and conditions in that unhappy country have gone from bad to worse. There has been a vociferous demand for intervention by the United States. This demand has come from citizens of the United States residing or doing business in Mexico, and from other sources. It has been assumed by these citizens and by some governments that it is the duty and the right of the United States to interfere in Mexico to command the peace.

Against great pressure two Presidents of the United States have declined to intervene, although Americans and Europeans, supposedly under the protection of our government, have been plundered and murdered. The civilized world has looked to this country for relief from Mexican anarchy. The fact that no intervention has occurred, except in one instance and for the specific purpose of resenting an insult to the American flag,-should convince the people of Spanish-America that neither the people nor Government of the United States desire to meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Of course there are circumstances under which intervention may become necessary. When treaty rights are not respected, or when the property of aliens is destroyed and their lives taken, their governments may interpose even with armed forces. Under such conditions intervention would be justified in the custom of nations and approved by all civilized Powers.

Although apt to lead to it, intervention is sometimes undertaken to prevent war, and is justified as a restraint of wrong-doing and illegal or immoral acts.

While these provocations have all no doubt existed, the United States, the big brother of the family of the American republics, has so far refused to undertake the task of restoring order in Mexico.

But is there not a better, a less expensive and more effective way of extending protection to aliens in Mexico than armed intervention by a single Power? The writer believes that there is, and two recent precedents may be cited. In one of these instances, the intervention in China in 1900, the plan was completely successful, and in the other it was partially so. In the Chinese intervention, made jointly by the United States and sundry European Governments, the issue was a happy one for everybody, even for China herself.

But it is to the situation in Mexico and the effort at mediation proposed by the Ambassadors from Argentina, Brazil and Chile, that specific reference is now made with the hope of indicating its value as a means for the preservation of peace. And here it may be well to say that the Mexican situation presents a purely American question, and must be settled by the governments of the American continent.

Everyone would like to see Mexico herself quickly and completely settle her internal troubles and avoid all interference from any other country or association of countries. But what if she will not, or cannot? Shall intervention be by the United States alone, which will mean war and a new crop of suspicion and hatred of the Anglo-Saxon, or shall it be in association with the orderly Spanish-American countries? In the latter case the futility of resistance will be apparent and quick and peaceful solution will certainly follow.

Unfortunately all the details of the work done at Niagara are not known to the general public, and a correct estimate of its importance is difficult. But enough is known to suggest that the precedent is likely to become of transcendent importance in the political future of the American continent.

The "A.B.C." mediation has taken its place in history, and in the opinion of the writer, will be fully justified in the future. Certainly it was not a failure, and the more it is studied the stronger becomes the impression that it begins a diplomatic epoch in the history of the Americas.

In their communication to the Secretary of State of the United States tendering good offices, the three Ambassadors said that they did so "for the purpose of serving the interest of peace and civilization on our continent, and with the earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed to the prejudice of the cordiality and union which have always surrounded the relations of the Governments and the peoples of America." It was a noble purpose, opportunely undertaken, and, while never dramatic, was in an important way, successful. A war between the United States and Mexico then seemed imminent, and none occurred. A condition which was fast bringing ruin to Mexico, as it had brought shame, was distinctly and promptly bettered, and, for some time thereafter, there was no "further bloodshed" in that unhappy country.

To many students of the Niagara mediation it appears to have two distinct features of value. It helped, though possibly in a minor way, to bring the belligerents in Mexico into communication with one another, and it certainly made them realize that other countries were not indifferent to conditions in that republic. It made them understand that chaos and bloodshed would not be permitted to go on forever. It compelled the Mexicans to realize that if they are to keep their sovereignty they must behave as a sovereign should, and not maintain an international nuisance. It forced them to think, and there was no more important fighting between the insurgents and the Huerta Administration after the mediators met. Occasional minor conflicts between the followers of irresponsible guerilla chiefs and the military are not chargeable to Huerta or Carranza, and they may still be expected, for banditry of long standing is never ended in a day. Indians who have tasted the free, wild life of the camp, the companionship of a horse and a rifle, and an opportunity for loot and vengeance, do not willingly or immediately go back to herding sheep or digging in mines.

The second and by far the greatest value of the Niagara conference is the precedent it made. It points the way to the settlement of similar troubles in the future. It may, I think, be regarded as the beginning of a Pan-American policy for the quieting of internal troubles and international disputes between the republics on this continent.

The proof it gave to the suspicious and doubtful citizens of the twenty Spanish and Portuguese-speaking republics that the people and Government of the United States contemplate no assault on their sovereignty and territory, sufficed in itself to lift the mediation out of the class of failures. It did not accomplish all that some people believed it would, or all that some of us hoped it might; but, in spite of the jeers of unsympathetic newspaper wits and the scorn of militarists, it did enough to establish a policy. Hereafter when any American country gives itself over to anarchy, those governments that prefer order to disorder, following the precedent of the "A.B.C." mediation, can jointly intervene to command the peace. If necessary to enforce this command, the military arm of all or a majority of the peaceable countries of America may be employed for that purpose. Under these joint operations, no great financial burden will be put on any one peacemaker, and, better

still, there can be no suspicion of motives, no apprehension of a loss of territory.

That the people of Mexico, Central and South America have entertained feelings of hostility toward this country, and a suspicion of its political purposes, is well known to observant travellers in those countries. The Mexican War of 1846, the exercise of over-lordship in Santo Domingo and Hayti, "dollar diplomacy" in Nicaragua and elsewhere, are all pointed to as reasons for this suspicion. The talk of some Americans of "manifest destiny," with its echo in the press, and the suggestion that the United States must, because of its ownership of the Panama Canal, control all territory down to the Isthmus, have not tended to remove that suspicion. South and Central Americans quite naturally say that the same reasoning applies to the territory south of the Canal, and is equally valid.

Such talk and the suspicion it has created have unquestionably interfered with the development of American trade in all Spanish America. It is human nature not to be inclined to favor, in trade or otherwise, people whose purposes are thought to be unfriendly. This feeling was perceptibly allayed by the proceedings at Niagara, and that, with the valuable precedent established, are distinct gains from the "A.B.C." mediation. Over-lordship, so offensive to these Central and South Americans, was inferentially disclaimed, and the President and the Secretary of State made it perfectly clear that all this government wants of its continental neighbors is friendship and mutual trade opportunities.

The great and epoch-making speech of Mr. Wilson at Mobile cleared the atmosphere and made the mediation possible. That was a great and statesmanlike speech; but alone it was not sufficient to remove hurtful doubt and suspicion. It needed the persistent and sincere efforts of the Secretary of State, whose work for peace has given him an eminent and enviable place in history, and the prompt and hearty agreement to the mediation proposal to accomplish that.

The way is now open for the future settlement of these revolutionary disturbances, the frequency and character of which have been a disgrace to the republican system of government. Why shall we not make the work begun at Niagara a permanent Pan-American policy? Something like it worked very well in China at the time of the Boxer movement.

There was no seizure of territory after the joint movement to Peking. But who can doubt that if the task of rescuing the legations had been left to any one of the great Powers of Europe, or to Japan, China would have paid for it with a big slice of her territory?

In the opinion of many earnest advocates of peace who feel a profound interest in all the American governments, this plan, if mutually agreed upon and carried into effect, would go far to remove this continent from the theater of possible war, and would be a long step towards universal peace. It would put an end to the persistent clamor for armed intervention in Mexico by the United States. It would take the sting out of intervention and more quickly and effectively accomplish all that could be expected from the most successful interference with arms by any one country. It would give a sense of relief and territorial security to the smaller Latin-American countries; and as all the larger and more powerful governments declare themselves supporters of the policy of peace and justice, it is hard to see how they could object to it. It is in line with the peace plan of Mr. Secretary Bryan and keeps step with the doctrine of The Hague, the doctrine of arbitration which in theory all good men endorse. A Pan-American policy of mediation and arbitration whenever disturbances shall unfortunately occur ought to convert what has been until recently one of the most turbulent sections of the earth into a region of peace and prosperity.

There is one distinct and mutual benefit to be shared by all the governments of the American continent sure to follow the establishment of sincerely cordial relations between them. It will strengthen them for resistance in the event of an assault on the sovereignty or territory of any of them, by any or all the Powers waived off by President Monroe in 1823. That will amount to an understanding for mutual defense among 175,000,000 people on one continent flanked on all sides by the world's greatest oceans.

JAMES L. SLAYDEN.