bassador as late as July 22nd and 23rd.10 On the same day that the last of these interviews was had-namely, July 23rd-the Austrian note was presented. The viewpoint of this note can be better understood after reading the report of Freiherr von Giesl, Austrian Minister at Belgrade, to the Austrian Foreign Office, dated July 21, 1914, in which, after he has discussed Austro-Servian relations and the attitude of public opinion in Servia with respect to the Pan-Servian movement, and the assassinations at Serajevo, he says by way of summary:

I consider this exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement with Servia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided.

*

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.11

The Austrian note, delivered two days later, July 23rd, at six o'clock, p. m. was conceived in the spirit of this advice. It starts out with a general arraignment of the Pan-Servian movement against the integrity of Austria-Hungary, which it is said Servia has permitted in open violation of her formal promise in 1909 to withdraw opposition to the annexation of Bosnia and ❝live on good neighborly terms" with Austria. This count of the indictment is summed up with the charge that "Servia has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions."

The note next proceeds to a specific charge of Servian responsibility for the assassinations of Serajevo. The count on this head reads:

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June that the Serajevo assassination had been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with

10 French Yellow Book, Nos. 18 and 20; British Command Paper 7596, Miscellaneous No. 10, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 1. As a consequence the Russian Ambassador at Vienna felt justified in going on leave July 20th. (French Yellow Book, No. 18, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 164).

11 Austrian Red Book, No. 6, Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold, July 21, 1914. This book will be printed in a future issue of the SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL.

which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and carried out by the Chiefs of the Servian frontier service.12 The note then proceeds to demand a publication in the official journal of the Servian Government of a declaration, the terms of which are. prescribed, formally condemning the Pan-Servian movement, this declaration also to be communicated to the Servian army, as an order of the day, and published in the official army bulletin. Furthermore, ten specific and very drastic demands are made upon the Servian Government for action, looking towards the suppression of Pan-Servian and Anti-Austrian propaganda in all its manifestations; i. e., in the press, through the Servian society Narodna Odbrana, already mentioned, and similar societies engaging in an anti-Austrian propaganda, in the schools, in the army and in official life.

The most serious of these demands, however, and the ones which under very general and even indefinite language doubtless aimed at securing that "effective control" of Servia of which Freiherr von Giesl spoke, and which therefore threatened the independence and sovereignty of Servia, were numbers 5 and 6, which read as follows:

5. To accept the coöperation in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the AustroHungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto. 13

The note concludes with the statement that "the Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th of July."

The note was accompanied by a half-page memorandum stating the conclusions reached up to that time as a result of the investigation of the 12 Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 254–257.

13 Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 254-257.

assassination of the Archduke, by the judicial authorities at Serajevo. The circular note of Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors to the Powers, transmitting the note to Servia stated that the Austrian Government had a "dossier recording Servian machinations and showing the connection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of June" which it "holds at the disposal" of the various Powers. 14 This dossier was actually transmitted in a circular dispatch of Count Berchtold of July 25th.15 It was communicated to the French government on July 27th 16 and presumably at about the same time to the other Powers. Much of the material contained in the dossier is of slight importance in itself except by way of creating an atmosphere through its cumulative effect. The summary of the testimony and confessions before the examining judge at Serajevo contains, however, detailed and specific evidence with respect to the complicity of certain Servian officials in the assassination of the Archduke, which if true is very damaging. This evidence undoubtedly called for an immediate and searching investigation on the part of the Servian Government without waiting to be asked, 18 14 Austrian Red Book, No. 8. British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 259.

17

15 Austrian Red Book, No. 19.

16 French Yellow Book, No. 75, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 212.

17 See for instance enclosure 11, relating to "Anti-Austro-Hungarian paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade," which are thus described: "Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia) and part plain (Southern Hungary) there is shown the 'zora' or dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are the names of all the provinces 'yet to be freed'-Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc."

18 On June 30th the Austrian legation at Belgrade asked the Secretary General of the Servian Foreign Office "the pertinent inquiry as to what steps the Royal police had taken or intended to take in an effort to trace the threads of the outrage which notoriously led into Servia. His reply was that so far the Servian police had not even taken the matter up." (Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Ritter Von Storck to Count Berchtold.) Servia would seem to have made a great mistake, to say the least, in not immediately starting an inquiry on the basis of this suggestion.

One cannot but be impressed with a remark of Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador to London, in discussing the Austrian note with Sir Edward Grey on July 24th, that "the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke." (British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.)

[When the above was written the Servian Blue Book was not available. See Nos. 5, 8 and 30. The conclusion reached in the text is not, however, affected.]

with a view not only to the punishment of those guilty of complicity in the assassination of the Archduke, so far as they were to be found on Servian soil, but to the clearing up of conditions which made possible the successful launching of attempts on the lives of Austrian officials from Servian territory, if these conditions were in fact as indicated by the evidence presented. It must be remembered, however, that this evidence at least as far as the Servian Government is concerned-is wholly ex parte, and that the treason trials at Agram in Croatia, in 1909, followed by the celebrated libel suit of the Serbo-Croat leaders against Dr. Friedjung at Vienna (involving the authenticity of documentary evidence supplied by the Austrian Foreign Office, and comparable to the famous state trial growing out of the London Times articles on Parnellism and crime) give point to the obvious suggestion that the Servian Government was and is entitled to be heard in its own defense before it is condemned.

With so much of the Austrian note as was aimed at securing the bona fide and energetic coöperation of Servia in punishing the assassins of the Archduke Ferdinand, without impairing Servian sovereignty and independence, everyone must sympathize. 19 But the demand for Austrian participation even in the proceedings looking toward the detection and punishment of the assassins certainly raises grave and delicate questions of procedure. And it is submitted that it was unreasonable under the circumstances to add to this demand, which still has a legitimate and specific object, namely, the punishment of the assassins, the further general demand that Servia should attempt to suppress the political aspirations of her people, even though these aspirations involved in a general and indefinite way the desire for the future acquisition of Austrian territory. It would have been little more unreasonable in principle and as matters have turned out, no more dangerous for the Austrian govern

19 See remarks of M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szapary, July 24, 1914, as reported by M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, French Yellow Book, No. 54, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 194.

"The intention which inspired this document,' he said, 'is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists. But the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible.' He concluded, 'take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee its result.""

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ment to seize upon some just cause of grievance which it might have had against Italy to demand of the Italian Government the suppression of all Irredentist propaganda in Italy; or for the German Government as a part of the Morocco settlement to have demanded that the French Government officially suppress all agitation in the French press, in the schools, or public life generally for the re-acquisition of the lost provinces. When, in addition to this demand, in its substance unreasonable, there was superadded the vague requirement for "collaboration" of Austrian officers "in the suppression of the subversive movement against Austria," which might mean almost anything by way of "effective control," one cannot wonder that the German Secretary of State, in talking with the British Ambassador, admitted that "the Servian government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands;" and "confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired, as a diplomatic document." 20 Or that Sir Edward Grey, in speaking to the Austrian Ambassador, observed that he had "never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." 21

THE RECEPTION OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE BY THE POWERS-AUSTRIA REFUSES TO EXTEND THE TIME LIMIT

When the terms of the Austrian note to Servia became known in the chancelleries of Europe on July 24th, they were received with surprise everywhere outside of Germany; with deep indignation and resentment

20 British White Paper, No. 18, supra. According to the German Ambassador to Austria, however, it was “impossible to speak effectively in any other way to Servia." (British White Paper, No. 32, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 279 at 280.) And compare the German official statement on July 24th, that "the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate." British White Paper, No. 9, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 263.

21 British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 259–260. See also French Yellow Book, No. 34, SupPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 180.

Compare Sir Edward Grey's reference in speaking with the German Ambassador; to the "extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note." (British White Paper, No. 11, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266.) See also British White Paper, Nos. 7, 16, 24, and 44.