campaign was known to us and that it compelled us, for reasons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium, but as early as the afternoon of the same day, August 2d, that is to say, before anything was known and could be known of this step, the British Government promised unconditional aid to France in case the German navy attacked the French coastline. Not a word was said of Belgian neutrality. This fact is established by the declaration made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on the 3d of August. The declaration was communicated to me on August 4th, but not in full, because of the difficulties experienced at that time in the transmission of telegrams. Besides the very Blue Book issued by the British Government confirms that fact. How then can England allege that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? How could British statesmen, who accurately knew the past, talk at all of Belgian neutrality? When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of need would not decide after all to spare the country and to retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after the occupation of Liège, at the request of our army leaders, I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about the fourth of August, the possibility for such a development was being kept open. Even then the guilt of the Belgian Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal. But the English statesmen were perfectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which in the meantime have been found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by me, prove and establish in what way and to what degree Belgium has surrendered her neutrality to England. The whole world is now acquainted with two outstanding facts. (1) In the night from the 3d to the 4th of August, when our troops entered Belgian territory, they were not on neutral soil, but on the soil of a state that had long abandoned its neutrality. (2) England has declared war on us, not for the sake of Belgian neutrality, which she herself had helped to undermine, but because she believed that she could overcome and master us with the help of two great military Powers on the Continent. Ever since the 2d of August when England promised to back up the French in this war, she was no longer neutral, but actually in a state of war with us. On the 4th of August she declared war, the alleged reason being our violation of Belgian neutrality. But that was only a sham motive and a spectacular scene intended to conceal the true war motive and thus to mislead both the English people and foreign neutral countries.

The military plans which England and Belgium had worked out to the minutest details now being unveiled, the policy of English statesmen is branded for all times of history to come.

Neumeyer marked with his own hand in the copy sent to the Editor-in-chief of the JOURNAL. The translation is that contained in Documents Regarding the European War, Series No. IV, International Conciliation, January, 1915, No. 86.

III. INTERVIEW OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, GIVEN TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ON JANUARY 24, 1915, AND PUBLISHED IN AMERICAN PAPERS ON JANUARY 25, 1915.7

I am surprised to learn that my phrase, "a scrap of paper," which I used in my last conversation with the British Ambassador in reference to the Belgian neutrality treaty, should have caused such an unfavorable impression in the United States. The expression was used in quite another connection and the meaning implied in Sir Edward Goschen's report and the turn given to it in the biased comment of our enemies are undoubtedly responsible for this impression.

My conversation with Sir Edward Goschen occurred Aug. 4. I had just declared in the Reichstag that only dire necessity and only the struggle for existence compelled Germany to march through Belgium, but that Germany was ready to make compensation for the wrong committed.

When I spoke I already had certain indications, but no absolute proof upon which to base a public accusation, that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in its relations with England. Nevertheless, I took Germany's responsibilities toward the neutral state so seriously that I spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany.

What was the British attitude on the same question? The day before my conversation with Ambassador Goschen, Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, in which, while he had not stated expressly that England would take part in the war, he had left the matter in little doubt.

One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason for England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England's honor and England's obligations we find it over and over again expressed that England's interests-its own interests-call for participation in the war, for it is not in England's interests that a victorious and therefore stronger Germany should emerge from the war.

This old principle of England's policy-to take as the sole criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right, reason, or considerations of humanity-is expressed in that speech of Gladstone's in 1870 on Belgian neutrality, from which Sir Edward quoted.

Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party thereto, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at a time when the occasion for action on the guarantee arrives; and he referred to such English statesmen as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his views.

England drew the sword only because it believed its own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality it would never have entered the war.

That is what I meant when I told Sir Edward Goschen in that last interview, when we sat down to talk the matter over privately as man to man, that among the reasons

7 The interview is reprinted from the New York Times Current History, Vol. 1, No. 6, pages 1120-1122. Only so much of the interview is given as refers to the violation of Belgian neutrality.

which had impelled England to go into the war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a scrap of paper.

I may have been a bit excited and aroused. Who would not have been at seeing the hopes and the work of the whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught? I recalled to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany; an understanding which, I reminded him, would have made a general European war impossible, and which absolutely would have guaranteed the peace of Europe.

*

In comparison with such momentous consequences was the treaty not a scrap of paper? England ought really to cease harping on this theme of Belgian neutrality. Documents on the Anglo-Belgian military agreement which we have found in the meantime show plainly enough how England regarded this neutrality. As you know, we found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office documents which showed that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then broken out—in other words, to do exactly the same thing for which, with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, it now reproaches Germany.

In some later dispatch Sir Edward Grey, I believe, informed Belgium that he did not believe England would take such a step because he did not think English public opinion would justify that action. And still people in the United States wonder that I characterized as a scrap of paper the treaty whose observance, according to responsible British statesmen, should be dependent on the pleasure of British public opinion-a treaty which England itself had long since undermined with its military agreements with Belgium!

Remember, too, that Sir Edward Grey expressly refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the event that Germany respected Belgian neutrality.

I can understand, therefore, the English displeasure at my characterization of the treaty of 1839 as a scrap of paper, for this scrap of paper was for England extremely valuable, furnishing an excuse before the world for embarking in the war.

I hope, however, that in the United States you will see clearly enough that England in this matter, too, acted solely on the principle of "right or wrong, my interest."

IV. STATEMENT OF SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DATED JANUARY 26, 1915, IN REPLY TO DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG'S INTERVIEW GIVEN TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ON JANUARY 25,

1915. 8

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorizes the publication of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent. It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere "scrap of paper."

The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the world largely

8 Reprinted from the New York Times Current History, Vol. 1, No. 6, pages 1122-1124. Only the portion of Sir Edward Grey's statement relating to the violation of Belgian neutrality is printed above.

depends upon the sanctity of agreements between individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency of civilization.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium "was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper"—that is, that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and that it was Germany who "took her responsibilities toward the neutral states so seriously."

The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of the plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that "England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906, and again in 1911.

The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British War Office or the Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely informal character and that no military agreement of any sort was at either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations took place between the British and Belgian officers it was expressly laid down on the British side that discussion of the military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium for the defense of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a marginal note upon the record explains that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our (Belgium's) neutrality by Germany."

As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British officer: "You could only land in our country with our consent"; and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium and that "so long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, "he did not believe England would take such a step because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action."

What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: “I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers he may find one reason in a fact well known to him-namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract. The railways were deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last.

This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and the other Powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by another Power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications.

In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as having thereby "abandoned and forfeited" her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a "wrong" had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911.

It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's code, wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it.

Those who are content with older and more generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said in his pastoral letter: "Belgium was bound in honor to defend her own independence. She kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and to protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath. England kept hers. These are the facts."

In the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that Germany "took her responsibilities toward the neutral states seriously," he alleges nothing except that "he spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany in invading Belgium."

That a man knows the right while doing the wrong is not usually accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness. The real nature of Germany's view of her "responsibilities toward the neutral states" may, however, be learned on authority which cannot be disputed by reference to the English "White Paper."

If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously why, when Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium.

The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's colleague (the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow). It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare: "Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just, but four times he that gets his blow in fust."

"They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow, "by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible."

Germany's real attitude toward Belgium was thus frankly given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German Chancellor in his speech to the Reichstag claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of hacking his way through. The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere scrap of paper.