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The clearness of the Italian recognition of the rights and interests of other states in the field of commercial, economic and colonial development is evident throughout the volume. And their just estimate and intelligent application of the principle that the vital interests of a nation can only be advanced with security and precision through a spirit of reciprocity and conciliation, is here fully demonstrated. "There is room in the Balkan Peninsula for the legitimate interests of AustroHungary and Italy," said Tittoni on one occasion, "There is equally room in the Balkan Peninsula for the legitimate interests of all civilized states, as well as first of all for those of the Balkan States." After the defeat of General Baratieri and the loss of their protectorate over Abyssinia in 1896, the Italian authorities experienced considerable difficulty in adjusting boundaries and establishing satisfactory relations between Abyssinia and their East African colonies. England and France also possessed certain special interests in Abyssinia. After some delay Italy joined Great Britain and France in the guarantee treaty of 1906, which preserves the independence and integrity of Abyssinia and secures the interests of all three of the interested states, including those of Italian Eritrea, Somaliland, the Benadir and their hinterland. Thus the Italian Government by generous cooperation and the recognition of the rights of other states, gained not only protection for her own legitimate interests, but the confidence and friendship of her two East African neighbors.
Since then, this spirit of conciliation and concession has been noticeable in the conduct of all her colonial politics, as when the Italian officials permitted the British to cross the border of Somaliland in their pursuit of the Mullah and later cooperated in securing the peaceful submission of the Mullah on their own territory. And Italy has shown a decided improvement in her colonial methods and in the conduct of colonial affairs. Her statesmen have learned at last how to handle the African peoples successfully and how to win their confidence. In the closing chapters of this volume, attention is called to the remarkable way in which Italy occupied the whole of the Benadir district in Somaliland in two years at a cost of 2,000,000 lire. Across the Jube river, in two campaigns in 1902 and 1903 and 1903 and 1904 Great Britain spent 62,000,000 lire; and Germany expended over 335,000,000 lire during the years 1904-1906 in putting down the Herero uprising in German Southwest Africa.
Norman Dwight Harris.
Das Internationale Landkriegsrecht. By Dr. Karl Strupp. Frankfort am Main: Verlag von Joseph Baer & Co., 1914. pp. xii, 252.
It appears from the publisher's notice accompanying this work that for some years the author has been engaged in the task of preparing a several volume commentary on the rules of land warfare—a much needed guide hitherto lacking in Germany. The outbreak of the great European War has convinced him of the desirability of publishing at once in condensed form the results of his investigations.
The reviewer has been particularly interested in the author's opinions on the crucial problem of military necessity. Dr. Strupp does not take the usual military viewpoint that the rules of warfare are, in general, subordinate to military necessity. Indeed, he does not hesitate to take issue with the view of the General Staff as set forth in that remarkable publication entitled, Kriegsgebrauch im Landkriege, to the effect that the Hague Regulations are not to be regarded as legally binding.
Our author maintains, on the contrary, that the Hague Rules would have the character of positive law even if their binding force were limited to the instances where they were not set aside by military necessity. This may be sound in logic, but what, it may be asked, would be the practical use of regulations which might be set aside by any belligerent on pretext of necessity?
The following classification of the various kinds of military necessity based on the views of Max Huber is particularly interesting:
(1) State necessity, which is not, properly speaking, a part of military law. "There is no case conceivable in which a rule of the law of warfare could possibly endanger the vital interests or existence of a state" (p. 5). Yet in another connection (pp. 133-34) the author excuses the violation of Belgian neutrality on this ground of State necessity. Without producing a particle of evidence, this distinguished German scholar says: "The German Empire was justified in demanding of Belgium permission to march through the western portions of her territory against France, after it was established that the latter country had planned an invasion of German territory through Belgium." Has it come to this in Germany that mere assertion resulting from the "will to believe" has usurped the place of evidence in dealing with questions of this kind? Not the least of the evils of this war appears to be its benumbing and paralyzing effect upon the German intellect and the consequent moral bankruptcy of German scholarship.
(2) War necessity, i. e., the military necessity which has reference to the general ends of warfare, such as a campaign, the siege of a city, devastation, etc. Such necessity was recognized and amply provided for in the Hague Rules.
(3) Military necessity with reference to particular military operations, such as ruses of warfare, the capture or destruction of property, the treatment of prisoners of war, etc. This form of necessity is only applicable in the few instances where there is an express reservation, as in case of the Hague Rules, Art. 23g.
(4) Necessity proper (Notstand), or the extreme need of self-preservation, as, for example, the killing of prisoners because of a lack of provisions. Doctor Strupp appears to believe that it is even justifiable under certain circumstances to allow prisoners to starve in the course of military operations (p. 7). If this or similar doctrines are generally held in Germany, the possibilities of the future are too fearful to contemplate.
Because of lack of time and space we cannot follow the author's views in detail. Suffice it to say that he treats his subject in scholarly fashion, cites good authorities, and furnishes each article of the Hague and Geneva Regulations with an appropriate commentary. There is little to criticise adversely, except in the few instances where he permits himself to refer to events connected with the invasion of Belgium. Thus, his discussion of reprisals (pp. 31-36) is very fair and satisfactory. He even condemns preventive reprisals or "acts of frightfulness" which have as their object the spreading of terror, though he does not refer to Belgium in this connection. But in a note on page 9 he cannot resist the temptation of recording his conviction (again without evidence) that the blame for the destruction of Ixmvain lies wholly at the door of its deluded inhabitants, thus adding insult to injury.
However, it should be said in justice to Dr. Strupp that had the German military authorities known and followed the teachings contained in his manual, they would not now stand discredited and anathematized by almost the entire civilized world.
The book is provided with an index, a list of authorities, numerous select bibliographies, and an appendix containing Dr. Lieber's "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field," the "Laws of Warfare on Land," published by the Institute on International Law in 1880, and the French texts of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.
Amos S. Hershey.
Die Funkentelegrafie im Recht. By R. Thurn. Berlin and Munich: J. Schweitzer. 1913. pp. 150.
This monograph is a handy resume of the progress made down to July, 1913, in the development, locally and internationally, of the law applicable in peace and in war to radiotelegraphy. The author starts with the pious voeu that this new means of intercommunication may serve to bind the nations together in peace under a community of law. Reflecting upon the events which have occurred since the book was written and the novel difficulties and unsuspected causes of friction to which radio communication has given rise, not to mention its contribution in "speeding up" warfare and thus increasing the terror and destructiveness of war, the author's hopes, though penned less than two years ago, appear naive, if not pathetic.
The introduction consists of a general analysis of radiotelegraphy in its relation to the science of law. Part I brings down to 1913 the legislation passed in the most important countries of the world. It is interesting to note in this connection that though the United States was the last among the Powers to subject radiotelegraphy to governmental control, it was the first to compel its installation on board sea going vessels.
The second part of the book consists of a critical examination of the principles of international law applicable to radiotelegraphy developed by the Institute and by individual pioneers in this field. Many of the liberal rules favored by the Institute were brushed aside even before the present war; especially where precedents are scant, one must expect great variance between the ideality of principle and the reality of practice.
Perhaps the most interesting portion deals with the rights and duties of neutrals. The communication sent to a land station at Hongkong on March 31, 1905, by the commander of the British cruiser Iphigenia to announce his encounter with the Russian Baltic squadron is designated as a violation of strict neutrality. Scholz uses the stronger term "unneutral." On the other hand, the author justifies the protest of Japan against the action of China in permitting wireless communication between Port Arthur and the Russian consulate at Chefu after the cable had been cut. The author's summary of the duties of neutrals over land stations within their territory substantially coincides with the practice adopted by the United States in the present struggle (p. 72). The correct position of a neutral toward messages known to be contraband passing through its airspace, though not intended for its land stations, presents an interesting problem. The author upholds the right but not the duty to interrupt such messages (p. 79). Contrary to the opinion of some writers, he fails to find a breach of blockade on the part of a neutral vessel upon the high seas, or in a neutral port, in communicating by wireless with the land stations of a blockaded belligerent (p. 79).
Arthur K. Kuhn.
Die Geschichte der Pan-Amerikanischen Bewegung mit besonderer Berucksichtigung ihrer volkerrechtlichen Bedeutung. By Dr. Robert Biichi. Breslau: J. U. Kern's Verlag. 1914. pp. xvi, 189.
This little book is the second of a series of international law monographs published by Doctors Schllcking and Wehberg. It is divided into four parts. The first discusses America and International Law; the second, the History of Pan-Americanism; the third, the Organization of Central America; and the fourth, Pan-Americanism and the policy of the United States.
Part one begins with a study of America's entrance into the community of nations and her acceptance of the principles of international law in force in Europe. He says: "Aber Amerika hat nicht nur die Prinzipien des damals in Europa geltenden Volkerrechts akzeptiert und angewendet, es hat auch einen ganz hervorragenden Anteil an dessen Weiterbildung genommen und manche liberalen Grundsatze aufgestellt und entwickelt. * * * Die Prophezeiung Jeffersons, Amerika verde Europa Unterricht erteilen, hat sich erfiillt." He then reviews America's contribution to the theory of neutrality and to the recognition of de facto governments, and her protest against intervention in the affairs of other states. America's influence on privateering and prize law and on arbitral jurisdiction also form parts of the so-called American international law.
The Pan-American movement is traced in part two, which begins with an enthusiastic commendation of James G. Blaine for initiating the series of Pan-American conferences, the first of which met at Washington late in 1889. After a brief statement of its composition and organization, its procedure is reviewed and the most important problems with which it dealt are explained, especially its work on behalf of international arbitration, and its organization of the Bureau of