in the complaint alone, but upon a reasonable construction of all the pleadings when considered together. Are the defects of the complaint cured by any averments contained in appellant's answer? The only averments in appellant's answer that in any way can be said to have any bearing upon this question are the following: "He denies. each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 and 6 of the complaint of the plaintiff herein; and further denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 3 of said complaint, except that the deed mentioned in paragraph2, and referred to in paragraph 3, was given by said defendant to said plaintiff as security to secure an indebtedness. then existing between the said defendant and said plaintiff, not to exceed the sum of forty-six hundred dollars ($4,600.00)." Here are two denials and one affirmative statement in the nature of an admission. This statement, however, defines and qualifies the nature and extent of the admission. What is the fair import of the language used, in view that the admission expressly refers to the deed? The deed to which the admission refers is alleged in paragraph 2 of the complaint to have been executed August 25, 1902, to secure the sum of money for which plaintiff in paragraph 1 says defendant "was indebted to plaintiff on said 25th day of August, 1902." Here we have an allegation, not of a present or existing, but of a past, indebtedness, namely, that the defendant on August 25, 1902, was-not that he now is indebted to the plaintiff. The admission is that the deed "was given by said defendant to said plaintiff as security to secure an indebtedness then existing between the said defendant and said plaintiff." (Italics ours.) This is not an admission that there is any indebtedness presently existing. It simply admits that an indebtedness existed on August 25, 1902. If paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint can in any possible way be construed so as to cover a present indebtedness, then that present indebtedness is denied by the defendant in his general denial of paragraph 1 of the complaint. True, this general denial is restricted by the qualified admission following the general denial. This admission certainly does not expressly ad mit the agreement on the part of the defendant to pay the indebtedness then existing, and, if such a promise to pay at some time be implied from the admission, the time when payment is to be made certainly is not implied. Assuming that there was nothing else in the answer except what we have set forth above, and for the purpose of determining the question now under consideration such assumption must be taken as true, would the court be authorized to enter a judgment on these pleadings for the amount or for any amount claimed by the plaintiff? That it would not seems too clear to admit of much doubt. If this be so, how did the answer cure the defects in the complaint? If A. alleges that on a certain day he sold and delivered to B. a. horse for the sum of $100, and that B., to secure said sum, executed a mortgage to A., it is clear that A. states no cause of action against B. Now, suppose B. answers, and denies A.'s statement, but by an affirmative statement admits the sale and delivery of a horse for $75 only, and also admits the execution of a mortgage to secure the latter sum-does the complaint and answer together state a cause of action? It certainly does not, unless the delict of B. is implied from the combined statements contained in the complaint and answer. Mr. Pomeroy, in his excellent work entitled "Code Remedies," states the essential elements of a good cause of action clearly and tersely thus: "Every judicial action must, therefore, involve the following elements: A primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff; and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this delict." (Pomeroy's Code Remedies (3d Ed.), sec. 453; Phillips on Code Pleading, sec. 32.) There certainly is no express allegation in the complaint, nor any direct statement or admission in the answer, which shows any delict on the part of the defendant. In the absence of this, there is no cause of action stated in the complaint, nor is this defect cured by anything contained in the answer. But, if we should be wrong in this conclusion, and it be conceded that the admission or statements in the answer sup ply the defects in the complaint, the judgment still cannot stand. The judgment is for $8,292.69, while the admission of the defendant, if it be taken as such, is only for $4,600. The judgment also directs a sale of the property, with directions to apply the proceeds derived from the land to the payment of the larger sum mentioned, when there is no cause of action stated or admitted in any event for more than $4,600. The defect, therefore, if cured at all, is not cured to the extent of the amount of the judgment entered by the court. It is not necessary to discuss the other errors complained of. With few exceptions, all are covered by what has been said. Those that are not covered will not likely arise again after the pleadings have been amended and reformed. The judgment is therefore reversed, with directions to the district court to grant a new trial, and permit the parties to amend their pleadings if they desire to do so, and to proceed with the case in accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellant to recover costs. MCCARTY, C. J., concurs. STRAUP, J., concurs in the result. INDEX. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 1. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-WHAT CONSTITUTES. Where one hav- 2. EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY. Evidence held insufficient to over- 3. Where a personal injury claim against a city is only partially ANIMALS. 1. RUNNING AT LARGE-FENCE LAWS. Though under Revised Stat- 2. TRESPASSING ANIMALS-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY. Evidence in an action for damages caused by sheep trespassing on premises 1. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT-CONSTRUCTION. An agreement, submit- |