The Magdalena Bay episode of 1912 raised a more direct issue. Of course the assurance of the Japanese Government must be accepted, that no territory had been acquired at Magdalena Bay by any Japanese with or without the consent of Mexico. Nevertheless, the belief remains that if nothing had been said about the matter, if the United States had gone on her way without remonstrance, the Japanese Government would soon have been in possession of a coaling station on the Mexican coast. The United States stands firm against any right of the Japanese to plant a station on the west coast of Mexico, and at the same time is trying to get islands lying off the coast of Central America, for a like purpose. A Japanese station in America cannot be allowed; but we hold the large group of the Philippines, with its 8,000,000 people, just off the Asiatic coast, and near neighbor to Japan.

The opposition of the United States to any Japanese territorial hold anywhere on the eastern side of the Pacific may not be logical, but it is firm, and has its basis in the interests of this country. Japan is nearer to western Alaska than is the State of Washington. Japan is but a few hours' sail from the Philippines, and a few days' sail from the coast of California. That nearness and the military and naval power of Japan make it necessary for the United States to apply to Asiatic influence in America the same principle that she maintains with regard to European interests. So far as the Monroe Doctrine has force and meaning and reason, it is as good against Asia as against Europe. The time may come when it will be asserted against Australia. The true American Doctrine is directed, not against this or that Power, but against a state of foreign mind, unfavorable to the interests of the United States in America.

JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE FOR ASIA

The effect of the joint note was tested when the war broke out in 1914, and Japan as one of the western Allies prepared to besiege Tsin-Tau. Official notice was given to the United States Government that it was the intention of Japan to return that province to China. After its capture, no steps were taken in that direction and the world was soon informed that the Japanese were pushing upon the Chinese a treaty which would give them a specially privileged position in China. The Japanese

were to have extensive rights of trade, the ownership and management of certain mines, and railroads, and positions as "controlling advisers" in police and financial departments. The Japanese by a' whimsical situation have long been Europeans in China; that is, they are entitled to the privileges of extraterritoriality, and they have pushed those privileges far. The recent demands, many of which have been embodied in a treaty, seem intended to put Japan in about the same position toward China, as that in which the United States is placed with regard to Cuba. If the treaty holds, henceforth nothing serious can be done by the Chinese Government without the good will, if not the formal approval, of Japan.

Considering that Japan has 53,000,000 people, besides Korea and Formosa, and China has between 300,000,000 and 400,000,000, the responsibility assumed by Japan is portentous. Japan is claiming in the whole of the Middle Kingdom a "sphere of influence" far wider than was expected by the great Powers, when disturbed by the Open Door despatch of 1899. Japan's preferences in trade seem likely to destroy that equality which was the basis of Hay's theory. Japan is laying up a legacy of distrust and hatred which may take the place of the fear and fury often felt by Chinese toward Europeans. It remains to be seen whether, when the war is over, Europe will accept this dictum, or will be in a situation effectively to protest.

Nothing in the future can be more certain than that Japan henceforth will stand against all countries as the leader of the Asiatic spirit and the defender of Asiatic empire in eastern Asia,--exactly as the United States feels herself the champion of true Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps it is fortunate for all the western Powers that China and Japan have shown that they will not pool their issues, and go forward hand in hand as the dual great Power of eastern Asia. Like Latin America, Asia is deprived of the influence in the world which its numbers and civilization would permit; it suffers from the same inability of men of kindred race to act together.

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART.

SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE

EUROPEAN WAR 1

VIII

BLOCKADES

International law allows a belligerent two means of preventing wholly or in part sea-borne commerce between his enemy and neutral states. These are: first, the right to seize and confiscate absolute contraband goods destined to enemy territory and conditional contraband intended for the use of the armed forces or government of the enemy state; and, second, the right to blockade the ports and coasts of the enemy and thereby to prevent commercial intercourse with him in all articles whether contraband or not. In the April number of this JOURNAL (pp. 372-401) I discussed in the light of the rules of international law applicable thereto the measures that have been adopted by the British Government in respect to trade in contraband since the beginning of the present war.2 The present article will be devoted mainly to a con

1 Continued from the July number, p. 594.

2 Since the publication of the article referred to above, British policy in respect to contraband has received an important extension by an order in council of August 21, 1915, placing raw cotton, cotton waste, and cotton yarn on the list of absolute contraband. Cotton is on the free list in the Declaration of London and shortly after the outbreak of the present war the British Government gave assurances to the American Government that shipments of cotton to Germany would not be interfered with, but after the establishment of the blockade in March all cargoes of cotton destined to Germany and even to neutral ports, when there was evidence that the ultimate destination was enemy territory, were seized by British cruisers and taken in (except that cotton sold to German buyers prior to March 2d was allowed to be delivered, or if stopped, to be purchased at the contract price, provided the ship sailed not later than March 31st). In a memorandum of the British Government of July 24th, it was stated that more than $2,250,000 had been paid by the British Government to American claimants for cotton seized in pursuance of the order in council of March 11th. In a letter of April 18th addressed to certain memorialists requesting that cotton be placed on the list of contraband, the Attorney General of England stated that cotton was being excluded from Germany and

sideration of the British order in council of March 11, 1915, the purpose and effect of which was to establish a blockade of all commerce entering and leaving Germany.

During the first months of the war neither Germany nor Great Britain resorted to blockading operations against the other. It is true, however, that the German war zone decree of February 4th 3 was frequently described by the press as a blockade measure. The English press described it as an attempt by Germany to obtain all the advantages and effects of a blockade without assuming the responsibilities and duties incumbent

4

Austria under the order in council as effectively as if it were absolute contraband and that nothing would be gained by putting it on the list of contraband. The order in council prevented access to German ports of all articles whether contraband or not; the effect of the order, he said, was virtually that of a blockade and therefore to declare cotton contraband would not alter the situation. But public opinion in England continued to demand that cotton be treated as contraband and this opinion was intensified by the belief, not to say the evidence, that large quantities of cotton were reaching Germany and Austria, especially through neutral ports, in spite of the blockade. The result of this pressure was the order in council of August 21st placing cotton on the list of absolute contraband. The British Government justified its action on the ground that cotton is now extensively used by the enemy in the manufacture of explosives, particularly those of a propulsive character, and that it has largely taken the place of saltpetre in the manufacture of gunpowder. Inasmuch, however, as cotton is also used much more extensively in the peaceful industrial arts the treating of it as absolute contraband is, of course, a violation of the distinction between conditional and absolute contraband. I discussed and criticised in the April number of this JOURNAL the disregard of this well settled distinction by the British Government. As is well known, the British Government during the Russo-Japanese War protested vigorously against the action of the Russian Government in treating cotton as contraband. It also protested against the American blockade upon outgoing cotton from the Southern States during the Civil War.

Germany and Austria before the present war ordinarily took about 2,000,000 bales, or about one-sixth of the American crop. During the past year they took about 1,000,000 bales from the United States; all of which, except 200,000 bales, was brought in through neutral ports. The British Government was reported in August to have been conducting an investigation with a view to determining what is the normal consumption of cotton in the neutral countries adjacent to Germany, the inference being that no cotton in excess of that amount would be allowed to go to those countries.

3 Considered in the July number of this JOURNAL, pp. 594-626.

4 It was so designated by some of the German papers, notably the Berlin Post. The London Times characterized it as a "so-called" blockade. It did not merit the name of "blockade," said the Times, "it was really an announcement that on and after the 18th of March Germany will run amuck in the North Sea."

upon the belligerent proclaiming a blockade. It was not a blockade, however, either in law or in fact, and it is doubtful whether the German Government intended it as such. If it was so intended, as some English publicists maintain, it was really a "paper" blockade because no adequate naval forces were stationed off the coasts of England to make it effective. The German decree merely announced that within a certain area of the sea, the limits of which were specifically defined, all enemy ships after a certain date would be destroyed, and, while neutral vessels were warned that they would be exposed to the danger of destruction while traversing the area designated, there was no intimation of an intention to prohibit neutral vessels from entering, or issuing from, enemy ports, such as a blockade implies.

The first instance during the present war of the institution of a real blockade was that established by Austria-Hungary of the coast of Montenegro in August, 1914. Due notice was given to neutrals and it was announced that the blockade would be made effective by means of naval forces. A second instance was that established by Great Britain and France in the latter part of February, 1915, of the coast of German East Africa. The British and French orders proclaiming the blockade announced that the area of the blockade would include the coast from latitude 4°, 41" South to latitude 10°, 40" South, a distance of 300 miles, and that four days' grace would be allowed for the departure of neutral vessels from the blockaded ports.

It was also announced that a sufficient number of vessels would be stationed off the blockaded ports to make the blockade effective. Apparently the institution of both blockades was entirely in conformity with the rules of international law as embodied in the Declaration of London and, so far as known, no complaints have been made by neutrals either in respect to their legality or mode of execution."

'Compare Phillipson, International Law and the Great War, p. 384. Commenting on the failure of the "so-called" German blockade of England, the London Times stated that during the first nine weeks following the going into effect of the decree, of 11,635 arrivals and sailings from British ports only 35 British steamers had been sunk by German submarines.

The British order in council of August 20, 1914, and the French decree of August 25, putting into force, with certain modifications and additions, the Declaration of London, made no changes in those portions of the Declaration dealing with block