I. OFFICIAL REPORTS FOUND IN THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT UPON THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS, OCTOBER 1914. I. REPORT OF GENERAL DUCARME, CHIEF OF THE BELGIAN GENERAL STAFF, TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER OF WAR. Confidential. Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations. Mr. Minister: BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906. I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications. The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for. The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it. Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs. He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety would be less complete. This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces. He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the English troops-which he estimated to last about ten days. I answered him that the places Namur and Liège were protected from a "coup de main" and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days. After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign has been con.sulted. In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other military attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend on it, that in 12 or 13 days 2 army corps, 4 cavalry brigades and 2 brigades of horse infantry would be landed. He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army. He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liège, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength. He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief command. I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully. Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: 12 days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (1 to 21⁄2 months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp. Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily. As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated. The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one-half of the English army could be landed within 8 days; the rest at the conclusion of the 12th or 13th day, with the exception of the Horse Infantry, which could not be counted upon until later. In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day. The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely: (1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the Press; (2) The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops. In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes. In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff. Other secondary questions which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or the Military authorities might exert on the Press. During the final meeting which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first Corps would be disembarked on the 10th day, and the second on the 15th day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first Corps, either in the direction of BrusselsLouvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the 11th day, and that of the second on the 16th day. I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea-transports so that the English troops could be with us between the 11th and 12th day. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be done. * In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea. In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our Eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies. Major-General, Chief of the General Staff. (Initials of Gen. Ducarme.) Note. When I met General Grierson at Compiègne, during the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me the result of the re-organization of the English army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above. Concluded September, 1906. 2. MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE, DATED APRIL 23 (1912?) BETWEEN THE BELGIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL JUNGBLUTH, AND THE BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHÉ, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BRIDGES. Confidential. The British Military Attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23rd. Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry-together 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular territory. Everything is ready. At the time of the recent events, the British Government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (chez nous), even if we had not asked for assistance. The General objected that for that our consent was necessary. The Military Attaché answered that he knew this, but that—since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country-England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (en tout état de cause). As for the place of landing, the Military Attaché did not make a precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostende. The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through. 3. EXTRACT FROM REPORT of baron GREINDL, BELGIAN MINISTER IN BERLIN, TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.5 I have had the honour to receive the dispatch of the 27 November last, P without docket-number, registration number 1108, 5 The entire despatch has apparently not been published, but that portion of it made public and printed by Dr. Dernburg in his pamphlet, The Case of Belgium is here reproduced. From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of Luxemburg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence of it. Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms part of the scheme of the "Entente Cordiale." If that were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our national center of refuge, we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Colonel Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the "Entente Cordiale," which were just as perfidious as they were naïve, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors. The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied as little as the newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several respects, also testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give to it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources and at any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of England and her allies. It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and France. II. SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, DELIVERED IN THE REICHSTAG ON DECEMBER 2, 1914.6 The Belgian neutrality which England pretended she was bound to shield, is but a mask. On the 2d of August, 7 P. M., we informed Brussels that France's plan of This is the speech of the Imperial Chancellor referred to by Professor Neumeyer and contained in the copy of the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten of December 3, 1914, which he was good enough to send. The passage printed is the one which Professor |