constitutional inhibition must have a reasonable construction. It is enough if the bill treats of but one general object, and that object is expressed in the title. the title. To require that each subdivision of the subject, each and every of the end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of the object, must be specially mentioned in the title, would greatly impede and embarrass legislation.' The act in question relates to the general subject of elections, and to say that the qualifications of those to be elected, as well as the qualifications of the electors, is not germane to the subject, might produce disastrous consequences. If such a ruling should be made it might serve as a precedent for annulling the act in other essential particulars certainly not more germane to the title than this one. The act has been in force for eight years, and valuable rights have accrued under it." It ought to be said It ought to be said in justice to the courts, that other courts, proceeding upon the same argument ab inconvenienti, have felt bound to give to similar constitutional provisions the same loose interpretation. An able review of the cases was made by Judge Rose, of Arkansas, in a paper read before the American Bar Association in 1882.6 Verily, it may be said of many statutes-to borrow a quotation there used-that Titles Hang loose about them like giant robes Upon a dwarfish thief." MUNICIPAL -Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 2. CORPORATION. CORPORATION. [DAMAGES] DAMAGES TO ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS FROM ERECTION OF BRIDGE.-In Cohen v. Cleveland, the Supreme Court of Ohio announce that they never will change the rule in McComb v. Akron, and we trust they never will. The city of Cleveland, proceeding under a valid statutory authorization and without negligence, erected a bridge in front of the plaintiff's house and lot, whereby it was damaged in about one-half its value. It was held that the city must pay him the damages which it had inflicted, although he had 617 Am. Law Rev. 495. 7 13 Weekly Law Bulletin, 555. 8 15 Ohio, 479; s. c. sub. nom. Akron v. McComb, 18 Ch. 229; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 453. not proceeded to have them assessed under a statute. the reason why they held that he need not proceed under the statute was that, as there was an intervening strip of roadway between his front line and the bridge, he was not the owner of lots "bounding or abutting upon the proposed improvement," within the meaning of statute. Upon the main question, the obligation of a municipal corporation to make compensation to a property owner for consequential damages of this nature inflicted upon him, the court, speaking through Okey, J., said: "These acts [authorizing the construction of the bridge] are supplementary to the municipal code; no objection which has been urged against their validity in this case is tenable; and in our judgment those acts, in connection with the municipal code, contain ample power for the erection of such structure. Hence, the viaduct cannot be, in contemplation of law, a nuisance, but is a lawful structure; and there is no complaint that there was negligence, malice or bad faith which caused injury to the plaintiff. But the right of Cohen to damages is not determined adversely to him by these facts. He is not entitled to compensation under the letter of the constitution,10 but may be entitled to such compensation in analogy to that provision. Injuries resulting from the change of established grades in streets, though made in accordance with the statute, and without negligence or malice, and other injuries of a kindred character, have been held to afford ground for the recovery of damages against municipal corporations." This court has, however, constantly acknowledged that McComb v. Akron, and cases following it, is a departure from the current of authority elsewhere; and, although these cases have not found favor with the judges delivering the opinions in Ratcliff v. Brooklyn, 12 Hill v. Boston, 18 Alexander v. Milwaukee, 14 Trans 9 R. S. Ohio, § 2315, (Municipal Code of Ohio, § 564.) 10 Art. 1 § 19. 11 Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159; McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 479; s. c. sub. nom. Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229; s. c. 51 Am. Dec. 453; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 133; Keating v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141. And see Little Miami R. Co. v. Naylor, 2 Ohio St. 235; Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Richard v. Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 506; Story v. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122. 12 4 N. Y. 95; s. c. 53 Am. Dec. 357, 366, note. 13 122 Mass. 344, 378. 14 16 Wis. 247, 256. portation Co. v. Chicago, 15 we are entirely we are entirely content with the doctrine, and would not change it if we could. But the justice of the Ohio rule, the firmness with which it has been adhered to for nearly half a century, and the manner in which it is recognized and enforced in our statutes, have established the doctrine as a rule of property, and it is now too late to inquire whether McComb v. Akron was properly decided. In other States, the same rule is in part or wholly adopted by constitutional or statutory provision." This is good, wholesome doctrine, and contrasts favorably with the barbarous rule formulated in British Cast Plate Man. Co. v. Meredith,16 and echoed in such decisions as Hill v. Boston,17 and Transportation Co. v. Chicago,18 a doctrine which is twin-born with the doctrine that the king can do no wrong; a doctrine which transforms the state from the guardian which protects, into the juggernaut which destroys; a doctrine which never could have been transplanted into American soil, except by judges whose technical learning outran their sense of justice. 15 99 U. S. 635. 16 4 T. R. 794. 17 122 Mass. 344. 18 99 U. S. 635. PROCEEDINGS IN REM AS AFFECTED BY DEATH OF PARTY. Is a libel in rem against a vessel or other property, in the admiralty court, converted into a proceeding in personam by the giving of a claimants' bond for all the property libeled, and appearance and defense by the claimant? This is a doubtful question, so far as light is thrown upon it in the American adjudications; but the authorities tend toward a negative answer to the question. The proceedings, commenced by the libel and seizure of the vessel or other property, were, in form, in rem. The remedies allowed the upon claimants' bond, against him and his sureties, are in form, in personam. It does not neccessarily follow, however, that the personal features of these remedies are evidence of a change in the character of the proceeding. The question stated may be considered as fairly arising whenever, after the intervention of a claimant in a proceeding in rem, he or one of his sureties shall die pending the hearing of the cause. What notice need be taken of such death? May the cause still proceed to a decree, and may such decree be properly rendered, as to the survivors, without noticing the death or awaiting any intervention or the part of the representatives of the decedent? These questions were presented in the early case of Penhallow v. Doane. During the Revolutionary war, a vessel had been captured by another, cruising under congressional authority, and had been libeled as prize in a colonial court, and after Doane had intervened as claimant, she had been condemned as prize. Doane prosecuted an appeal to the appellate court, in which in 1783, the sentence of the lower court was reversed and the property was ordered to be restored; but before this judgment was rendered in favor of Doane, he was in fact dead. After the creation of the Federal Courts, Doane's representatives brought suit upon the judgment, when, it was objected that the decree in Doanes' favor was void because be was then dead, and therefore his claim had abated. Elaborate opinions were given in the case by several of the justices of the Supreme Court, three of whom agreed that the death of Doane did not abate the proceedings in the suit in rem. Two of these were of the further opinion that inasmuch as the sentence of a court of admiralty binds all the world, because all the world are parties to the proceeding, it was not necessary to take any notice of the death of the claimant Doane; and the third took the view that the decree, though voidable, was valid until reversed in a regular proceeding. The representatives of Doane were therefore allowed a recovery on the judgment pronounced in 1783. In the James A. Wright,2 substantially the same questions arose, though in a different form, inasmuch as the decree in this case had been pronounced after the death of the claimant, but against him. The case was a libel in rem, against a vessel, for tort. The claimant intervened and defended the suit in the usual manner, giving bond for the property, with two sureties. He was dead at the time of the trial, but this fact was not made known 13 Dallas, 54. 2 10 Blatch., 160. 66 3 to respond to the terms of his stipulation, no to the court. On the hearing in the District The question was also illustrated in the. further rulings of the court in the same case. Having found the merits of the case in favor of the libellants, the court intimated that the decree of the district court, though good as to the sureties, was bad as to the deceased claimant, and said, "Had the attention of the district court been called to the fact that Dakin, one of the bondsmen on whose stipulation for value the vessel was released, had died, that court would, probably, have ordered summary judgment against the survivors only." The case of the C. F. Ackerman + presents a variation of the question. A decree having been rendered against the libelled vessel, which was not paid by the claimants, the libellants moved for summary judgment against one of the two stipulators in the claimant's bond. To this the stipulator interposed two objections; first, that the libellants had not exhausted their remedies against the claimant, and second, that the other stipulator was dead. The court followed to its logical conclusions the principle that a proceeding in rem is notice to all the world, and held that the libellants' right to proceed against the stipulators became perfect upon the rendition of the decree, that this right was not affected by the solvency or insolvency of the claimant, and that each stipulator was bound 33 Ben., 248. These decisions would seem to be legitimate deductions from the statutory form of bond prescribed for execution by claimants in adthe required condition of which is "to answer the decree of 5 It is probable the court in such cause. that the admiralty courts would hold, if necessary, that this condition was by the statute made a part of every admiralty stipulation, even though the document itself might omit it in whole or in part. At all events, bonds given in admiralty proceedings are construed by the courts according to the settled rules governing admiralty stipulations, rather than according to common-law rules, even when informally drawn." Mr. Conkling, in the form recommended by him for claimants' bond in such cases, inserts in the condition, the words, "shall well and truly abide and answer the decree of the said court in the aforesaid cause ;" and says that he deems it "expedient to adhere to the words of the act." In the form of stipulation recommended by this author for like cases, the stipulators bind themselves that the claimant "shall abide and answer the decree of the said court in the aforesaid cause; and unless he shall do so, they do hereby severally consent that execution shall issue forth against them. This conforms to the idea of a stipulation under the civil law, the judicatum solvere, by which the stipulators bound themselves to surrender the thing or pay its va lue,' The 999 or in other words, "to secure to the actor the payment of the judgment." 10 effect of the corresponding stipulation in the English admiralty practice is that the stipulators consent, in case of default in the performance of the condition, that admiralty them. That process shall issue against there is no practical difference, under the 4 14 Blatch., 360. 5 Rev. Stats. U. S., § 941. 6 Save v. Townsend, 1 Ware, 286. See this case for a learned dissertation on the general subject of stipulations under the civil and admiralty law. 72 Conklings' admiralty, 583. 8 Id. 582. 92 Conk. Adm. 83. 10 Save v. Townsend, 1 Ware, at p. 308. American admiralty system, between a bond and a stipulation in such cases, is evident from the statute, which authorizes either to be given, indifferently, by the claimant, and provides as to either that "judgment thereon, against both the principal and sureties, may be recovered at the time of rendering the decree in the original cause." 12. Whether it be a bond or a stipulation, therefore, which the claimant has given, the incidents which attach to it remain those peculiar to a proceeding in rem, and the liability of the sureties is commensurate with all the possible contingencies of such a proceeding. 13 It is true that the admiralty courts hold that the bond or stipulation given by the claimant becomes a substitute for the res, to such an extent even that the court will refuse an application for the re-seizure of the res.14 It is true also, that it is held that the judgment against the claimant and his sureties, when once rendered, becomes a judgment in personam, which has all the attributes of any other judgment in personam, and may be made the subject of an action in any court having jurisdiction of the defendant. 15 But until such judgment is obtained, it would seem that the case is still, in contemplation of the admiralty jurisprudence, proceeding as a case in rem, for it is expressly held that as a feature of the substitution of the stipulation for the res which was libelled, "the stipulators are liable to the exercise of all those authorities on the part of the court, which it could properly exercise if the thing itself were still in its custody," which is according to "the known course of the admiralty.' 16 not be embarrassed by the death of a party or any other incident such as might cause "the law's delay" to protract an ordinary suit at law. J. O. P. APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN THE ORGANIZATION OF A CORPORATION. LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO. v. HAMBLEN.* Circuit Court U. S., Northern District Illinois, March 9, 1885, The Circuit Court of the United States will not grant an injunction at the suit of a foreign corporation to restrain the organization of a corporation having the same name as that of such foreign corporation. In Equity. F.Ullmann, for complainant; Beck & Roberts, for defendants. GRESHAM, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The complainant company was organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, in 1875, forįthe purpose of mining anthracite coal in that State, and selling the same there and elsewhere. It owns valuable coal mines in Pennsylvania, and does a large and lucrative business. For a number of years it has had an extensive and profitable business in the west and north-west; and for convenience in the management of that business it has maintained an agency at Chicago, where it owns real estate, including a dock worth $200,000, and has on hand coal worth $400,000. The defendants in this suit, wishing to create a corporation in Illinois bearing the same name as the complainant, to carry on the same business, filed their articles of association with the secretary of State on the 26th of December, 1884, under the general laws of Illinois authorizing the creation of corporations. The secretary of State thereupon issued to the defendants a license as commissioners to open books for subscription to the capital stock of the new corporation, to be known as the Lehigh Valley Coal Company. This suit was brought to prevent the defendants, by injunction, from receiving stock subscriptions, or taking any other steps necessary to be taken under the statute, in the creation of the new corporation. The object of the defendants in causing an Illinois corporation to be created, bearing the same name as the complainant company, is obvious. They hope, by this means, to secure the benefit of part, at least, of the patronage which the complainant has acquired. Unwilling to engage in open, manly competition with the complainant and others carrying on the same business, the de *S. C., 23 Fed. Rep. 225. fendants resort to a trick or scheme whereby they hope to deceive the public, and obtain an unfair advantage of the complainant. Such conduct might be fairly characterized more harshly; and it is with extreme reluctance that I deny the complainant the relief prayed for. The complainant is a foreign corporation, and it is only by comity that it is doing business in Illinois at all. The State can say to it any day, "Go!" and it must go. That being so, I do not see that the complainant has a legal right to say a corporation shall not be created in Illinois bearing its (the complainant's) name. If the State of Illinois may create a corporation bearing the same name as the complainant,-and it certainly can, -this court has no right by injunction to prevent anything from being done under the State law which is necessary in the creation of such a corporation. The commissioners perform a function under the laws of the State in the formation of the. corporation. If they are not offices of the State they are instrumentalities employed by the State. If they can be enjoined from receiving stock subscriptions under the license issued to them by the secretary of State, I do not see why the latter might not be enjoined from issuing a license, or doing anything else under the State statute. The general law authorizing the secretary of State to issue a license to commissioners to receive stock subscriptions, provides that no license shall be be issued to two or more companies having the same name. Before bringing this suit, the complainant should have brought to the attention of the secretary of State the matters alleged in the bill. He might, on a proper application, have revoked the license to the defendants, unless they adopted another name for their company. I do not think this court can interfere by injunction, at the instance of a foreign corporation, and prevent any necessary step from being taken under the statute of this State in the creation of a corporation. I do not say what may be done if the defendants succeed in creating their corporation bearing the complainant's name, and a suit shall be brought by the complainant to prevent individuals claiming to be officers or managers of such corporation from interfering with the complainant's business, as already stated. The temporary injunction heretofore granted is dissolved, and the bill is dismissed. CRIMINAL LAW - SELF-DEFENSE-CHARACTER OF DECEASED-DYING DECLARATION. BOYLE v. STATE. Supreme Court of Indiana, September, 1884. In a trial of murder the defense being that the homicide was committed in self-defense, the defendant may show that his acquaintance with deceased was a brief association as criminals; it is error to refuse to permit him to show that deceased told defendant on the night before that he had previously committed two felonious assaults, and that he preferred a knife to a pistol for such work, as it was more effective. A dying statement that victim knew of no reason for the assault, is not a statement of opinion, and is admissible. NIBLACK, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This was a prosecution for murder under § 1904 of the Revised Statutes of 1881. The indictment was in six counts. The first count charged the appellant William Boyle, with having on the 15th day of March, 1884, at the County of Allen, in this State, unlawfully, purposely,feloniously, and with premeditated malice,killed and murdered one Daniel Casey, by then and there shooting him to death with a pistol. A jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged above in the first count of the indictment, and fixed his punishment at death. After considering and overruling a motion for a new trial, the court pronounced judgment upon the verdict, and sentenced the defendant to be hung on Wednesday, the first day of October, 1884. A freight train running from Crestline, in the State of Ohio, to Fort Wayne, in this State, stopped at Monroeville, in Allen County, early in the morning of the 15th day of March, 1884. One of the brakemen on the train found the defendant and Casey together in a box car, in which they had been riding without authority from the conductor. The brakeman ordered both of them to leave the car, which they did without unnecessary delay. After coming out of the car the defendant and Casey fell into a quarrel about something, to which no one else gave attention. They proceeded together along one of the streets of Monroeville for a short distance, when they came to a stop a few feet apart. At this point the defendant, being seemingly very angry and much excited, declared his intention to kill Casey, and, suddenly drawing a revolving pistol from one of his pockets, fired upon him, inflicting a mortal wound, from which death ensued two and a half days thereafter. The defendant, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, stated that he had first met Casey at Bucyrus, Ohio, on the 12th day of March, three days before reaching Mooreville; that they immediately became acquainted and confidential; that on the afternoon of that day they went to a town fifteen miles north of Bucyrus, the name of which he did not remember, where, during the ensuing night, they burglariously entered some stores, by which means they obtained a large lot of knives, some razors and a considerable amount of jewelry, all of which they concealed about their persons; that they proceeded thence, partly on foot and partly by railroad, to Lima, Ohio, where, on the night of the 14th of March, they got into the freight train upon which they were found next morning at Monroeville; that, during the night, |