as to what the diplomatic correspondence shows, but also disagreement as to the value of any conclusions which can possibly be reached by the examination of the official correspondence. On the one hand there has been perhaps in some instances a disposition to give too great weight to the mere fact that a statement (perhaps a hearsay statement) appears somewhere in the correspondence; and upon the other, a disposition to discredit all such official documents, as being written for effect and having no real value in forming a just appreciation of the great events with which they deal. It is respectfully submitted that both these extreme views are mistaken.

It is of course true that diplomatic communications frequently contain sentiments which justify Hosea Biglow's comment,

Ain't our piety sech (in our speeches an' messiges)

Ez t' astonish ourselves in the bes'-composed pessiges.

They even sometimes contain statements of alleged fact which cannot be excused merely as mistakes, but deserve to be qualified "by a shorter and uglier word." But when the correspondence on both sides is considered, particularly when it consists of simultaneous telegraphic exchanges between a half a dozen capitals, as in the present case, such misstatements, if they exist, can ordinarily be detected. And even a misstatement has its value. It either shows what the man who made it thought to be the fact at the time, or what he wished others to think was the fact. And either of these may be as important as the fact itself, in elucidating the issues to which the correspondence relates.

It is also true that the diplomatic correspondence preceding a war very frequently-and this was naturally the case in the hurried telegraphic exchanges of the week preceding the outbreak of the present war-deals with the immediate rather than the fundamental causes of the war. We should not expect a verbatim record of the conference of the Roman envoys with the Carthagenian Senate while Hannibal was hammering the walls of Saguntum (if obtainable) to afford an adequate discussion of the underlying philosophy of the death struggle between Rome and Carthage. For this we must wait for Livy, if not for Bernhardi and Cramb. But such a record would be of immense interest and value. Fundamental causes must wait an occasion to make themselves

1

manifest, and sometimes the occasion never comes. Even the immediate causes of the greatest war in history are worthy of the most careful study.

Again, it may be admitted that no country in such circumstances as the present, could be expected to publish at this time all of its official correspondence relevant to the outbreak of the war, and that none of the belligerent countries have in fact done so.1

But while this affects the value of the diplomatic correspondence as published, it does so to a very different degree depending on the apparent nature, extent and justification for the omissions. For instance, in the present case it is of course absolutely natural and proper (so long as the elimination of this portion of the diplomatic correspondence does not distort the meaning of the remainder) for all the belligerent governments to observe great discretion with respect to what they publish which may relate to or involve the Italian government; and needless to say they have all done so. On the other hand, the omission of correspondence exchanged before the opening of hostilities, between allies now parties to the war, as for instance the omission of correspondence known to have taken place between Germany and Austria, which is noticeable in both the German White Paper and Austrian Red Book, although explainable on perfectly legitimate grounds, is more signifi

cant.

Again, while the "falsification" of such correspondence (unless we so classify such incidents as Bismarck's editing of the Ems telegram) is

1 Mr. James M. Beck, in his article "In the Supreme Court of Civilization," N. Y. Times Current History of the War, No. 3, Jan. 9, 1915, pp. 415, 416, pointed out the omission from the German White Paper of practically all correspondence between Berlin and Vienna, an omission which the publication of the Austrian Red Book since that time has only made good to a limited extent. But Mr. Beck appears to have fallen into error when he made the sweeping statement that "the official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession."

Compare Dr. von Mach's "Defense of the Dual Alliance, a Reply," ibid., p. 438, pointing out omissions in the British White Paper (which however, aside from the correspondence with Rome, as to which see supra, p. 404, do not appear to be important); and Dr. Helfferich's "The Dual Alliance v. The Triple Entente," N. Y. Times, March 14, 1915, which performs the same service, for the French Yellow Book. An omission from the Russian Orange Book is pointed out infra, p. 421, note 43.

happily practically unknown, it is of course always possible and has been charged in the present instance (most injudiciously, it is respectfully submitted) by a distinguished professor.2 Against such a charge correspondence published while it is still hot, so to speak, as the British White Paper, albeit it not unnaturally shows some signs of its hasty compilation, is in a better position than the more finished French Yellow Book, published only after a considerable interval for reflection, and containing correspondence of earlier years, which cannot in the nature of things be supported by the internal evidence of cross-references which so greatly fortifies the numerous telegraphic exchanges during the week prior to the outbreak of the war.

*

Moreover, it is quite true, as has been pointed out, that even if the diplomatic correspondence were published in toto, with literal accuracy, we would still have much to learn elsewhere even concerning the immediate causes of the outbreak of the war. There would still be those "important plans * laid in the embrasures of windows where important men stand and talk so that no one can hear." 3 And under modern conditions there must be added (unless they were officially recorded) the telephonic conversations, such, for instance, as those which are known to have taken place between Berlin and Vienna, and which may have changed the fate of history.

But after all reservations and deductions are made, it remains true that if the immediate responsibility for the war were a matter for inquiry before the Hague Court, or any other arbitral tribunal,—as other similar although less important matters have been,-the court would resort in the first place to the diplomatic correspondence, for the all sufficient reason that experience has shown that in general this obvious official source of information is, with all its limitations and imperfections, more to be relied upon than any other.

2 By Professor Delbrück, of the University of Berlin, in an article entitled "Germany's Answer," Atlantic Monthly, February, p. 241. The word "falsification" may possibly be due to an unhappy translation. But there can be no question of Professor Delbrück's responsibility (upon the strength of a preconceived theory supported it is submitted by wholly insufficient evidence) for the substantial charge conveyed by the word, against the English and apparently also the French Government.

3 Professor Sloan, in N. Y. Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 520.

THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SERAJEVO, AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY 23RD

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand d'Este, presumptive heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his Consort, the Princess of Hohenberg, were assassinated at Serajevo, in Bosnia, by Slavs of Servian sympathies but Austrian nationality.3

It was at once charged in the Austrian press that the crime was the result of Pan-Slav agitation, originating in Servia, and a bitter discussion ensued between the newspapers of the two countries. 3 It was generally recognized in the chancellories of Europe that the crime would and should result in representations on the part of Austria to Servia, after proper investigation; but a considerable nervousness was felt as to whether or not Austria's representations would be kept within reasonable bounds. The Austrian Government appears to have kept its own counsel officially, with the exception of Germany. But the matter was in the air everywhere in diplomatic circles, and Sir M. de Bunsen the British Ambassador at Vienna, on July 15th received from a private source a forecast of what was about to happen, which he telegraphed to his government on the following day. Apparently upon the strength

3a See Servian Blue Book, Nos. 8, 12, 16.

* As to the nature of Germany's advance information see infra, p. 418, note 35. Italy, the other member of the Triple Alliance, appears not to have been taken into the confidence of Austria. On July 27th M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to his government the following conversation with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

"He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that be had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. 'In no way,' the Minister replied: 'we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us, then, to make any such communication to Vienna.

(French Yellow Book, No. 72, SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, April, 1915, p. 208). See to the same effect, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, September 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 2, who says that the Italian Ambassador at Vienna "was left completely in the dark." See also French Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 35, 50, 56, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, pp. 172, 181, 191, 196; British White Paper, No. 38, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 282, 283.

'Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 1, refers to this telegram which however does not appear in the British

of this telegram Sir Edward Grey mentioned the matter to the German Ambassador on July 20th, expressing the hope that Austria would not do anything until "they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia."6 Sir Edward Grey also appears to have taken the matter up with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, direct, and "asked him to recommend his government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications; not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."

Russia and France also approached the Governments of Austria and Germany with suggestions of moderation, and warnings of the probable consequences of unreasonable action. The advice of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, was especially significant. "No country has suffered more than Russia, from crimes prepared upon foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten Servia? Do not enter upon that path." 9

In response to these representations, the Russian and French Ambassadors had received reassuring declarations at Vienna as to the contents of the forthcoming Austrian note, in the case of the French Am

White Paper. See Dr. von Mach's article N. Y. Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 438, referred to supra, p. 404, note 1.

"British White Paper, No. 1, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 1. The German Ambassador in turn either upon this or some other occasion about the same time, appears to have asked Sir Edward Grey privately, if need arose, to "exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg." (British White Paper, No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Ambassador at Paris, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266.)

7 French Yellow Book, No. 19, M. Paul Cambon to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 22, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 165.

8 French Yellow Book, No. 15, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, p. 162 (recounting representations at Berlin by the Servian, Russian and French representatives). See also French Yellow Book, No. 17, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 164.

'French Yellow Book, No. 10, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 6, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 159.