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tation. We do not want a Parliament in India ; but administration will not and cannot be successful until the people are admitted to some share in its control. The good work has already been commenced. Legislative Councils in every large Province admit some members elected by the people. The principle is capable of extension, and every district in a Province should be allowed to send its Representative. Madras and Bombay have Excecutive Councils; other Provinces in India should be provided with such 'Executive Councils, and Indian Members should find a place in them. The GovernorGeneral's Executive Council consists of a number of able and experienced Englishmen, nearly all of them heads of spending departments. Some representation of the people, i.e. of the taxpayers, in the Council would strengthen the administration, and make it better informed and better able to promote the welfare of the people. And the Secretary of State in London would benefit by the advice and information which qualified Indians, admitted to his Council, could give him on grave matters of administration. For forty-five years Secretaries of State have ruled India without hearing the voice or the opinion of an Indian member in his Council Chamber at Whitehall. Such exclusive and distrustful administration is unpopular as it is unsuccessful.
The remedies suggested above are not innovations ; they are necessary developments of the system which has grown up during nearly half a century. We do not like experiments in Government; we distrust new and ideal Constitutions. We desire to see progress in the lines which have already been laid down ; we wish to bring the system of administration, already formed, more into touch with the lives and the interests of the people.
For the present constitution of the Indian Govern* ment is not in touch with the lives of the people, does
not protect the interests of the people, and has not secured • the material well-being of the people. The Democracy
of Great Britain, reasonable and fair-minded on the whole, cannot interest itself in the details of Indian administration, and must necessarily look after its own interests. The Parliament of Great Britain cannot give adequate attention to Indian affairs. And the Secretary of State, who is a member of the British Cabinet, with the Councillors selected by himself, does not represent the people, does not know their needs, does not secure their interests. In India, the Governor-General and his Councillors, selected by himself, are under the orders of the Secretary of State, and are not in touch with the people. The entire policy of Indian administration, in all its important details, is shaped and controlled and regulated by the oligarchy at Whitehall and the oligarchy at Simla. There is no place in the administrative machinery where the views of the people are represented, where the interests of the taxpayer are protected. The wit and ingenuity of man could not devise a system of administration for a vast and civilised population, where the people are sco absolutely, so completely, so rigorously excluded from all'share in the control over the management of their own affairs. Is it any wonder that that administration — the oligarchy at Whitehall and the oligarchy at Simla-should, amidst surrounding Imperial influences, sometimes forget the over-taxed Indian cultivator, the unemployed Indian manufacturer, the starving Indian labourer ?
Such was not the past in India. Hindu and Mahomedan rulers were always absolute kings, often despotic, but never exclusive. Their administration was crude and old-fashioned, but was based on the co-operation of the people. The Emperor ruled at Delhi; his Governors ruled provinces; Zemindars, Polygars, and Sardars virtually ruled their estates; villagers ruled their Village Communities. The entire population, from the cultivator upwards, had a share in the administration of the country. It is true that modern administration
must necessarily be more centralised, more thorough in the supervision of every detail, more uniformly regulated, than the administration of the Middle Ages. If so, then this modern administration should necessarily contain within itself some popular element, and should be helped and sustained by popular bodies in divisions and districts. To make the present administration more centralised, and at the same time to exclude from it all popular element, is to preserve the despotism of the Middle Ages without the advantages of self-government which that despotism left to the people.
From whatever point we view this grave question, we arrive at the ultimate truth-a truth which Englishmen know better than any other nation on earth—that it is impossible to make Indian administration successful and the Indian people prosperous without admitting the people to a share in the control of their own affairs. “It is an inherent condition of human affairs,” said John Stuart Mill, “ that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others, can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. By their own hands only can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be 'worked out." Indian hands have been tied up too long, and the result has not been happy. Let Indians to-day stand side by side with British administrators, and work conjointly to help their country and improve their wretched lives.
England herself stands to gain and not to lose by a constitutional government in India. Isolation does not strengthen the empire, it is already creating discontent among a numerous population which will necessarily be an increasing source of political danger. A popular form of government will arrest this evil and will strengthen the empire; it will enlist the people of India in the cause of the empire; it will make them proud of the empire as their own. More than this, it will arrest the evils which a despotic form of government creates—ino England as much as in India. It will arrest that insidious influence with which England's eastern despotism infects and poisons her own institutions and her own people year after year.
It is said of Louis XI., King of France, that on one occasion he had decided to hang his soothsayer, but that he changed his mind on being told that the duration of his own life depended on that of the soothsayer. It is certainly true, in a far higher sense, that England's destiny hangs on the destiny of India. A prosperous India will help England's trade, and a constitutional India will strengthen England's Empire. Impoverished India starves England's trade, and a despotic form of government in India spells England's decline.
IN DE X
ABBOT, Capt., 21, 22
Andaman Islands, 257
Arabi Pasha, 441
Arbuthnot, Sir Alex., 414
Arcot, N., 70, 71, 75, 94, 176
Area, Brit. India, 602; Nat. States,
Argentine Republic, 547
Argyll, Duke of, 248, 260, 390, 397,
405, 497, 499, 502
Asia, Central, 105, 249, 420, 445,
Assam, 102, 105, 143, 144, 352, 519,
521, 522, 526, 527
Association, British Indian, 155,
- Indian Reform, 27
Auckland, Lord, 3-12, 14, 88, 152,
167, 181, 202, 212, 217
Ava, 24, 443, 444
BACKERGUNJ, 605, 606
Bagshaw, John, M.P., 125, 126
- Lady Betty, 426
Ballantyne, Sergeant, 259
Banerjea, Surendra Nath : Evidence,
Baraka Ores, 526
Baring, Sir Evelyn, see Cromer
Baroda, 32,,177, 556
| Bazley, Thomas, 131, 132
Beadon, Cecil, 280, 281
Behar, 279, 460
Bellew, Dr., 421
| Beluchistan, 184, 255, 423, 446, 526