ters as every newspaper in Europe has recorded, and as every almanack might tell; and for the confirmation of which the remembrance of millions would not be appealed to in vain. Though renewing the risk of superfluous illustration, we still designedly adhere to the words of the historian, in order to exclude even the suspicion of any adaptation of terms, or any forced construction of facts, and to obviate the doubts and distrust which may have been generated in the minds of some inquirers, by too incautious an acquiescence in imaginary theories, of which time may have brought a speedy refutation.

'Bonaparte at the age of twenty-six assumed the command of the army of Italy. He found the army in numbers about fifty thousand; but wretchedly deficient in cavalry, in clothing, and even in food; and watched by an enemy vastly more numerous. It was under such circumstances that he at once avowed the daring scheme of forcing a passage to Italy, and converting the richest territory of the enemy himself into the theatre of war. Soldiers,' said he, 'you are hungry and naked; the republic owes you much, but she has not the means to pay her debts. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds. Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal. Soldiers with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy? This was his first address to his army at this period." "This," in the words of Sir Walter Scott, was showing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped.'

"He perceived that the time was come for turning a new leaf in the history of war. With such numbers of troops as the infant republic could afford him, he saw that no considerable advantages could be obtained against the vast and highly disciplined armies of Austria and her allies, unless the established rules and etiquettes of war were abandoned. It was only by such rapidity of motion as should utterly transcend the suspicion of his adversaries, that he could hope to concentrate the whole pith and energy of a small force

History of Napoleon Bonaparte, No. 1. Family Library, Murray, London. Vol. i. pp. 35, 36. Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon, vol. iii. p. 98.

upon some one point of a much greater force opposed to it, and thus rob them (according to his own favourite phrase) of the victory. To effect such rapid marches, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their mind to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that, instead of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare to rely wholly for the means of subsistence on the resources of the country into which their leader might conduct them. They must be contented to conquer at whatever hazard; to consider no sacrifices or hardships as worthy of a thought. The risk of destroying the character of the men by accustoming them to pillage, was obvious. Against the enemies of the republic, its success (of the scheme) was splendid even beyond his hopes.

"The objects of the approaching expedition were three: First, to compel the king of Sardinia, who had already lost Savoy and Nice, but still maintained a powerful army on the frontiers of Piedmont, to abandon the alliance of Austria. Secondly, to compel the emperor, by a bold invasion of Lombardy, to make such exertions in that quarter as to weaken those armies which had so long hovered on the Rhine; and if possible to stir up the Italian subjects of that crown to adopt the revolutionary system and emancipate them for ever from its yoke. The third object, though more distant, was not less important. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMISH CHURCH was considered by the Directory as the chief though secret cause of the support of royalty within their own territory, and TO REDUCE THE VATICAN INTO INSIGNIFICANCE, or at least to force it into submission and quiescence, appeared indispensable to the internal tranquillity of France. The revolutionary government, besides this general cause of hatred and suspicion, had a distinct injury to avenge. Their agent Basseville had, three years before, been assassinated in a popular tumult at Rome; the papal troops had not interfered to protect him, nor the pope to punish his murderers; and the haughty republic considered this as an insult, which could only be washed out with A SEA OF BLOOD."*

"The original idea entertained by the French government for prosecuting their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome and exacting complete _atonement for the murder of Basseville. But, as the English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a mat

* Hist. of Napoleon, vol. i. pp. 36, 38.

ter of very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that even if safely landed, they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded by the British fleet. Bonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised."*

Napoleon's plan for gaining access to the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors: they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains; he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow stripe of comparatively level country, which intervenes between these barriers and the Mediterranean sea, and forcing a passage WHERE THE LAST OF THE ALPS MELT, AS IT WERE, INTO THE FIRST AND LOWEST OF THE APPENINE RANGE."t

"In penetrating into Italy by the SOURCES of the Bormida, some hopes might be entertained of separating and intersecting the Sardinian and Austrian armies, because from that position Lombardy and Piedmont were both menaced."

"The battle of Monte Notte was the first of Bonaparte's victories. In consequence of the success of Monte Notte, and the close pursuit of the defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed them on that side of the Alps, which slopes towards Lombardy, and where the STREAMS from the mountains run to join the Po."§

"Beaulieu (general of the Austrians) had now to retreat northward in all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida.-Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position, the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in extent. Augereau advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under Massena, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the right wing, commanded by La Harpe, manoeuvered on the right of all, for the purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank.-La Harpe having crossed the Bormida, where the STREAM came up to the soldiers' middle, attacked in front and in flank the village of Dego, where the Austrian commander-in-chief was stationed. The first attack was completely successful,—the heights of Biastro were car

* Scott's Napoleon, ib. p. 96. + Hist. of Napoleon, p. 38. Las Casas' Journal, vol. i. part 2, p. 184.

§ Scott's Life of Napoleon, vol. iii. pp. 102, 103.

ried, and the Piedmontese routed. The assault of Dego was not less so, although after a harder struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and was entirely separated from the Sardinians, who had hitherto acted in combination with him.

Leaving sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu, Bonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and retreated to the line of the (river) Tanaro."*

"Napoleon in the mean time fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed from the heights of Monte-zemoto, the splendid view of the fertile fields of Piedmont, stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet, WATERED by the Po, the Tanaro, and A THOUSAND OTHER STREAMS which descend from the Alps."t

In less than a month,' to quote from another history of the same events, did Napoleon lay the gates of Italy open before him. He had defeated in three battles forces much superior to his own; inflicted on them, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, a loss of 25,000 men; taken eighty guns and twenty-one standards; reduced the Austrians to inaction; utterly destroyed the Sardinian king's army; and lastly, wrested from his hands CONI and! TORTONA, the two great fortresses called 'the keys of the Alps;' and, indeed, except Turin itself, every place of any consequence in his domínions," &c.‡

а

"Bonaparte, meanwhile, had paused for a moment to consolidate his columns on the heights, from which the vast plain of Lombardy, rich and cultivated like a garden, and WATERED with innumerable fertilising STREAMS, lay at length within the full view of his victorious soldiery. Hannibal forced the Alps,' said he gaily, as he now looked back on those stupendous barriers, and we have turned them ;'—' happy idea,' says Las Casas, which conveyed in two words, the idea and results of the campaign. The army passed the Tanaro; for the first time, it was now absolutely in the plains. General Staingel passed the Cursaglia and scoured the plain. The head-quarters were fixed at the castle of Lezegno, on the right of the Cursaglia, near the point at which it falls into the Tanaro. Massena passed the Tanaro to attack the Piedmontese. Three columns, on the 25th April, entered at the same time Cherasco, Tossano, and Alba. On the 28th, the armistice of Cherasco was concluded, at the junction of the Tanaro and Stura, and there Bonaparte thus * Scott's Life of Napoleon, pp. 104-107. † 1bid. pp. 107, 108.

Hist. of Napoleon, ibid.