Skow v. Green Bay & Western R. Co. 141 Wis. 21. might readily have observed the open space in the daytime, and that when so observed by them it was a reasonably safe place to alight from trains, does not meet the situation presented here, which required the use of the platform in the nighttime. There is an obvious and marked difference in seeing the open space on these different occasions; and while a place might clearly be reasonably safe for use by daylight, we cannot say it would be so by artificial light. And so here, under the evidence tending to show that the open space could not be seen under the condition of the artificial light provided, it was properly left for the jury to determine whether or not the company performed its duty of furnishing a reasonably safe place to alight from the train, and the verdict as to this issue must stand. Appellant's counsel, in his argument to show that the defendant was not negligent in the respects alleged, makes assertions and statements to the effect that the plaintiff miscalculated the distance from the car step to the platform; that she failed to call on the trainmen for assistance when she observed that it was dark; that she evidently omitted to look where she was about to step and to locate the platform before stepping off the lowest car step; and that she neglected to retain a hold on the iron railing at the side of the steps while descending. On these assertions counsel predicates the claim that such conduct on her part constitutes negligence contributing to cause her fall and to produce the injuries. The infirmity of these claims is that there are facts and circumstances shown by the evidence either negativing these assertions of fact or giving explanations which left their existence or nonexistence to be found by the jury. Upon the evidence the jury might well have concluded that the plaintiff was ordinarily careful in alighting from the train and we cannot, therefore, disturb their finding on this issue. Exceptions are urged upon rulings on the admission and rejection of evidence, of which the following only need be no Skow v. Green Bay & Western R. Co. 141 Wis. 21. ticed: The defendant offered a witness to show specifically the defalcation of plaintiff's husband in his business and her knowledge thereof, as explanatory of and as accounting for her insomnia, but which she attributed to the injuries received in the accident. The court permitted counsel to show generally that her husband had difficulties with persons for whom he sold musical instruments respecting his returns on sales of pianos, that she had knowledge thereof, and that it caused her trouble and worry. We think these matters were sufficiently gone into to enable the jury to determine whether it affected her health or caused her sleeplessness, as claimed by the defendant. In view of the state of this branch of the case no error was committed in excluding further details of the husband's business affairs. An exception is insisted on to the admission of evidence in behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that she was a nurse by profession, that she had been engaged in the business after her marriage, and that she expected to conduct it as her separate business in the future. The admission of this evidence becomes immaterial in the view we take of this branch of the case in relation to the claim that the damages are excessive. As appears in the foregoing statement, the plaintiff engaged in nursing before and from time to time after her marriage. It also appears that she engaged in such nursing at irregular intervals and on occasions when she felt so inclined. Her testimony also discloses that she did no nursing for about a year immediately preceding the accident, that she was not established as a nurse at Black River Falls, and that she had expected to do nursing again at this place some time in the spring of the year in which the injuries were received. Giving the fullest weight to the evidence on this subject, it fails to show that she was engaged in a separate business or that she was engaged in performing services whose proceeds she was entitled to retain as her individual earnings. Nor does it show with reasonable certainty that she was about to engage Skow v. Green Bay & Western R. Co. 141 Wis. 21. in such services or business in the future. Furthermore, if it be assumed that she would engage in nursing at some future time, it still remains an imaginary and speculative question whether she has sustained a loss to her prospective business or individual earnings. We are persuaded that the evidence as to her separate business and individual earnings is wholly insufficient to establish a loss with that reasonable certainty required by the law to permit a jury to allow her damages therefor. A liability of the defendant for the damages plaintiff has suffered has been found by the jury; but, since the court improperly submitted evidence to them on which they may have awarded her compensation for the prospective loss to her separate business and individual earnings, we have concluded that the amount allowed the plaintiff as compensatory damages ought to be reduced by the amount allowed by the jury as the damages to her prospective separate business and individual earnings. In view of the evidence of damages for which she was entitled to recover, the jury could not have allowed plaintiff as damages to her prospective separate business and earnings to exceed $1,000. In our judgment a reduction to $1,500 of the amount allowed the plaintiff as compensatory damages will in all reasonable probability cure the error of submitting to the jury the evidence of damages suffered by plaintiff to her prospective separate business and individual earnings. Baxter v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644. The printed case is not in conformity to Supreme Court Rule 6, which requires that it shall contain an abridgment of the record so far as necessary to present the questions for decision. As is said in Johanson v. Webster Mfg. Co. 139 Wis. 181, 120 N. W. 832, so it is here: "Counsel have attempted no abridgment of the evidence, but apparently have printed in full the reporter's minutes. . . ." Compliance with the rule demands that the printed case shall contain in narrative form State v. Hall, 141 Wis. 30. an abridgment only of the evidence so far as is required by the questions for decision. Counsel owe the duty of compliance with the court's rules to aid in an expeditious and orderly presentation and examination of the cases on appeal. Costs for printing a case not complying with the rules are forbidden by Rule 44. No other question requires consideration. By the Court.-The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; with the option, however, to the plaintiff, within twenty days after the filing of the remittitur, to take judgment against the defendant for the sum of $1,500 and costs. No costs are to be taxed for printing the case on appeal. Oriminal law: Pleading statutory offense: Employment of child in place where intoxicating liquor is sold: "Beer garden:" Validity of contract immaterial: Construction of statutes: Independ ent contractor. 1. A complaint charging that defendant employed a child under the age of sixteen years in a "beer garden" states an offense under subd. 2, sec. 1728a, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 523), forbidding the employment of such a child "in any place where intoxicating liquors are made, given away or sold." 2. Failure to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute does not render the complaint insufficient if no substantial right of the defendant is affected and he is not prejudiced thereby. 3. The engagement of children in the kinds of work specified was the evil sought to be guarded against by subd. 2, sec. 1728a, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 523), and the fact that the engagement was under a contract void because for labor to be performed on Sunday, does not preclude a prosecution of the employer. 4. The evil which a statute is designed to cure may be considered in construing it. State v. Hall, 141 Wis. 30. 5. Defendant, the manager of a beer garden, contracted with an adult to furnish music therein for a gross sum. He neither knew nor saw at the time any of the musicians except the person with whom he contracted, and had no knowledge as to their ages. That person employed a minor under sixteen years of age to assist with others in furnishing the music; but after defendant's attention was called to that fact he caused the minor to be discharged. Held, that the person contracted with was not, within the meaning of sec. 1728h, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 523), defendant's agent, servant, or foreman in employing the minor, and that the violation, if any, of subd. 2, sec. 1728a, was not by defendant. REPORTED from the municipal court of Milwaukee county: A. C. BRAZEE, Judge. First question answered in the affirmative; second and third questions in the negative. This is a criminal prosecution in which action was brought upon the following complaint: "Ira Lockney, being first duly sworn, on oath complains to the district court of the county of Milwaukee that Allen L. Hall on the 5th day of July, A. D. 1908, in the county of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, being then and there the manager of a beer garden, did unlawfully employ and permit one Constantine Schoen, a child then and there of the age of fifteen years, to be employed and to work in said beer garden, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Wisconsin, and prays that the said Allen L. Hall may be arrested and dealt with according to law." Upon trial the defendant was convicted of employing a boy under the age of sixteen years in violation of the statutes. During the trial questions of law arose which, in the opinion. of the trial judge, required the decision of this court, whereupon at the request and upon the consent of defendant and before judgment the court below certified the following questions: "(1) Does the complaint in this action state an offense under the statutes of the state of Wisconsin? "(2) Does the fact that the contract was for the employ |