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SECTION I. The Acquisition of Citizenship. (1) By Birth.— Citizens are either natural-born or naturalized. One who is born in the United States or under its jurisdiction is a natural-born citizen without reference to the nationality of his parents. Their presence here constitutes a temporary allegiance, sufficient to make a child a citizen.1

A difficult question exists in the common law as to the citizenship of a child of English parents, born abroad. The New York Court of Appeals has decided that such a person was a citizen on the ground that the duty of allegiance passed by descent, the child following the condition of the father, and that the question in this country is to be determined by the common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution.2 Sir Francis Bacon, in the great case of the antenati already referred to, was a strong advocate of this opinion and accepted all its consequences. He said, "If a man shall look narrowly into this point he shall find a consequence that may seem at the first strange, but cannot well be avoided, which is, that divers families of English men and women plant themselves at Rouen or at Lisbon and have issue, and their descendants do intermarry among themselves without any intermixture of foreign blood, such descendants are naturalized to all generations, for every generation is still of liege parents and therefore naturalized, so as you may have whole tribes and lineages of English in foreign countries." 3 Sir Francis Bacon's deduction will not now readily be accepted as law. The opposing theory that persons born abroad of American parents are aliens, unless there is a naturalizing statute in their aid, is powerfully sustained by a distinguished jurist, the late Horace Binney. His proposition may be briefly summed up thus: birth here confers citizenship; birth abroad causes alienage. On this view the citizenship of the parents is of no consequence. Citizenship assumes a territorial character. The sole inquiry is who had the sovereignty over the territory where the child was born at the time of its birth?

jurisdiction had been acquired by the cession or conquest of territory," etc. The later statute of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 67 (1878) gives jurisdiction over British subjects in any vessel within one hundred miles of the coast of China or Japan, without reference to the fact whether the ship is British. This is a clear assertion of the right of Parliament to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects as to criminal acts no matter where committed, and an implied affirmance of the view that the allegiance of a subject is a personal tie having no dependence on

times or places. These statutory powers are directed to be carried into effect, by the orders of the Queen in Council. Such orders have already been issued, being framed with great comprehensiveness as well as precision of detail. See 38 & 39 Vict. c. 51, § 6.

1 Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583. 2 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356. 8 Hargrave's State Trials, 81.

4 2 Am. Law Reg. 193. "The Alienigence of the United States."

Mr. Binney's article has been said to have led to the enactment of a statute by Congress, Feb. 10, 1855. This law is now a section of the Revised Statutes of the United States.1 The substance of it is that all children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States whose fathers were citizens thereof at the time of their birth, are citizens of the United States, but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.2 If Mr. Binney's views in the article referred to are correct, this statute created a new class of citizens; if not, then it took away the rights of citizenship from a large number of persons, children of American fathers who never resided in the United States. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Article of the Amendments to the United States Constitution should be noticed. This is, that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." It may be thought that there is an implication in this statement that no other persons can be citizens except such as are born or naturalized here. The more correct view would seem to be that a constitutional provision of this kind is not intended to abridge existing rights, but rather to confirm such as are specified. In that view, the controversy concerning natural-born citizens remains unaffected except by § 1993 of the Revised Statutes. (a)

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(2) By Naturalization. The whole subject of naturalization is vested in Congress by the United States Constitution. Its language is, "Congress shall have power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." It is judicially decided that the word "uniform" makes the power exclusive in Congress, and that the States have no power to naturalize citizens.*

In carrying out this power Congress has conferred the right not only upon United States tribunals, but also upon State courts. to act as the means of naturalizing. This power is conferred upon a court of any of the States, having common-law jurisdiction, a seal, and a clerk. The State courts are not bound to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, but may do so if they will; when they act, they for this purpose perform a judicial function for the United

1 § 1993.

2 This language is qualified by § 2172, which provides that the children of persons who now are or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered citizens thereof.

8 Art. I. § 8, cl. 4.

Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 269; Thurlow . Massachusetts, 5 How. U. S. 504, 585.

6 U. S. Rev. St. § 2165.

(a) See ante, p. 72, note (a).

States. Only the court can naturalize; the clerk cannot do so.1 The court renders a judgment which is entered in the usual manner on the records. When once entered all inquiry is closed; like other judgments it is complete evidence of its own validity.2

3

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The following requirements apply to naturalization: First. Declaration of Intention. The alien must make a declaration before the proper court two years prior to his admission to citizenship, that it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen, and to renounce all allegiance to foreign states or sovereignties, and particularly by name to that state of which he is at the time a citizen or subject. This preliminary declaration is not required from the following classes of persons: (1) From applicants who are minor residents of this country for three years next preceding their majority, though they cannot be naturalized unless they have resided five years within the United States including the three years of minority; (2) aliens of full age who have enlisted in the army (whether regular or volunteer forces) and been honorably discharged; (3) aliens in the country prior to June 18, 1812. This last provision has practically become obsolete from lapse of time.

The "declaration of intention" may be made before the clerk of the court as well as the court itself.

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Second. Admission to Citizenship. It is a rule that an alien cannot be admitted as a citizen unless he has resided in the United States five years at least preceding his admission, and within the State or Territory where naturalized one year at least. The fact of residence must be proved by other evidence than the applicant's own oath. There are two exceptions to the requirement of five years' residence. One is, when the applicant has enlisted in the army and been honorably discharged, in which case the time is reduced to one year; the other exception is in the case of seamen in the merchant service, who may be admitted within three years after their declaration of intention.

There is a special rule applicable to declarants who die before they are actually naturalized. In such a case the widows and children are considered as citizens on taking the oaths prescribed by law.4

An applicant must also make it appear that he is a man of 1 Matter of Clark, 18 Barb. 444.

2 Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393; McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N. Y. 263; Ritchie v. Putnam, 13 Wend. 524; In re McCappin, 5 Sawy. C. Ct. 630. The elements necessary to a record of naturalization are con

sidered in Matter of Coleman, 15 Blatch.
406. Where there is no record, oral evi-
dence of naturalization is inadmissible.
Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89.
8 U. S. Rev. St. §§ 2165-2174.
4 U. S. Rev. St. § 2168.

good moral character and attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States. He must also renounce any title of nobility which he may have. Naturalization of a husband includes that of the wife and minor children. Marriage of an alien woman (if she belongs to the class or race entitled to be naturalized) to a citizen constitutes her a citizen.1 A court cannot make naturalization retroactive. An alien will not be presumed to be a citizen by residence within this country for any time no matter how long. Congress may also naturalize by a general statute, as in the case of citizens of Texas, who were made citizens of the United States by virtue of the collective naturalization effected by the act of Annexation of Dec. 29, 1845.*

SECTION II. Special Rules as to Citizenship under the United States Constitution. - The object of this subdivision is to bring together the rules growing out of the following clauses in the Constitution: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; "5 and also the first part of the second sentence of Article Fourteenth of of the Amendments, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." These two clauses, many years apart in point of time, should be considered separately.

(1) The Provision in Art. IV. of the Constitution. This clause refers to "privileges and immunities" which are fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have been at all times enjoyed by the citizens of the several States. It does not, for example, require a State to permit the citizens of other States to share in its fisheries which are the property of the State. No privileges are secured except those which belong to citizenship. The Supreme Court is not disposed to lay down any general formula upon this subject, but to leave the meaning of the words to be determined in each case upon a view of the rights asserted or denied in the litigation.8

Some of the instances in which this clause has been applied will now be adverted to. A State cannot withhold from a citizen of another State a license to sell goods which it grants to its own citizens. The same rule would be applied to similar discrimina

1 U.S. Rev. St.'§ 1994; Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; 14 Opinions of Attys-Gen'l, 402.

2 Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89. * Hawenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483. Citizenship, 13 Opinions of AttysGen'l, 397.

Art. IV. § 2, cl. 1.

McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Corfuld v. Coryell, Wash. C. Ct. 371. 7 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. U. S.

591.

8 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 395; Conner v. Elliott, supra, 593.

Bliss' Petition, 63 N. H. 135; State v. Lancaster, Id. 267.

tions in a revenue law.1

If a license to sell be required, but no distinction is made between residents and non-residents, the law will be constitutional.2 (a) Again, it is not an interference with the equal rights of citizens to require persons practising medicine to obtain a certificate from the State Board of Health.3 (b)

The test in all this class of cases is the presence or absence of discriminations in the regulations unfavorable to citizens of another State. The decisions turning upon this point are quite numerous and uniform in upholding the rights of citizens of other States.4

Licenses required by a State of citizens of another State as a prerequisite to pursuing a commercial avocation in the legislating State will be unconstitutional as an unauthorized interference with interstate commerce. (c) This rule has been applied in a number of cases in favor of commercial drummers.5 In the case last cited in the note, the principle was extended to an act passed by the so called "Legislative Assembly of the District of Columbia " (which is but a municipal body created by Congress), though strictly speaking there was no commerce between States within the words of the Constitution.

Distinctions are made in some State statutes between the right of residents and non-residents to bring actions in the State courts. An instance of this kind occurred in a recent New York case, in which it was held that the statute was not unconstitutional. (d)

1 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Rash v. Halloway, 82 Ky. 674.

2 State v. Long, 95 N. C. 582. 8 State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1.

Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; The John M. Welch, 18 Blatch. 54; State v. Furbush, 72 Me. 493; State v. McGinnis, 37 Ark. 362; McGuire v. Parker, 32 La. An. 832. A recent case in which the con

(a) A liquor license law providing that the vender must be a male inhabitant of the State is not in conflict with this clause of the Constitution of the United States. Welsh v. The State, 126 Ind. 71. See also Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250.

(b) Craig v. Board of Med. Examiners, 29 Pac. R. 532.

(c) The general subject is discussed in the following cases: American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. R. 609; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Norfolk R. R. v. Pennsylvania, Id. 114;

stitutional rule was declared not to be violated is Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 222.

5 Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S.

141.

6 Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 112 N. Y. 315; construing § 1780 N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure.

Minnesota v. Barber, Id. 313. See also Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York State, 143 U. S. 305; Ficklen v. Shelby Co. Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1; People v. Wemple, 29 Abb. N. C. 85. Discrimi nations made against non-residents of certain counties of a State are not necessarily invalid. Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. St. 250.

(d) See Robey v. Smith, 30 N. E. Rep. 1093; Shirk v. City of La Fayette, 52 Fed. R. 857, holding that a statute prohibiting the appointment of a non-resident

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