defense, prevented the plaintiff from procuring the necessary evidence to make out that defense by causing him to be detained a prisoner until the judgments were obtained, and that the imprisonment was for the purpose of preventing a defense to the actions. In this case, however, there is no allegation that the judgments of the justice court were obtained by any unfair means practiced on the part of the defendant. We think the true rule is that a judicial finding by the court of original jurisdiction, not alleged to have been procured by unfair means, must be held to be conclusive on the question of probable cause. There are, indeed, cases which

hold to the contrary, but they are few in number and do not seem to us to be otherwise sufficient to control the general current of the authorities. Goodrich v. Warner, 21 Conn. 432; Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283. It is to be noted that in Virginia the court were divided in opinion on this question. Womack v. Circle, 29 Gratt. 192."] Welch v. Boston, etc. R. Corp., S. C. R. I.,Dec. 31, 1884; 1 Eastern Repr. 36.

12. MORTGAGE. [Foreclosure-Laches.]-When Defense of Laches Unavailing, Though Twenty Years have Elapsed.—In a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage in chancery, where no excuse is shown in the bill for allowing more than twenty years to elapse before bringing suit, objection to such failure cannot be urged at the hearing upon pleadings and proofs, if the evidence shows that the action is not in fact barred. [In the opinion of the court it is said by Champlin, J.: "The suit was commenced October, 1883. Attention is called by defendant's counsel to the face of the bill; that it does not set out any payments as having been made on the note and mortgage; and that it appears to be an attempt to foreclose a mortgage that became due April 16, 1861, without showing any excuse for the laches; and counsel claims that the bill shows no equity that entitles complainant to the relief prayed. In support of this position he cites the following cases: Hurlbut v. Britain, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 191; McLean v. Barton, Har. Ch. 279; Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400; Reynolds v. Green, 10 Mich. 355; Ford v. Loomis, 33 Mich. 122. The case of Ford v. Loomis is not in point. The others are cases where the objection was taken by demurrer. In this case the objection is not raised by demurrer, but by answer, and the case is before us upon pleadings and proofs. Had the objection been taken by demurrer, the complainant would have been obliged to go out of court, or amend his bill showing that the suit was not barred by the laches of the holder of the mortgage, But the objection to the bill cannot be urged upon the hearing upon pleadings and proofs, if the proofs show that the action is not barred. Prior to 1879 there was no statute of limitations in force in this State applicable to mortgages upon real estate, and no conclusive presumption of payment, after a certain period had elapsed, existed by express legislative enactment. But courts of equity, following the analogies of the law, have refused relief in cases where it would have been barred at law by lapse of time. The bar is not, however, a legal, but an equitable one, and the presumption of payment may be rebutted by circumstances. Abbott v. Godfroys, 1 Mich. 179; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 272; Curtis v. Goodenow, 24 Mich. 18; McKinney v. Miller, 19 Mich. 142; Baldwin v. Cullen, 51 Mich. 33; s. c., 16 N. W. Rep. 191. The evidence in this case shows conclusively that both mortgagor and mortgagee recognized the continued validity and force of the mortgage debt." The court then proceeded to show that the evidence rebutted the presumption of payment of the mortgage debt, and affirmed a decree of foreclosure.] Baent v. Kennicutt, S. C. Mich., June 10, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 808.

the opinion of the court, by Durfee, C. J., it is said: "The creditors contend that they are entitled to the fund, because the mortgage, being unrecorded, is valid only between the parties to it. The creditors, however, show no right to the fund which they can enforce in this case, unless they are entitled to it under the assignment; and the question, therefore, is whether the assignee, as trustee for them, has acquired a right which is superior to the mortgage, or has simply succeeded to the right of his assignor which is subject to it. There can be no doubt that, ordinarily, where there is no statute to add to the effect of the assignment, a voluntary assignee succeeds simply to the right of the assignor. The cases to this effect are numerous, and have always been regarded as law by this court. Williams v. Windsor, 12 R. I. 9; Gardner v. Commercial National Bank, 13 id. 155, 173; Bridgford v. Barbour, 80 Ky. 529; Housel v. Cremer, 13 Neb. 298; Heinrichs v. Woods, 7 Mo. App. 236. The statute (Pub. Stat. R. I., chap. 237, § 15) alters the law to some extent, but not so as to affect this case. If the fund belongs to the creditors, it belongs to them under Pub. Stat. R. I., chap. 176, § 9, which declares that "no mortgage of personal property hereafter made shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto, unless possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and retained by the mortgagee, or unless the said mortgage be recorded," etc. Under this provision, taken literally, the mortgagee can have no claim under the mortgage against any person but the mortgagor. The statute, however, must receive a reasonable construction. We do not suppose anybody would seriously assert that the mortgage, because unrecorded, would be invalid against a mere donee. In Pratt v. Harlow, 16 Gray. 379, it was held, under a statute like ours, that the mortgagee could maintain trover against a mere stranger or intruder tortiously converting the mortgaged chattel. But how, after demand, is the assignee, if he simply succeeds to the right of the mortgagor, in any better position? In this case we should be very glad to yield to the authority of some of the cases cited for the creditors, if we could consistently; but we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the mortgage is good as against the assignee, the assignee having no better right than the assignor. Hawks v. Pritslaff, 51 Wis. 160; Wakeman v. Barrows, 41 Mich. 363. If the assignment were made subject to the mortgage, no one would say that the assignee could hold against the mortgage. As we construe it, it is in legal effect made subject to the mortgage. Indeed, the assignment purports to be only an assignment of 'all my state and property,' etc., in general terms. It does not specifically convey the assignor's stock in trade. It may be doubted even whether an assignee for value under such an assignment would not take subject to the mortgage. Adams v. Cuddy, 13 Pick. 460; Chaffin v. Chaffin, 4 Gray, 280; Cook v. Farrington, 10 id. 70; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen. 159. We conclude, therefore, that the mortgagee must have the fund, but considering that his neglect has been the cause of the difficulty, let it be without costs from the creditors and subject to the further costs of the case." The learned editor of the Eastern Reporter cites Bish. Insolv. Debtor (2nd ed.) § 276.] Wilson v. Esten, S. C. R. I., Jan. 24, 1885; 1 Eastern Repr. 42.

14. PUBLIC LANDS. [Pre-Emption.]-When Heirs not Allowed to Control Patent.-One in the occu

pation of unsurveyed lands of the United States, for pre-emption of which he has taken none of the steps required by the pre-emption laws, has a mere privilege of pre-emption, which is neither a title, legal or equitable. Until there is an offer to do what the pre-emption laws requires to be done to initiate and prosecute a pre-emption right, there is no existing claim of the settler to pre-empt, which can be completed after his death, by his heirs or administrator, under § 2,269 of the United States Revised Statutes; and if no such claim was initiated and prosecuted by him in his lifetime, he acquired no proprietary interest in the land, which, upon his death, would descend to his heirs, and clothe them with an equitable right to control the the patent to the land subsequently issued by the United States upon an entry made by another. [Citing Grand Gulf R. Co. v. Bryan. 8 S. & M. 268; Hutton v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 475; Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187; The Yosemite Valley Case, 15 Wall. 77.] Buxton v. Traver, S. C. Cal., June 25, 1885; 6 W. C. Repr. 852.

15. RAILWAY COMPANIES.-Duty not to Impair Drainage of Adjacent Lands.-A railway company must so build its road-bed as not to impair the drainage of the land over which it passes, and must construct necessary cattle-guards and crossings under penalty of paying damages for injuries caused by its omissions. The failure to stipulate in the donation of the right of way that cattleguards and crossings must be provided does not deprive the donors from recovering for injury caused by the want of them. They are incidents of railroad building. The company must build them for its own protection. Heath v. T. & P. R. Co., S. C. of La., Opelousas, July, 1885. 16. RECEIVER. [Assignment-Patent Right].-Court will order Assignment of Patent Right to Receiver.-A receiver of an insolvent debtor, appointed under Pub. Stat. R. I., Chap. 237, § 13, is entitled to a patent right belonging to the debtor, and the court may order the debtor to assign the same to the receiver. [Citing Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes, 152; Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126.] Keach v. Chadwick, S. C. R. I., Dec. 2, 1884; 1 Eastern Repr. 17.

17. REDEMPTION. [Limitation.]-Bill to Redeem Chattles Barred in Six Years.-A bill to redeem chattels which have been forfeited under a mortgage is barred in six years, by analogy to the statute of limitations. [In the opinion of the court by Durfee, C. J., it is said: "The complainant contends that the right in equity continues indefinitely unless the mortgage is foreclosed by sale or otherwise. This view may be supported by a few dicta, but the general current of decision is against it. Undoubtedly the right in equity will continue as long as the mortgage continues to recognize the mortgage as subsisting: but when the mortgagee, having possession, ceases, after default, to recognize the mortgage as subsisting and deals with the property as his own, it is, according to the great preponderance of authority, for the mortgagor, if he wishes to redeem, to bring his suit to redeem within a reasonable time. As to what is a reasonable time, the cases are not very clear. Mr. Jones, in his treatise on Chattel Mortgages,says that 'reasonable time may well be determined by analogy to the statute of limitations applicable to actions at law for the recovery of personal property.' Jones on Chat. Mortg., § 687. The time within which a real property mortgage may be redeemed is limited to

twenty years, after the mortgagee in possession ceases to recognize the mortgage as subsisting, from analogy to the statute of possession. If in like manner we determine the time for chattel mortgages from analogy to the statute of limitations of personal actions, the right to redeem will cease at the expiration of six years. This has been adopted as the rule in Alabama (Humphres v. Terrell, 1 Ala. 650; Byrd v. McDaniel, 33 Id. 18); and is recognized as a proper rule in Missouri. Perry v. Craig, 3 Mo. 516. Evidently twenty years is unreasonably long; for personal property is not permanent and indestructible like real estate, but ordinarily it is movable, liable to be lost, perishable from use or time, and even when it consists of shares of stock, subject to great fluctuations in value. If six years is long enough for an action at law, when personal property belonging to one person has been appropriated by another, we see no reason why, in the absence of fraud or some other special ground of equitable relief, six years is not likewise long enough for the institution of a suit to redeem a chattel mortgage, when the mortgagee in possession, having an absolute title at law, ceases to recognize any right in the mortgagor and treats the property as his own."] Greene v. Dispeau, S. C. R. I., Dec. 20, 1884; 1 Eastern Repr. 19.

18. SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. [By Sample.] When Sale Regarded as a Sale by Inspection, and not by Sample.-"A sale of grain or other commodity in bulk cannot be regarded as a sale by sample, simply because a portion only is exposed to view; if the bulk is thrown open to inspection, the buyer is considered to have inspected the bulk, and not to have relied upon that only which is exposed to view as a sample; the intention of the parties in such case is to sell by inspection, not by sample." Selser v. Roberts, S. C. Pa., Oct. 6, 1884; opinion of the court by Clark, J.; 15 Pittsb. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 346.

19.

[Implied Warranty.]- No Implied Warranty in Case of Sales by Sample.-A sale of chattels by the production of a sample, without fraud or other circumstances fixing the character of the sample as a standard of quality, does not imply any warranty of quality. [In the opinion of the court Clark, J., says: "It is certainly settled in a long line of cases in Pennsylvania, that a sale of chattels by the production of a sample, without fraud or other circumstances fixing the character of the sample as a standard of quality, does not imply any warranty of quality. Differ as we may as to the policy or propriety of such a principle, we cannot deny that it is now recognized as the settled law of this State. Bowkins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23; Jennings v. Gratz, Id. 169; Fraley v. Beckham, 10 Barr, 320; Whittaker v. Eastwick, 25 P. F. Smith, 229; Boyd v. Wilson, 2 Norris, 319. The sample (as stated in the case last cited), under such circumstances, pure and simple, becomes a guaranty only that the article to be delivered shall follow its kind and be merchantable simply."] Selser v. Roberts, S. C. Pa., Oct. 6, 1884; 15 Pittsb. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 346.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"A LEGAL PUZZLE."

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The Tennessee Supreme Court agrees in theory, at least, with your position as defined in "A Legal Puzzle," 21 C. L. J. 120, that a man should be tried for the murder first, and, if convicted, hanged, and afterwards should serve his term for burglary.

In the last volume of our published decisions, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 228, in delivering the opinion in State v. Parker, Cooke, J., says that the judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary for the felony should be first executed, and that after this had been done, the judgment on the misdemeanor could be executed, putting his decision on the identical ground occupied by the learned editor of the C. L. J.-"less opportunity of escaping before the execution of the more severe sentence." The two judgments were affirmed by the Supreme Court on the same day.

I have not been able to go into a search for authorities on the question asked in "A Legal Puzzle." but I know as a fact that there is now in the Tennessee State Prison one William Coats, a prisoner from this (Giles) county, serving a ten year term for an attempt to poison; and the same man stands indicted in the Giles County Circuit Court for a murder committed in our county jail while he was incarcerated there waiting his trial for the attempt to poison.

He was indicted for the murder soon after he had been carried to the State prison. There has never been the thought of trying him for the murder until after the expiration of his ten year sentence; but we have a provision in our code which says that, upon conviction of two or more offenses, imprisonment for one shall begin upon expiration of imprisonment for the other, Tenn. Code (T. & S.) § 5228, and this may bear on it. FLOURNOY RIVERS.

Pulaski, Tenn.

ANOTHER ANSWER.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

A partial answer to the "Legal Puzzle" in C. L. J. of August 7th, is in Kennedy v. Howard, 74 Ind. 87. Kennedy, while in the penitentiary, killed a convict. He was tried in the courts of the county in which the penitentiary was situated and remanded to the peni tentiary for life. At the end of the term for which he was first sent he sought his release, but it was denied. On appeal the court said he, "while * there in prison was as much amenable to the criminal law of the State as if he had been out of prison. And the court had jurisdiction of the offence, it having been committed within the body of Clark county (where the penitentiary was situated.) It cannot, as we think, be rightfully said, that while a person is undergoing imprisonment in the penitentiary, the proper court has no right or power to try him for an offense which he may commit while there imprisoned." A similar case was, we understand, before the Iowa Supreme Court; at least the writer of this, at his request, sent to the attorney-general of that State, the citation of this case. In Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318; s. c. 4 Crim. L. Mag. 359 (also reported in American Reports) a plea of guilty was forced from the accused and he was sent to the penitentiary for life. Afterwards he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the court that sent him to the penitentiary. It was granted on appeal, and he was brought before the court, tried and convicted; and sent back to prison for life, his case being affirmed on appeal. Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147. Crawfordsville, Ind. W. W. T.

STATUTORY BONDS WITH SUPERADDED CONDITIONS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The learned editor is in error in his note (21 C. L. J. 110,) to the opinion of Lewis, P. J., 21 C. L. J. 108-110 in the case of the Rubelman Hardware Co. v. Greve, reported under the head of statutory bonds with additional undertakings when he says the cases cited are the only American ones bearing on the subject.

The question of the liability of sureties on bonds whose requirements are broader and on those whose requirements are more restricted, than the statute prescribes has come before the Tennessee Supreme Court several times.

"As to statutory bonds, superadded and distinct conditions, not imposed by the statute, may be rejected as illegal and the conditions required by the statute enforced." 2 Hump. 500; 1 Cald. 85; 4 Cald. 268; 4 Heisk. 550; 12 Heisk. 38; 4 Baxt. 440; 1 Lea, 511; 6 Lea, 155; 11 Lea, 228; 12 Lea, 314; 2 Tenn. Ch. 267 & 356. In Ranning v. Reeves, 2 Tenn. Ch. 267, the opinion is very explicit.

"If the bond require less than the statute prescribes it is good as far as it goes. Judgment to that extent may be rendered," but nothing can be added. 2 Yerg. 83, 321; 4 Yerg. 199, 496; 7 Yerg. 17, 91; 9 Yerg. 9; Cald. 235; 11 Lea, 228.

There are also other Tennessee cases bearing more or less remotely on the question.

Pulaski, Tenn.

FLOURNOY RIVERS.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

MICHIGAN'S NEW LAW OF LIBEL.-The Legislature of Michigan has recently passed the following statute: SECTION 1. In any suit brought for the publication of a libel in any newspaper in this State the plaintiff shall recover only actual damages if it shall appear that the publication was made in good faith and did not involve a criminal charge; that its falsity was due to mistake or misapprehension of the facts, and that in the next regular issue of such newspaper after such mistake or misapprehension was brought to the knowledge of the publisher or publishers, whether before or after suit brought, a correction was published in as conspicuous a place in said newspaper as that occupied by the article sued on as libellous.

SEC. 2. In any action or suit for the publication of a libel in any newspaper in this State the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover, in addition to actual damages, any greater sum than $5,000.

SEC. 3. The words "actual damages" in the foregoing section shall be construed to include all damages the plaintiff may show he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, and no other damages.

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 4, 1885.

CURRENT EVENTS.

THE SOUTHERN LAW TIMES.-We have received the initial number of a periodical bearing the above name. It is an octavo of twenty pages, in ordinary law book form. It is edited and published by Frank L. Wells, Esq., of Nashville, Tennessee, at $5 per year to single subscribers, with a reduction to clubs. It proposes to furnish all the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina and South Carolina, the leading cases in full and comprehensive synopses of all others, as well as to give notes of cases, editorial articles, gleanings from exchanges, book reviews, queries and answers, and a series of articles on Southern law and lawyers. This is a very extensive programme, and in order to carry it out our learned brother will have to enlarge his publication several-fold. His present number contains several interesting editorials, and a considerable amount of digested matter from the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

THE VERDICT IN THE CASE OF CLUVERIUS. -The Virginia Law Journal is one of the best of our legal exchanges. We always open it eagerly when we receive it in our mail, and never fail to find something in it of interest. We have, however, noted with regret that it has not had one word to say in opposition to the monstrous decision of a bare majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, which interferes with the sovereign right of Virginia to raise revenue and to maintain its existence as one of the States of the Union. We have read, though with much less regret, the abuse which it sees fit to bestow upon us for our criticism of the verdict of the jury in the case of Cluverius. We do not of course profess, at this distance, to know whether Cluverius is guilty or innocent of the murder of his cousin, but we read the evidence carefully from day to day, as it was published in the daily papers which we received from the East; we also read some Vol. 21-No. 10.

careful analyses of it in the daily press; and while we have not charged our mind with the details of it, we could see nothing in it at the time but evidence tending to show that Cluverius had seduced his cousin, and that she had afterwards been drowned in a reservoir. But whether he drowned her, or she drowned herself, was left by the evidence, as far as we read it, wholly to conjecture. Nevertheless, Cluverius was a scoundrel for seducing his cousin, with whom he had been raised as a brother, and the jury, instead of giving him the benefit of the reasonable doubt, gave it to the public, and rendered a verdict in accordance with that universal sense of justice which says that the man who an innocent girl is not fit to live. venture to regard the verdict as in which the view that the jury took of the enormity of the crime which Cluverius undoubtedly had committed, led them to resolve all points against him, and to find him guilty of a crime which it is more than likely he never committed.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

will seduce We'do still

an instance

OBLIGATION TO

GIVE PUBLIC NOTICE OF THE TIME OF CLOSING ITS OFFICES.-Those who have paid the Western Union Telegraph Company for services which were never rendered, will heartily agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, given in an abstract to a recent decision of his in a former number,1 that a telegraph company is under no obligation to inform its employees, and through them the public, of the time of night at which its various offices are closed. The difficulty of communicating such information to its employees, which seemed so great to the learned justice, would probably seem so small to a practical business man as to provoke a smile. It would be very easy for such a company to classify all its offices according to the population of the city or place, and to make and furnish to the public a definite rule as to the hours within which its offices of the different classes are kept open. The Western Union Telegraph Company has grown to be, in a practical sense, a monopoly. By the absorption of other lines, it has placed itself above competition. It serves the public unequally, and in many cases with

1 Given v. W. U. Tel. Co., ante, 125.